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ABSTRACT 
Public policy decision-making refers- to actions taken within 
-A 
governmental settings to formulate, adopt, imnlen^ent. evaluate, or change 
policies. In this growing interdependent world, /Ijejjrocess of foreign policy 
formulation is becoming more and more COJX^IQX in which, besides formal 
actors, informal actors play an increasingly important role. The US is no 
exception to this rule. Therefore, in addition to the executive and legislative 
branches of government that remaini the principal initiator , of American 
foreign policy, there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US 
foreign policy. These include multitudes of lobby groups, business interest, 
trade union, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media, public opinion, 
think tanks and the like. 
The modern states depend on experts whose views on issues can provide 
the theories and rationale for policy and legislation. State structures are the 
dominant but not the only sources of policy innovations as there is a need to 
consult other interest for information. Think tanks seek to provide this kind of 
information and occasionally play a dynamic role in identifying problems. 
They are increasingly a mechanism for refining and presenting knowledge and 
expertise in a relevant and usable manner. 
Britain's American colonies broke with the mother country in 1776 and 
were recognized as the new nation of the United States of America following 
the Treaty of Paris in 1783. Sustained by victories in World Wars I and II and 
the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US remains the world's most powerful 
nation state. The economy is marked by steady growth, low unemployment and 
inflation, and rapid advances in technology. Given the importance of the US in 
the world affairs it is important to understand how the debate on the global role 
of the US is evolving, how foreign policy decision are made, what US priorities 
are and how the US exercises its power and influence on the world stage. 
Foreign policy generally refers to how the government of the state acts 
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in relation to other states. It can also refer to what government do in relation to 
international organizations, multinational corporations, political and military 
organisations that are not state actors, and sometimes even prominent 
individuals. 
There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US 
foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the 
beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a 
high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force 
structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 
transnational organised crime and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of 
issues associated with environment-environmental degradation and biodiversity 
- since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US security. 
These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be significant US 
foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the prosperity of US 
citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these issues are energy, 
international trade and international financial management. Finally, there are 
wide ranges of issues - sustainable development, pandemic disease control, 
international resource management, and democratisation - that are important 
general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are important not 
only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, but also 
because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country has a 
responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a 
better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by 
US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy 
influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they 
relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy. 
Making policy about any particular issue occurs not in a single 
moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over 
a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of 
different types of decision and actors. The policy process is conventionally 
analysed in relation to stages of policy development. Think tanks, experts 
and expertise generally become important and influential at different points 
in the policy process. 
The relationship between political leaders and those who advise them is 
critically important to the study of governmental decision-making. Knowledge 
is the central aspect of power. In this increasingly complex, interdependent and 
information rich world, government and individual policy makers face the 
common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear in the governmental 
decisions making. Policy-makers need basic information about the world and 
the societies they govern, how current policies are working, possible 
alternatives, and their likely costs and consequences. As a matter of fact, in 
both information rich and poor societies policy makers need informations that 
are understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful. 
By providing their expertise to members of Congress, the Executive and 
the bureaucracy, policy advisors play a vital role in formulating and injecting 
ideas into the policy making process. While policy makers in the United States 
continue to solicit the advice of experts in universities, interest groups, 
professional and business associations, corporations, law firms and consulting 
agencies, they are relying increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy 
research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy 
ideas. Think Tanks are among the most numerous organisational forms devoted 
to policy research, and they are often amongst the most focused and visible 
sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making. 
The literature on American foreign policy making continue to grow, but 
only recently has the participation of think tanks in the policy formation 
process been discussed. The increasing involvement of think tanks in the policy 
making process requires scholars to reevaluate various models and theories 
developed to explain how leaders make policy decisions. This is not to suggest 
that contemporary theories and models of foreign policy decisions making need 
to be supplemented, but rather that their parameters should be expanded to take 
into consideration how think tanks identify and shape policy issues and 
problems. By treating think tanks as an important input into the policy making 
process, instead of passive observers of American politics, foreign policy 
analysts can provide a more detailed explanation of the various actors 
competing for power in the political arena. 
The term 'think tanks' was employed originally in the United States 
during World War II to refer to a secure room or enviroimient where defense 
scientists and military planners could meet to discuss strategies. This rather 
narrow usage of the term has since been expanded to describe over 1500 US-
based organisations that engage in policy analysis and approximately 2,500 
other similar institutions worldwide. 
Think tanks are largely twentieth century inventions. But the expert 
advisor and the intellectual working in the shadows of power have had a role in 
the political life for more than two millennia. Political advising in the west 
began with famous teachers who tutored young princess and prepared them for 
leadership. Aristotle tutored the young Alexander. Some leaders have found 
themselves turning to books for solitary counsel. For example, Niccole 
Michiavelli's book 'Prince' has served as a practical manual for many 
generations of aspiring politicians. 
Defining think tanks, and establishing clear boundaries as to which 
organisations fit within the categories, is one of the most conceptually difficult 
tasks in analyzing these organizations. At the broadest level, one can say that 
think tanks are institutions that provide public policy research, analysis, and 
advice. However, this definition casts the net very broadly. Many interest 
groups, university research centres and other civil society organisations carry 
out policy research and advice as one of their activities, if not the central one. 
Many government agencies also offer policy research and advice as a major 
function. 
To overcome the difficulty, we generally accepted the core definifion of think 
tanks as policy research organisations that have significant autonomy from 
government and from societal interest such as firms, interest group, and 
political parties. However, we also recognise that autonomy is a relative rather 
than an absolute term, and that the operational definition of think tanks must 
differ from region to region. 
These public policy research organisations first appeared in the US and 
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Europe at the turn of 20 century when organisations such as the Brooking 
Institution (1916), the Carnegie Endowment for International peace (1914) the 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (1914) and Royal Institute for International 
Affairs (1920) were established. After the World War II, the term was applied 
to contract researchers, such as RAND Corporation, that did a mixture of deep 
thinking and programmes evaluation for the military. The use of the term 
expanded in the 1960 to describe other groups of experts who formulated 
various policy recommendations, including some quasi-academic research 
institutes concerned with the study of the international relations and strategic 
question. By 1970, the term think tank was applied to institutions focusing not 
only on foreign policy and defence strategy, but also on current political, 
economic, and social issues. At the dawn of the 21 '^ century, more than 1,200 
think tanks dot the American political landscape. They are a heterogeneous lot, 
varying in scope, funding, mandate, and location. McGann classifies think 
tanks into five types: 
> Independent civil society think tanks established as non profit 
organizations; 
> Policy research institutes located in or affiliated with a university; 
> Corporate created or business affiliated think tanks; 
> Govemmentally created or state sponsored think tanks; 
^ Political party (or candidate) think tanks. 
While think tanks in recent years have become a "global phenomenon", 
U.S. think tanks are distinguished from their counterparts in other countries by 
their ability to participate directly and indirectly in policy making and by the 
willingness of policy-makers to turn toward them for policy advice. 
With an expanding market for ideas and their legitimacy established, 
think tanks still require money to operate. Policy research institutes cannot 
rely on membership dues to cover operating costs. Nor can they rely upon 
the sales of publications and services. Therefore, philanthropy and corporate 
support are essential to their survival. 
The majority of think tanks in the United States are composed of a 
group of intellectuals dedicated to solving the most challenging economic, 
social, and political problems confronting the nation. They also maintain 
staffs consisting of researchers, administrators and individuals offering 
technical support. Indeed, it is often expected that the staff at think-tanks 
perform a variety of functions ranging from writing and researching papers, 
to editing volumes and newsletters or magazines, to organising conferences 
and seminars, and to fund raising and preparing news releases. 
Most think tanks share common objectives of shaping and moulding 
public opinion and public policy. As the United State prepared to assume the 
role of a hegemonic power in the aftermath of the World War II, a number of 
think tanks were making their presence felt in the policy making circles. 
Through their publications, conferences and meetings with members of the 
Executive, Congress, and a host of government departments, boards, and 
agencies, think thanks were able to develop and expand their network of 
influence throughout Washington. 
Yet, despite their appeal, only a fraction of the estimated 1,500 think 
tanks in the United States have made their presence felt in key policy-
making circles. The Brooking Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise 
Institute, Rand and the Heritage Foundation, among others, are frequently 
referred to in the media. 
The desire for poUcy influence is one major aspect of think tank activity. 
Their increasingly active involvement and influence in the policy- making 
process came as no surprise to the scholars. However, the questions that 
scholars continue to struggle with are how much of an impact and in what 
specific ways? 
Think tanks are in the business of developing, refining, repacking, 
and most importantly, marketing ideas. To this end, they employ a number 
of strategies to convey their thoughts to policy makers and to the public. 
These range from testifying before Congressional Committees and 
submitting editorial pieces to major newspapers, to inviting elected officials 
to participate in think tank sponsored seminars. 
However, rarely there is a one-to-one correspondence between a book 
or a study and a particular policy change. There are numerous intervening 
forces that mediate and alter the impact of research that shroud any cause 
and effect relationship that may exist between policy institutes and 
government decision making. Hence, influence can not be measured. Proof 
of it is elusive and, at best, unreliable. Think tanks indicators such as media 
citations or appearances of staffs before Congress and various committees 
merely signify that think tanks have attracted the attention of the media and 
politicians. It does not demonstrate that the thinking or perceptions of the 
public or politicians has been influenced or that some policy initiative or 
reform has resulted. Asking the question, 'How do you measure the 
influence of independent policy research institution?' misses the point. It is 
more important to ask first, what they do that is relevant, and how? In a 
nutshell, while it is difficult to accurately measure the extent to which think 
tanks influence specific policy decision, it is possible to identify the various 
strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. 
By doing so, one can begin to observe how and to what extent think tanks 
have become entrenched in Washington's decision making network. 
Think tanks affect American foreign poHcy-makers in five distinct ways: 
by generating original ideas and options for poHcy, by supplying a ready pool 
of experts for employment in government, by offering venues for high level 
discussions by educating the U.S. citizens about the world, and by 
supplementing official efforts to mediate and resolve conflict. However, it is 
not easy to grab the attention of busy policy makers already immersed in 
informations. To do so, think tanks need to exploit multiple channels and 
marketing strategies- publishing articles, books, and occasional papers, 
appearing regularly on television, op-ed pages and newspaper interviews. 
Congressional hearings provide other opportunities to influence policy choices. 
Think tanks are hidden participants in policy, whereas decision making 
in the formal political arenas by political parties, legislature and executive is a 
more transparent process. While think tanks do not have a clear consistent or 
legally designated route to policy influence, their policy entrepreneurships in 
policy and epistemic communities provides informal but haphazard access and 
opportunities for agenda setting. They invest in a gradual, incremental creep of 
new ideas into prevailing thinking. 
This study focuses on key issues of foreign policy strategy of the US 
and policies that serve it best, and key questions of foreign policy politics, 
regarding institutions and actors within the American political system as their 
roles and the influence they exercise. However, the main focus of this study is 
on analyzing how and to what extent think-tanks have become involved in 
the political arena in America and to highlight the various governmental and 
non-governmental channels they rely on to participate in the policy making 
process since World War II. By analysing so, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the domestic sources of public policy would be possible. 
The study is based on both primary and secondary source. The 
primary sources incorporate government documents, reports, Presidential 
speeches and think tanks annual reports. A number of tables, figures, books, 
articles and website bibliography linked to the topic provide a helpful guide 
for research. The approach to this study is qualitative, historical and 
analytical. The work is divided into five main chapters. The plan of the work 
is as under: 
Chapter one provides the comprehensive theoretical aspect of 
American foreign policy making process keeping in mind the determinants, 
implementation process and related issues. It, then, identifies the different 
actors involved in foreign policy making in America. However, a large part 
of it is devoted to analyse the growing involvement of think tanks in the 
policy making process. In brief, it also examines the several contemporary 
theories often employed by scholars to explain how foreign policy is made. 
By exposing some of the inherent limitations of several theories and models, 
it attempts to highlight that it is necessary to expand the parameters of the 
study of foreign policy decision making in order to take into account the 
growing involvement of think tanks in the policy formulation process. 
Chapter two discusses the importance, aims and objectives of 
American foreign policy. Moreover it, examine the various issues that 
emerge or reemerge in the US foreign policy and on which decision makers 
seek views of experts. It, then, discusses the slow but steady rise of the US 
global power. A brief historical review highlights some of the issues that 
have chartacterised American foreign policy since the founding of the 
republic. Further it examines the domestic and external pressures that 
propelled the US to intervene in two World Wars and after 1945, to establish 
a world wide network of alliances and military bases to fight the Cold War. 
The record of three Presidents in the office after the end of Cold War and 
how they attempted to define a new post- Cold War paradigm for American 
foreign policy is also discussed. 
10 
Chapter three evaluates the dilemma of defining think tanks. 
Further, it, looks at the typology and changing role of American think tanks. 
Although a think tanks boom has occurred internationally, the political, 
legal and cultural condition in the US presents a more fertile environment 
for think tanks growth. Accordingly, it shows up the factors responsible for 
the exceptional growth of think tanks culture in America since World War 
II. Different from both public and private sector organisation, they face a set 
of problems peculiars to the non-profit organisation. 
Despite the central role of think tanks in the US have made their 
presence felt in the key policy making circle. Therefore, Chapter four, looks 
at the organisation, management and influence of three major think tanks, 
keeping in mind their size, funds, area of specialisation and media citations. 
It, then, identifies the various strategies and channels they rely on to gain 
access to the corridors of power. By doing so, it observes how to what extent 
think tanks have become entrenched in American decision making networks. 
The concluding Chapter discusses why it is necessary to devote 
greater attention to the role think tanks play in the foreign policy making 
process and also to provide more comprehensive approach to the study of 
American foreign policy making. While it is important to identify the 
psychological and bureaucratic constraints, which influence decision 
makers, it is equally important to examine other domestic inputs, which may 
influence the behavior of American decision makers. 
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PREFACE 
After casting aside the isolationist policy to assume the global 
responsibilities of a hegemonic power after World War II, the United States 
had to rely increasingly on policy analysts for advice on how to conduct its 
foreign relations. Moreover, as the American bureaucracy significantly 
expanded after the war, in response to growing domestic and foreign 
concerns, so too did the opportunities for policy experts to share their 
insights with government officials. Through their publications, conferences 
and meetings with members of the Executive, Congress and a host of 
government departments, boards and agencies, think tanks such as the 
Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations and Rand 
Corporation have been able to develop and expand their networks of 
influence. 
Given the importance of the US in world affairs it is important to 
understand how the debate on the global role of the US is evolving, how 
foreign policy decision are made, what American priorities are and how the 
US exercises its power and influence on the world stage. 
The fact that the US is a democracy, influences every aspect of the 
process, method, personnel, speed and ultimate success of its foreign policy. 
It means that many departments of the government, private groups, and 
persons are involved and that, in most cases foreign policy operates before 
the public eye. In flow charts and diagrams outlining the foreign policy-
making process, the role and responsibilities of the Executive, Congress, the 
National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and other decision influencer like media and public 
opinion are clearly defined. However, the role and function of think tanks in 
the foreign policy-making process has largely been ignored. 
While policy makers in the United States continue to solicit the 
advice of experts in Universities, interest groups, professional and business 
IV 
associations, corporations, law firms and consulting agencies, they rely 
increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy research institutions to 
identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy ideas. 
Therefore, this study focuses both on key issues of foreign policy 
strategy, of what the US national interest is and which policies serve it best. 
Also the key questions of foreign policy politics, which institutions and actors 
within the American political system play what roles and have how much 
influence. However, the main spotlight of this study is to analyse how and to 
what extent think-tanks have become involved in the political arena in 
America and to highlight the various governmental and non-governmental 
channels they rely on to participate in the policy making process since 
World War II. By analysing so, a more comprehensive understanding of the 
domestic sources of public policy would be possible. 
The study is based on both primary and secondary source. The 
primary sources incorporate government documents, reports, Presidential 
speeches and think tanks annual reports. Tables, figures, books, articles and 
website bibliography linked to the topic provide a helpful guide for research 
as secondary sources. The approach to this study is qualitative, historical 
and analytical. The work is divided into five main chapters. The plan of the 
work is as under: 
Chapter one provides the comprehensive theoretical aspect of 
American foreign policy making process keeping in mind the determinants, 
implementation process and related issues. It, then, identifies the different 
actors involved in foreign policy making in America. However, a large part 
of it is devoted to analyse the growing involvement of think tanks in the 
policy making process. In brief, it also examines the several contemporary 
theories often employed by scholars to explain how foreign policy is made. 
By exposing some of the inherent limitations of several theories and models, 
it attempts to highlight that it is necessary to expand the parameters of the 
study of foreign policy decision making in order to take into account the 
growing involvement of think tanks in the policy formulation process. 
Chapter two discusses the importance, aims and objectives of 
American foreign policy. Moreover it, examine the various issues that 
emerge or reemerge in the US foreign policy and on which decision makers 
seek views of experts. It, then, discusses the slow but steady rise of the US 
global power. A brief historical review highlights some of the issues that 
have chartacterised American foreign policy since the founding of the 
republic. Further it examines the domestic and external pressures that 
propelled the US to intervene in two World Wars and after 1945, to establish 
a world wide network of alliances and military bases to fight the Cold War. 
The record of three Presidents in the office after the end of Cold War and 
how they coped in attempting to define a new post- Cold War paradigm for 
American foreign policy is also discussed. 
Chapter three evaluates the dilemmas of defining think tanks. 
Further, it, looks at the typology and changing role of American think tanks. 
Although a think tanks boom has occurred internationally, the political, 
legal and cultural condition in the US presents a more fertile environment 
for think tanks growth. Accordingly, it shows up the factors responsible for 
the exceptional growth of think tanks culture in America since World War 
II. Different from both public and private sector organisation, they face a set 
of problems peculiars to the non-profit organisation. 
Yet, not all think tanks in the US have made their presence felt in the 
key policy making circle. Therefore, Chapter four, looteat the organisation, 
management and influence of three major think tanks, keeping in mind their 
size, funds, area of specialisation and media citations. It, then, identifies the 
various strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of 
power. By doing so, it observes how to what extent think tanks have become 
entrenched in American decision making networks. 
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The concluding Chapter discusses why it is necessary to devote 
greater attention to the role think tanks play in the foreign policy making 
process and also to provide more comprehensive approach to the study of 
American foreign policy making. While it is important to identify the 
psychological and bureaucratic constraints, which influence decision 
makers, it is equally important to examine other domestic inputs, which may 
influence the behavior of American decision makers. 
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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The foreign policy of a state is what it actually does in its 
relations with other states. Whatever else may be said about American 
foreign policy making since the end of the Second World War, there can be 
no doubt that tremendous academic attention has been focused on it. For 
more than forty year, the policy-making process has attracted a seemingly 
endless flow of studies. Many of them examining at a micro-level the broad 
range of relevant political and governmental institutions and processes. 
Some providing detail case studies of particular decisions or crises and a 
relative handful setting forth conceptual frame working or theories for the 
more illuminating study of the phenomena.' 
Foreign Policy is more than history and the events, personalities and 
decisions that comprise it. The modern era, brought a new complexity to the 
conduct of foreign affairs. American foreign relations are determined 
through a series of complex policy making decisions. Foreign policy became 
a melange of agencies, institutions, and specialties. Perhaps the most 
important dimension of American foreign policy which brought a whole new 
groups of actors and institutions into the foreign policy field-scientists, 
academicians, journalists and of course, policy research institution or think 
tanks. 
Of many influence on the US foreign policy formulation, the role of 
think tanks is among the most important and highly appreciated. A 
distinctively American phenomenon, think-tanks affect American foreign 
policy makers in five disfinct ways: by generating original ideas and opfions 
Michal Girard, Wolf Dieter E Serwm and Keith Webb, eds Theory and Practice in Foreign 
Policy Making National Perspective on Academics and Professionals in International 
Relations, (London Printer Publication, 1994), p 126 
Priya Singh, Foreign Policy Making in Israel Domestic Influences (Kolkata: Mulana Abul 
Kalam Azad, Institute of Asian Studies, 2005), p 3 
for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for employment in 
government; by offering venues for high level discussions; by educating US 
citizens about the world; and by supplying official efforts to mediate and 
resolve conflicts/ 
Their greater impact is in generating 'new thinking' so that US 
decision-makers better perceive and effectively respond to various issues 
and challenges. Original insights can alter conceptions of the US national 
interest, influence the ranking of priorities, provide road maps for action, 
mobilize political and bureaucratic conditions, and shape the design of 
lasting institutions. It is not easy, however, to grab the attention of busy 
policy makers already immersed in information. To do so, think-tanks need 
to exploit multiple channels and marketing strategies publishing articles, 
books, and occasional papers, appearing regularly on television, op-ed pages 
and newspapers interviews. Congressional hearings provide another 
opportunity to influence policy choices.'* 
The US occupies a unique position in world affairs. Never in 
history has a country dominated the international scene to the extent that the 
US does today. No matter what the indicator- military power, economic 
strength, political influence, technological powers, cultural model- the US is 
in a league of its own. It is the only nation on earth able to project power in 
every part of the world and since 1990, it has been involved in resolving 
conflicts on every continent. As Secretary of state Madeleine Albright, 
stated in 1996, to the consternation of some diplomats in Washington, "the 
US is the indispensable nation whose work never stops''.^ 
Richard Hass, "Think Tanks and US Foreign PoHcy: A Policy Makers Perspective", US Foreign 
Policy' Agenda, International Inforamtion Programme, Electronic Journal of the US Department 
oj States, 7(3) November, 2002, p 173, http://unifostate.govt.ioumals.itps/ ]102iipe/ 
pi 73'has htm 
Donald Abelson. Think Tanks and their Role in US Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 
I996),pp 81-90 
Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriefl 
(New York . Routledge, 2002), p xv. 
Being global leader, the United States of America is concerned 
about the issues like world democracy, eradication of world poverty, global 
warming and health issues (HIV). However, proliferation of weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear technology in the hand of rough states 
and issue of Terrorism are top priorities on the US foreign policy agenda. In 
a world shadowed by the threat of nuclear holocaust, continually plagued by 
limited conflicts around the world and the attacks on the world Trade Centre 
and the Pentagon on September^, 2001 proved that we live in truly 
interconnected global era. The Watchwords of all these events are speed, 
communication networks, interdependency and risk. 
Although there is no significant threat to the US (apart from 
terrorism) it has had to confront with a number of difficult issues in the post-
Cold War World. How is the US to relate to a world that is no longer bi-
polar, but increasingly complex? How is the US to meet the new security 
threats, including terrorism? How does it deal with failed states? Under what 
circumstances should it intervene overseas? When should it act alone, and 
when with allies? How does it deal with the rapid pace of globalisation.^ 
Understanding the decision-making process in the U.S. foreign 
policy depends first on knowing that the policy making process begins with 
recognition that an issue is worthy of attention from political leadership. 
This process of issue recognition potentially involves the direct collection of 
information by governmental sources along with the impact of information 
from and other Lobbying efforts by concerned interest groups, both 
domestic and international. Once an issue is elevated to a position on the 
foreign policy agenda that issue is subject to interpretation by the 
bureaucracy, the Congress, and the President and members of his staff 
Based on these varying interpretations of the issue, policy makers, interact, 
each attempting convince the other participants of the validity of their 
interpretation of the problem presented by the issue and the most 
appropriate solution for the United states to adopt in addressing that issue. 
In formulating their arguments, decision makers are often well aware of the 
desire of the American public and relevant interest groups both domestic 
and foreign. As a matter of practice, participants in the policy making 
process tend to be more responsive to the concerns of domestic interest 
groups, particularly those interest groups with whom they interact most 
frequently. Once some form of consensus -even a marginal consensus - is 
achieved, then the administration proceeds to formulate and implement an 
agreed upon policy to address the issue in question. Although policy 
implementation is usually assigned to a lead agency, in practice many 
departments and agencies of the U.S. government co-ordinate their efforts to 
implement a policy. 
The conduct of foreign affairs is divided into formulation and 
execution of policies. Since the emergence of the national states, these two 
branches have been recognised and institutionalised by all sovereign nations. 
American foreign policy is not created in a vacuum as some sort of 
indivisible whole with a single grand design. Rather, mixing foreign policy 
is a prolonged process involving many actors and comprising dozens of 
individual policies towards different countries regions, and functional 
problems. The complex process of determining foreign policy makes it 
difficult to decide who should be credited with initiating or altering any 
particular foreign policy. 
In flow charts and diagrams outlining the foreign policy-making 
process, the role and responsibilities of the Executive, Congress, the 
National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and other intelligence gathering agencies are clearly 
defined. However, the role and function of think tanks in the foreign policy-
6 . Ibid., p. XVI. 
7 . C. Herrick and P.B. McRae, Issue in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Longman, 2003), 
pp. 26-27. 
making process has largely been ignored. The George W. Bush 
administration drew heavily on people working in the American Enterprise 
Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and other Pro-republic think-tanks when 
it took office in January 2001. Similarly many people who had worked in 
the Clinton administration were hired by think-tanks e.g. James Steinberg 
went to head the foreign policy programme at Brooking. 
The relationship between political leaders and those who advise 
them is critically important to the study of governmental decision-making. 
By providing their expertise to members of Congress, the Executive and the 
bureaucracy, policy advisors play a vital role in formulating and injecting 
ideas into the policy making process. While policy makers in the United 
States continue to solicit the advice of experts in Universities, interest 
groups, professional and business associations, corporations, law firms and 
consulting agencies, they are relying increasingly on scholars from think 
tanks or policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times 
o 
implement policy ideas. 
In this increasingly complex, interdependent, and information rich 
world, governments and individual policy makers face the common problem 
of bringing experts knowledge to bear in governmental decision-making 
policy makers need basic information about the world and the societies they 
govern, how current policies are working possible alternates, and their likely 
costs and consequences. 
For policy makers in many countries it is not a lack of information 
that politicians and government officials are confronted with but an 
avalanche of information and paper. Indeed, policy-makers are frequently 
beseiged by more information than they can possibly use: complaints from 
constituents, reports from international agencies or civil society 
Donald E. Abelson,«. 4, p. 1. 
organisations, advice from bureaucrats, position papers from lobbyists and 
interest groups, and exposes of the problems of current government 
programmes in the popular or elite media. The problem is that this 
information can be unsystematic, unreliable, and/or tainted by the interests 
of those who are disseminating it. Some information may be so technical 
that generalist policy-makers can not understand it or use it. Some 
information may be politically, financially, or administratively impractical, 
or contrary to the interests of the policy maker? Who must make decision 
based on information that they often feel is less than adequate. Other 
information may not be useful because it differs too radically from the world 
view or ideology of those receiving it. In developing and transitional 
countries, the basic data needs to make informed decisions often does not 
exist and must be collect and analysed and put into a form that is usable by 
parliamentarians and bureaucrats.'° 
In politics, information no longer translates into power unless it is in 
the right form at the right time. Governments and policy-makers are often 
moved to seize the moment because the right social and political forces are 
in alignment or because a crisis compels them to take action. In either case, 
they often move quickly and make decisions based on available information, 
which does not always lead to the most informed policy. In short, policy 
makers and others interested in the policy-making process require 
information that is timely, understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful.'^ 
There are many potential sources for this information, including, 
government agencies, university, based scholars, research centers, non profit 
consulting firms, and international agencies. But in countries around the 
world, politicians and bureaucrats alike have increasingly turned to a 
James McGam, "Think Tanks and the Transnationalization of Foreign Policy", US Foreign 
Policy Agenda, International Information Programme, Electronic Journal of the US Department 
of States, 7(3), November 2002, http//:uninfo.state.govt.joumals.itps/l 102ipe/pl73/mcgan.htm. 
James McGann and Kent Weaver (ed.) Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalyst for ideas and 
Action, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), p. 1. 
James McGann, n. 9. 
specialised group of institutions to serve their needs. Independent public 
policy research and analysis organisations commonly known as 'think tanks' 
'have filled policy-makers insatiable need for information and systematic 
analysis that is policy relevant.'^ 
Think-tanks may be defined as independent, non-interest based, 
non-profit organisation that produce and principally rely on expertise and 
ideas to obtain support and to influence the policy making process. The term 
'think-tanks' was employed originally in the United states during World 
War II to refer to a secure room or environment where defence scientists 
and military planners could meet to discuss strategy. ^ ^ UNDP defines think-
tanks as organisation engaged on a regular basis in research and advocacy 
on any matter related to policy. They are the bridge between knowledge and 
power in modern democracies.''' 
These public policy research organisations had first appeared in the 
U.S and Europe at the turn of 20* century when organisations such as the 
Brooking Institute of World Economics (1914), the Royal Insdtute for 
International Affairs (1920) were established. After World War II, the term 
was applied to contract researchers, such as RAND co-operation that did a 
mixture of deep thinking and programme evaluating for the military. The 
use of the term expanded in the 1960s to describe other group of experts 
who formulated various policy recommendations, including some quasi-
academic research institutes concerned with the study of the international 
relations and strategic question.'^ By 1970s, the term think-tanks was 
applied to institutions focusing not only on foreign policy and defence 
strategy, but also on current political, economic, and social issues'. At the 
12 . James McGann and Kent Weaver,ed, n. 10, pp. 2-3. 
13 . James Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of New Policy Elite, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1991), p. XIII. 
14 UNDP, "Thinking the Unthinkable: From Thought to Policy. The Role of Thmk Tanks in 
Shaping Government Strategy: Experience from Central and Eastern Europe", Brastevala, 
UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independence States, 2003, p. 6. 
15. James Smith «./^. PP-13-14. 
beginning of the 21'' century, more than 1,500 think-tanks dot the American 
intellectual landscape. They are a heterogeneous lot, varying in scope, 
funding, mandate and Location.'^ 
The term 'think tanks' was employed originally in the United States 
during World War II to refer to a secure room or environment where defence 
scientists and military planners could meet to discuss strategy. This rather 
narrow usage of the term has since been expanded to describe over 2000 US 
based organisations that are engaged in policy analysis and approximately 
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2,500 other similar mstitutions worldwide. 
But why did such a massive proliferation of the think tanks take place 
following World War II? More specifically, why did so many think tanks 
specialising in foreign policy emerge? A number of explanations are worth 
exploring. First, as a result of casting aside its isolationist shell to assume the 
global responsibilities of a hegemonic power after World War II, the United 
States may have had to rely increasingly on policy analyst for advice on how to 
conduct its foreign relations. Moreover, as the American bureaucracy 
significantly expanded after the war, in response to growing domestic and 
foreign concern, so too did the opportunities for policy experts to share their 
insights to with government officials. According to Dennis Bark, a senior 
fellow and co-coordinator of the National Security Affairs Programme at the 
Hoover Institution, the combinations of these factors permitted such think tanks 
as the RAND Corporation, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace to have 'an enormous impact on US 
foreign policy' during this period.'^  
The considerable access these and other think tanks hade to policy-
makers during the first half of the twentieth century may very well have 
inspired the creation of the research institutions determined to leave their mark 
16 . Richard Hass, n. 3. 
11. James smith, n.l3 
18. Ahe\son.n.4, p50-51,ref) 
on US foreign policy. However, since may of the most prominent foreign 
policy advisers to presidents following world war II, such as George Kennan, 
Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew, Brezeninski, McGeorge Bundy, 
and Dean Rusk, to name a few, gained national prominence while they were 
employed in universities or in the foreign services, it is difficult to argue that 
their success alone was the sole motivating factor for individuals to create 
dozens of think tanks in the post war era.'^ 
The impact of anti war and civil rights movements in awakening the 
public conscience to political and social turmoil at home and abroad may have 
also contributed to the proliferations of think tanks. Not unlike interest group 
mobilising popular support against the war, may so called 'liberal think tanks' 
though no means to limited to, the institutes for policy studies, were created to 
provide scholars with an opportunity to challenge many of the underlying 
motivations of Americans domestic and foreign policy. 
Similarly, during the 1960s and early 1970s, as several conservative 
academics were becoming increasingly disillusioned with what they considered 
to be a growing liberal bias among the faculty at American universities, an 
increasing demand for autonomous research institutions emerged. Dr.Thomas 
Henriksen, Associate Director of the Hoover Institution, maintains that think 
tanks such as the Institute for Contemporary Studies (1972), the Heritage 
Foundations (1973), and the Cato Institutes (1977) were founded to allow 
conservative academics to pursue their research institutes in a more congenial 
environment.^' 
Generous corporate financing and tax-exemptions for non-profit 
organisations also appears to have provided an impetus for policy 
entrepreneurs, political leaders and aspiring office holders to create their own 
think tanks. By establishing private think tanks as non-profit organisations and 
employing sophisticated direct mailing techniques, founders of policy research 
19 Ibid, pp50-5\ 
20 Ibid, pp.50-51 
21 Ibid pp 50-51 
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institutions could, with the assistance of prominent political leaders, encourage 
corporations, philanthropic foundations and private citizens to contribute 
thousands of dollars to support and advance particular ideological and political 
perspectives on domestic and foreign policy issues. Contributing to the coffers 
of think tanks could also, according to some fun raising letters, provide 
corporate and private citizens with increasing access to decision-makers. 
In additions to various tax loopholes and the growing desire of policy 
experts to peruse their research in a more hospitable environment, the 
proliferations of think tanks can also be attributed to the declining role of 
political parties in the United States. As Kent Weaver of the Brooking 
Institutes point out: 
Weak and relatively non-ideological parties have enhanced think tanks 
role in several ways. The most important effect of the US party system is that 
parties have not themselves taken a major role in policy research arms of their 
own. Think tanks have helped fill this void. 
Unlike Germany or else, where political parties have created their own 
political foundations to conduct policy research, in the United States, decisions-
makers in the White House and on Capitol Hill do not draw on the expertise of 
a party-based foundation, but actively solicit policy advice from multiple 
sources. The absences of party research institutions and the decline in 
importance of political parties in the United States, combined with a highly 
decentralised political system, have provided think tanks with considerable 
opportunities to market their ideas. Moreover, the willingness of the civil 
service to rely on contract research institutions to advise policy-makers on 
issues ranging from the economic implications of deregulating the airline 
industry to the utility or futility of developing and deploying a space -based 
defence system have also enable think tanks offering specialising expertise to 
fill an important void in the policy making community.'^ '' 
22. Ibid,pp.50-51 
23. Ibid,pp.50-51 
24. Ibid, pp. 50-51 
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In the early 1900s, the major industrialists set up philanthropic 
foundations to protect their money from taxation and to craft their legacy for 
generations to come. Later on, these magnates used their foundation to finance 
research institutions to play a role in the debates over policy.^ ^ 
Given the extensive ties between think tanks and government 
departments and agencies, as well as the frequency with which their 
members are appointed to higher level government positions, one cannot 
afford to disagree their growing involvement in the policy-making process. 
Through publishing brief and full length studies on a wide range of policy 
issues inviting decision-makers to conferences and seminars, providing 
commentaries on network newscasts, establishing liaison offices to develop 
and maintain contact with members of Congress and the Executive, serving 
on various Presidential boards, commissions, election task forces and 
transition teams and giving testimony before congressional committees and 
subcommittees, think-tanks have become permanent fixtures in the policy 
formation process. Though not generally considered to be part of the 
formal structure of the American government for decades think tanks have 
managed to operate effectively within its parameters.^^ 
By the mid 1990s, there was little question as to which think-tanks 
decision-makers turned to for advice. On domestic policy, the Brooking 
Institution had few rivals. On questions of foreign policy, members of the 
Council on Foreign Relations the Carnegie Endowments for International 
Peace and the Hoover Institution were frequently consulted. Yet by the early 
1970s, this elite group of think tank could no longer monopolize the policy 
research community. As dozens of research institutions emerged in and 
around Washington in the decades following world Wart II the composition 
of the policy-making community began to change. Determined to influence 
25 . Vijay Prashad, " The Think Tanks war Machine", Frontline, May 21,2004, p. 64. 
26 . Donald E. Abelson, n. 4, p. 2. 
27 . James A. Smith, n. 13, p. 62. 
28 . Donald E. Abelson, n. 4, p. 65. 
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a wide range of economic, social and political issues, a new generation of 
think-tanks sought to be more actively involved in the policy-making 
29 
process. 
The increasing involvement of think tanks in the policy-making 
process requires scholars to re-evaluate various models and theories 
developed to explain how leaders make policy decisions. The black box of 
decision-making continues to conceal the inner working of the governmental 
process, however, a closer look at the behaviour of think-tanks will allow to 
pear a little further inside. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to analyse 
how and to what extent think-tanks have become involved in the political 
arena in America and to highlight the various governmental and non-
governmental channels they rely on to participate in the policy making 
process. By analysing so, a more comprehensive understanding of the 
domestic sources of public policy would be possible. Further this study also 
deals with the key issue of foreign policy strategy i.e., what the U.S. 
national interest is and which policies serve it best. 
FOREIGN POLICY: A THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
Foreign policy refers to a consistent course of action followed by 
one nation to deal with another nation or region, or international issues. A 
country's foreign policy is usually based on values (such as democracy, rule 
of law), interests (such as defence of or expansion of territory), and may 
reflect broad national objectives or be a very specific response to a 
particular situation. A country can achieve its foreign policy goals by 
employing a variety of instruments ranging from political, diplomatic, and 
military to economic, social, and cultural. Foreign policy is often influenced 
by many different variables; including a country's historical ties to other 
nations its culture, type of government, size, geographic location, economic 
strength, and military power. A country's foreign policy is usually aimed at 
29. Ibid. 
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preserving or promoting its economic and political interests abroad and its 
position in the world. 
It is one of the truisms of Political Science that every state has a 
foreign policy. Each sovereign political unit can not escape having some 
kind of relations with them. These relations should be ordered and governed 
by some more or less national plan. Therefore, foreign affairs always one of 
the major fields of government actions, has grown in importance under the 
conditions of modern technology. So that today it is the principal concern of 
• ^ 1 
many states and is of primary significance to all. It is also because: 
> it seeks to protect the territorial integrity of the country and protect the 
interest of its citizens, both within and outside the country. 
> the objective of foreign policy is maintenance of link with other 
members of international community and adoption of policy of conflict 
or co-operation towards them with a view to promote its own interest. 
> the primary interest of each state is self preservation, security and well 
being of its citizens. 
> the foreign policy aims at enhancement of the influence of the state 
either by expanding its area of influence or reducing that of other states 
to the position of dependency. 
The study of foreign policy is not an easy task. And this task has 
been rendered even more difficult by the new perspective which has been 
provided by the behaviouralist in recent years. This perspective has given 
rise to the fundamental question as to what should be the focus of our 
inquiry in the study of foreign policy. Traditionally one of the approaches 
which dominated the studying foreign policy has been historical or 
descriptive. This approach is based upon the idea that we should study 
30 . Frasser Cameron, n. 5, p. xvi. 
31 . M. Kumar, Approaches, Theoretical Aspect of International Politics, (k^di: Shivalal Agarwala 
& company), pp.323-329 
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diplomacy with as much accuracy as possible. Those following this 
approach are not interested in formulating general laws or constructing 
special scheme of international behaviour. They are reluctant to deal with 
contemporary events. The main weakness of this approach is that it under 
estimates the relationship between political power and interests of foreign 
policy. The second traditional approach to the study of foreign policy has 
been ideological. It insists that the various general ideologies should be 
applied to an understanding of the international community. 
The behaviourlists view both these approaches as inadequate. They 
proceed with the assumption that nations have a complex pattern of interest 
which provides a general framework for the policy makers to formulate and 
implement their policies. Then the various patterns of interests have to be 
classified in accordance with their comparative significance. One of the 
most important tasks of the policy makers is to establish a hierarchy of 
interests and to relate them to the interests of other nations or of the whole 
world community. The policy-makers are also expected to develop a 
community of interests. Thus the behaviourlists insist on an analytical 
approach which emphasizes that we should be interested more in the study 
of foreign policy processes rather than in that of the actual narration of 
foreign policies registered in the past. Thus the focus of the analytical 
approach is on those factors which determine the nature of the international 
environment.^^ 
It is this approach which has set some writers to examining the 
question of the frontier of foreign policy. These writers have brought some 
fresh insights into our study of foreign policy. They insist on going beyond 
the apparent content of foreign policy and reach the indirect factors 
32 Joseph E Black and Kenneth W Thompson eds, Foreign Policies in a World of Changes, (New 
York, 1963), pp 9-10 
33 Kenneth W Thompson and Roy C Maerid, S. "Two Basic Approaches of Foreign Policy", in 
Roy C Macridis ed, Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs, 1962 (2nd ed.), pp. 1-
28 
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influencing foreign policy decisions and to approach the analysis of foreign 
policy behaviour in a scientific manner28. By being scientific is meant 
striving for objectivity and precision and for valid generalizations. James 
Rosenace is for most among those who have argued for recognizing the need 
for bringing about scientific precision in our study of foreign policy.• '^' 
Foreign policy is conceived as a social and political process. It is 
on-going affairs, not one that may be seized and studied in all its 
ramifications at a particular moment in time. Dynamism is the Keynote of 
all international relationship, and our analysis should be so oriented as to 
take account of unceasing evolution and change. Only by devising 
techniques that encompass the notion of process can we develop a picture of 
foreign policy that is at all relevant to reality. We can list the steps of the 
35 
process as follows : 
> the establishment of the criteria; 
> the determination of the relevant variables in the situation; 
> the measurement of the variables by criteria; 
> the selection of a goal; 
> the elaboration of a strategy to reach the goal; 
> the decision to act; 
> the action itself; 
> the evaluation of the results of the action in terms of the original criteria. 
The makers of foreign policy act in accordance with the instruction 
of the community which they represent and on whose behalf they speak and 
act. The policy makers are an essential component of the process of foreign 
policy. In shaping the foreign policy on behalf of the community, they have 
to operate at two levels with the community which gives them instructions 
and supplies the resources with which to carry out their functions, and with 
34 . Mehendra Kumar, n.31, pp. 323-329 
35 . Harald Jacobson and William Zimmermann, "Approaches to the Analysis of Foreign Policy 
Behaviour", in Harold Jacobson and William Zimmerman, eds. The Shaping of Foreign Policy, 
(NewYork, 1969),p. 5. 
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other states whose behaviour the poHcy makers try to change or regulate. 
George Modelski calls the flow of actions from the community towards the 
policy makers the "input" and the actions of the policy makers towards other 
nations the "output''. Thus the task of policy makers is to transform inputs 
into outputs.^^ 
Foreign policy can not exist in a vacuum. It can function only in the 
context of interest, and objectives. State action in pursuit of an objective 
may assume any of a great variety of forms. Modern technology has added 
greatly to the supply of foreign policy techniques available to the statesman. 
Despite their increased number, however, they all fall into one of the four 
traditional categories of tool and techniques, the four channels of state 
action. These four are: Political action, through the mechanism of diplomatic 
representation; economic action, through the productive and destructive 
system of the state; psychological action, through the techniques of mass 
persuasion, Military action: through armed forces. From among these four 
types a statesman chooses in such combination as seems to him to be best 
suited to the particular purpose he has in mind.^ ^ 
Although the formulation of a foreign policy may be caused by a 
variety of elements, policy maker can attempt to proceed without keeping in 
mind some basic factors that impose limitations upon his planning and to a 
considerable extent, predetermine his course of action. These factors are 
partly measurable in scientific terms, partly imponderables full of 
uncertainty. 
Academics have sought to describe and explain US foreign policy 
through a variety of factors. Some of these factors involve the nature of the 
world faced by the United States as it formulates policy. Other factors relate 
to physical and fiscal (available dollars) capacities of the United States to 
36 . See F. Jones, Analysis Foreign Policy, (London, 1970). 
37 , Charles 0. Lerche JR, Foreign Policy of the American People (New Jercey: Englewood Cliffs : 
Prentice Hail, Inc, 1961), p. 5. 
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develop and implement policy on a regional or global scale. Further sources 
of US foreign policy relate to the norms, historical experience, ideological 
preferences, and perceptual biases of US policymakers and the US public (or 
at least the informed and politically active Sectors of the US public). The 
mix and relative power of the interest groups seeking to influence US policy 
on any given issue represent yet another important determinant of U.S. 
foreign policy. Finally, US foreign policy is in some way a product of the 
on 
decision-making process itself. 
The analysis of U.S. foreign policy has changed over time. Initially, 
analyses resembled diplomatic history in which specific policy events were 
described in great detail but largely devoid of overall theoretical grounding. 
By 1960s, analysts increasingly attempted to identify patterns and 
regularities in factors influencing policy formulation. The eventual 
emergence of a more structured analysis of U.S. foreign policy owes a great 
debt to James Rosenau and his development of a pre-theory of foreign 
policy.^ ^ This multicausal pre-theory postulated that American foreign 
policy, like any other country's foreign policy, was a product of five general 
factors. The first of these factors is the nature of the international system. 
Included in this factor are geographic realities, the basic configuration of 
power in the international system, the level and dispersion of technological 
capabilities among the states and non-state actors in that system. The second 
factor identified is the nature of U.S. society. It includes the value system 
driving the society, the relative variety of interest groups in U.S. society at a 
given point in time, and the economic condition of the United States. The 
nature of the U.S. governmental system represents the third influence on 
U.S. foreign policy development. This factor includes the influence of basic 
Executive Legislative relations in the United States, as well as the capacities 
of the U.S. bureaucracy, both civilian and military. Role factors, as fourth 
38. MahendraKumar, «. 5/,p. 323. 
39. Charles 0. Lerche Jr.,«. i7, p. 8. 
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factors, concern the influence of existing norms of behaviour for U.S. 
leaders as well as precedents of proper behaviour established by the action 
of pas U.S. leaders. These norms and behavioural precedents established by 
past US leadership to some degree establish the proper role and relationship 
of the various governmental actors involved in the policy process. Finally, 
Rosenau proposed that the personality (including the personal preferences 
and perceptual biases) of the specific US decision makers, such as the 
President and his key advisors, could shape US foreign policy responses. 
These are called idiosyncratic factors. 
Various contemporary analysts of US foreign policy including 
Kegley and Wittkopf, Rosati, Hastedt and Snow and Brown - either 
explicitly or implicitly apply Rosenau's framework as they provide detailed 
analyses in their texts of the actors and processes involved in the 
formulation policy. Although these and other texts on the formulation of 
U.S. foreign policy differ to some degree in how they address the impact of 
systemic, societal, governmental, role, and idiosyncratic factors, they all 
recognize the importance of these five categorical factors in shaping 
policy.'^ ^ 
Therefore, in approaching American foreign policy, there over a 
dozen different categories of data on which enquiry should be based. Each 
of them has some relevance to the foreign policy the United States is 
conducting. Each has a place in the model of American foreign policy 
process. Each, therefore, forms part of the American foreign policy. The list 
that follows may includes 13 separate components.'*' 
1) The national interest of the United States as tradition and concept. 
2) Specific formulations of the national interest. 
3) The historical background of American foreign policy. 
40 . Christophen Herrick and B. McRae, n. 7, P. 6. 
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4) The mechanism and procedures for making and executing American 
policy. 
5) The international milieu in which United States is acting. 
6) The policies of other states to which the United States must react. 
7) The capabilities of the United States, general and specific. 
8) The general international action pattern of the United States. 
9) The specific objectives sought by the United States. 
10) The courses of action taken by the United States to attain its objectives. 
11) The evaluation of the policies of the United States. 
12) The unresolved issue remaining in American foreign policy. 
13) The probable future course of American foreign policy. 
FOREIGN POLICY POLITICS: 
Foreign policy politics is the "process of choice", the making of 
foreign policy through the political institutions and aimed at societal 
influences of the American Political System.'*^ 
In addition to the executive and legislative branches that remain 
principal initiator of American foreign policy, there are now more relevant 
players, more issues, and more pressures. Single issue interest groups have 
proliferated, professionalised and now regularly promote their policy goals 
within the legislative and executive arenas. The explosion of group activity 
has been particularly evident in the foreign policy realm, which had been 
relatively free of strong, broad-based group pressures. Add to these multiple 
and increasingly powerful organizations a much larger pool of academic and 
policy experts in foreign and military affairs who go in and out of 
government and who also represent many international interests. Today 
most multinational companies and even foreign government hire Americans 
with legislative and executive experience and "contacts" to represent them 
41 . James J. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in Barry Farrell, ed. 
Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, IH: North Western University 
Press, 1966), pp. 27-92. 
20 
on pending issues in which they have an interest. Foreign policy has become 
more people's business, debated and conducted for the most part by more 
people with substantive training and experience in foreign affairs from both 
the public and private sectors."*^ 
President and Congress: 
The US system of government is characterized by a strongly 
functioning separation of powers. The constitution states that power is 
shared between the presidency and a bicameral congress plus a Supreme 
Court. The constitution of the United States did not expressly delegate 
authority for the conduct of foreign affairs to any specified agency. 
However, the President is the most important actor in the foreign policy 
decision making process. The famous inscription on President Truman's 
desk '"The Buck stops here". Remain true today.'"' If the Executive branch 
of the government speaks with several voices on foreign affairs, the problem 
becomes still more complicated when congress gets involved. All the 
Presidents have needed to use congress to ratify their foreign policies. 
Therefore, executive and legislative branches each play important roles that 
are different but that often overlap."*^ 
One of the oldest conflicts in the American system of government is 
that between congress and the President over the right to formulate and 
implement foreign policy. Is the President solely responsible for the conduct 
of external relations? Is the Congress an equal partner? Or does Congress 
have the right to shape U.S. policy by enacting legislation which prescribes 
a President's flexibility?'^^ 
42 Christopher! Herrick and B McRae, n 7, p. 7 
43 Bruce W. jentleson, American Foreign Policy The Dynamics of Choice in 21st Century, (New 
York W W Norton & Company, 2004), p 9 
44 Stephen J Wayne, "The Multiple influences on U S. Foreign Policy-making", International 
Information Programme. Electronic Journal of US Department of States 
45 Frasser Camron, n 5, p 38 s 
46 John G. Tower, Congress Vs the President: " The Formulation and Implementation of American 
Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Winter, 1981/2, 
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When people think of foreign policy-making in the United States, 
they usually think of the President. After all, President has been the chief 
architects and implementer of American foreign policy since the beginning 
of the Republic. The framers of the Constitution were mindful of the 
advantages that the Presidency brought to this endeavour: a hierarchical 
institution with a single head, the one institution that would be in continuous 
tenure, and the one that could act with greatest "energy, dispatch, and 
responsibility, "to quote James Wilson, one of the delegates at the 
Constitutional convention.'*^ Robert Dahl wrote in 1950 that "perhaps most 
important fact about Congress and its role in foreign policy therefore , is that 
it rarely provides the initiatives". 
But the framers also were fearful of arbitrary and irresponsible 
actions by a chief executive. To reduce the likelihood that a President might 
engaged in activities that would be harmful to the national interest, the 
Constitution imposed checks on a range of executive powers, particularly 
those of war and peace. Treaties were subject to Senate ratification by a 
two-third vote, while executive appointments, including those of 
ambassadors, required concurrence by a majority of the Senate. Also vested 
in Congress was the authority to regulate foreign Commerce, declare war; 
raise, maintain, and make rules for a standing army and navy; call up the 
militia, and appropriate money for the operations of government and 
conduct of foreign policy.'*^ So, these are five specific powers related to 
foreign policies are given to Congress in the American constitution. These 
are^°-
> Congress is given the power to regulate trade. 
r The Senate must pass a declaration of war by a 2/3 majority. 
47 . Stephen J. Wayne, n. 39. 
48 . Robert Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, (New York : Nrton, 1950), p. 58. 
49 . Stephen J. Wayne, n. 39. 
50 . Frasser Camron, n. 5, p. 70. 
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r- The Senate must give "advice and consent" to the President's cabinet 
including all political appointees ambassadors and senior military 
appointments by a simple majority. 
> The Senate must pass all treaties negotiated by the President by 2/3 
majority. 
> Congress must also approve or "appropriate" 
Table 1.1 Principal Foreign Policy Provisions of the Constitution^^ 
War power 
Treaties 
Appointments 
Foreign 
commerce 
General powers 
Power granted to : 
President 
Commander in chief of 
armed forces 
Negotiate treaties 
Nominate high-level 
government officials 
No explicit powers, but 
treaty negotiation and 
appointment powers pertain 
Executive power; veto 
Congress 
Provide for the common 
defense; declare war 
Ratification of treaties, by 
two-thirds majority (Senate) 
Confirm President's 
appointments (Senate) 
Explicit power "to regulate 
foreign commerce" 
Legislative power; power of 
the purse; oversight and 
investigation 
In addition, Congressional committees are powerful bodies that 
provide oversight of the executive branch and hold hearings. Where 
government officials and experts testify about all aspects of US foreign 
policy. Staffs play a vital role in preparing briefing papers and speeches for 
Congressmen. Furthermore, divided partisan control of government 
contributed to the closer scrutiny that Congress gave to Presidential foreign 
policy initiatives and matters of implementation. The party that controlled 
one or both houses of Congress, but not the White House, gained political 
advantage from investigating irregularities, mismanagement, and failures in 
the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch as is the case of Iraq. 
51 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n.43, p. 34. 
52 . Stephen J. Wayne, n. 44. 
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On the other, President's power much depends on the political 
landscape in which he operates as well as the personality and political skill. 
The qualities needed to ensure an effective presidency includes the ability to 
communicate, persuade and rally public support. An important aspect of the 
President's power is his ability to set the agenda and to use the prestige of 
the office as a "bully pulpit" to explain and seek public support for his 
policies. It has been shown how President Wilson failed to persuade 
Congress of the merits of the League of Nations while President Roosevelt 
was able to win a huge majority to support US membership of the United 
Nation." 
Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of 
Presidential and Congressional dominance in making foreign policy, 
variously defined by different scholars. One study classified the period 
1789-1829 as one of Presidential initiative; 1829-1898 as one of 
Congressional supremacy, and 1899 through the immediate post World War 
II period as one of growing Presidential Power.^ "* Another study defined 
three periods of Congressional dominance 1837-1861, 1869-1897 and 1918-
1936, with a fourth one beginning towards the end of Vietnam War in 
1973.'^ During the Reagan and Bush Administrations the Pendulum swung 
back towards Presidential dominance, reaching its height in 1991 during 
operation Desert Storm against Iraq.^ ^ In the post-Persian Gulf war era, both 
President and the Congress are confronted with issues in foreign policy that 
may well define which branch of government will play the dominant role 
during the first decade of the twenty first century. But cooperation between 
the two branches is necessary for a strong and effective U.S. foreign 
policy." 
53 . Frasser Camron, n. 5, pp. 38-39. 
54 . Daniel Cheever and Field Haviland, American Foreign Policy and Separation of Power, 
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President's Advisors: Big Fours 
In the post Cold War World, there is an increasing number of 
foreign policy actors involved in the executive branch. As foreign policy has 
become more of a political football, the President has come to depend more 
and more on his closest advisors in the white House and National Security 
Advisor. 
The National Security Council (NSC) operating under the direct 
authority of the President has steadily increased its authority in recent years 
and the NSC advisor has become the key figure in the US foreign policy 
machine. The National Security Act was passed in 1947 to establish a 
National Security Council. The formal NSC comprises the President's main 
external relations advisers including the Vice President, the Secretaries of 
State and Defence the Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff, the Director of the 
CIA, and the National Security Adviser. It is the NSC staff, however, that 
provide the stready stream of briefing papers for the President. The National 
Security Adviser is the hinge between the formal NSC and the working 
machine. Over the past few decades, the National Security Adviser has often 
emerged as the most important foreign policy aid to the President. The 
National Security Adviser has a number task including advising and briefing 
the President, managing the decision-making process and explaining and 
defending the policies of the administration in public. A piano-playing-
child Prodigy, Condolezza Rice, had a role in the George W. Bush 
CO 
administration going beyond foreign policy. 
Constitutionally, the State Department is the lead executive agency 
for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, a mission based on the role of the 
Secretary of State as the President's principal foreign policy adviser. In 
fact, Secretary of State is the first cabinet officer in line to succeed to the 
Presidency (The succession starts with the Vice President, the speaker of the 
58 . Frasser Camron, n. 5, pp. 41-44. 
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House, the President of the Senate, and the Secretary of State). The State 
department has the primary role in^ ^ 
> Leading and coordinating US representation abroad. 
> Conducting negotiations and concluding agreements and treaties. 
> Managing the international affairs budget. 
> Coordinating and supporting international activities of other US 
agencies. 
Several Secretaries of State, John Hay, Evans Hughes, Dean 
Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, James Barker, Madeline 
Albright, and Collin Powell have a record of achievements.^ ^ 
In constitutional terms, the Department of Defence (DOD) - is 
responsible for the formulation of general defence policy, in particular the 
military strategy and the definition of the "mission Statement of the armed 
forces. In terms of defining an overall approach and policy regarding 
national security issues, however, the DOD is but one actor and the NSC has 
increasingly taken lead in defining the overall national security strategy. 
Apart from its seat on the NSC, the Pentagon also plays an important role in 
US external relations through its foreign bases its training and assistance 
programmes and its regional military commanders. Because of its size and 
enormous resources the Pentagon plays an increasingly important role in the 
formulafion of US foreign policy. '^ 
The intelligence community - The US has the largest intelligence 
apparatus in the world with the various agencies making a round the clock 
input into the formulation of US foreign policy. The Director of the CIA is 
simultaneously director of the intelligence community, of which CIA is but 
one component. President expect that, for what they spend on intelligence, 
the product should be able to predict coup, unheavals, riots, intentions, 
military moves and the like with accuracy. President and his national 
security team usually are ill informed about intelligence capabilities. 
59 Ibid, pp. 44-46. 
60 ibid 
61 ibid pp. 52-54. 
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Therefore, they often have unrealistic expectations of what intelligence can 
do for them. Oversight of the intelligence community is exercised by the 
NSC and the President's foreign intelligence advisory board. There are also 
two congressional oversight committees that have a remit to review 
operations and the senate must approve the director of intelligence.^^ 
Department of Homeland Security - Among the most significant 
responses of the Bush administration to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have 
been its incremental steps to establish the Department of Homeland Security 
(DOHS). The establishment of the DoHS brought a variety of governmental 
functions and agencies into a single cabinet level department in order to 
move effectively against the threat posed by domestic and international 
terrorism 63 
As American foreign policy has grown increasingly complex, 
foreign policy politics in the executive branch do not occur only at the 
senior advisory level. As table below shows, the foreign affairs bureaucracy 
is vast and complex. 
Table 1.2 : The Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy*'* 
Overall Foreign 
Affairs 
Responsibility 
Foreign 
Economic Policy 
Political 
Democratization, 
Economic 
Development 
Intelligence 
Agencies 
Internationalized 
Domestic Policy 
National Security 
Council 
Commerce Dept. 
Bureau of 
Economic Affairs 
(State Dept) 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
(AID) 
Central 
Intelligence 
Agency 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
State Dept. 
Treasury Dept. 
U.S Trade 
Representative 
Bur. of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and 
Labor (State Dept.) 
National Security 
Agency 
Office National 
Drug Control Policy 
Defense Dept. 
(Pentagon) 
Agriculture Dept. 
International 
Trade 
Commission 
Defense 
Intelligence 
Agency 
Bur. of 
International 
Labour Affairs 
(Dept of Labor) 
Dept. of 
Homeland 
Security 
62 Ibid, pp 61-65 
63 Office of the Counter Terrorism of the US Department of State, 3 0 September, 2001. 
64 Bruce W Jentleson, n 43, p 48 
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MAJOR DECISION INFLUNCERS: 
In addition to the executive and legislative branches of government, 
there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US foreign policy. 
These include a multitude of lobby groups, business interests, trade unions, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think-tanks and international 
organization. 
Interest Groups: These are formal organisation of people who share a 
common outlook or social circumstances and who band together in the hope 
of influencing government policy.^^ There are five main types of foreign 
policy interest groups based on differences in the nature of the interests that 
motivate their activity and their forms of organization.^^ 
Table 1.3. A typology of foreign policy Interest Groups^ :^ 
Type General Examples 
Economic groups Organisations of trade unions, national associations of 
manufactures, consumer federations of America, 
Identity groups. Jewish Americans, Cuban Americans, Greek Americans, 
Political issue groups Refugee internationals, committee on present dangers 
world wild life fund. 
state and local 
government 
Local elected officials for social responsibilities, 
Califomia world trade commissions. 
Foreign 
governments. 
Washington law firms, public relations companies. 
Economic Interest Groups includes Multination Corporations 
(MNCs) and other businesses labour unions, consumers whose lobbying is 
motivated principally by how foreign policy affects the economic interests 
of their members. Identity Groups are motivated less by economic interests 
65 Larry Barman and Bruce Murphy, Approaching Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1996), p 408. 
66 Bruce W. Jentleson, n4 3, pp. 49-58. 
67 Ibid,p 50. 
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than by ethnic or religious identity. Ethnic identity groups have sought to 
influence U.S. relations with the country or region to which they trace their 
ancestry or heritage. Political Issue Groups include groups that are organised 
around support or opposition to a political issue that is not principally a 
matter of their economic interests or group identity. These are anti war 
groups, Environment group etc. State and local Governments, although they 
do not fit the term interest groups in the same way, increasingly seek to 
influence foreign policy as it affects their interest.^^ 
Interest groups seek to influence foreign policy according to many 
different strategies aimed at the various foreign policy actors. To influence 
Congress, lobbyists regularly meet privately with Senators and 
representatives who are allies to set strategy, count votes and in some cases 
even to help write the legislation and financial contribution at the of 
election. Interest groups also try to influence directly executive branch 
departments and agencies as they formulate and implement foreign policy 
on day-today basis. Groups also take their efforts to influence foreign policy 
outside the halls of Congress and the executive branch, mobilising protests 
and demonstration to show "shoulder to shoulder" support for there causes. 
Especially in recent years, foreign policy interest groups have become quite 
astute at using the media as a magnifying glass to enlarge their exposure and 
as a megaphone to amplify their voice.^^ Samuel Huntington has noted that 
for an understanding of American foreign policy, it is necessary to study not 
only the interests of the American state in a world of competing states but 
rather the play of economic and ethnic interest in American domestic 
,• • 70 
policies. 
News Media: Despite the declining coverage of foreign policy, prior to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, one can not ignore its presence. Nearly 
68 . Ibid., p. 49-58. 
69. /6/a'., pp. 49-58. 
70 . Samuel Hintington, Foreign Affairs, March-April, 1997. 
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all government and congressional offices have a television screen, usually 
tuned to CNN. And thus have instant access to news from around the world. 
Other than CNN for coverage of foreign policy, first rank still goes to major 
newspapers (such as: New York Times and Washington Post) major 
television networks (ABC, NBC and Fox News) and major news magazine 
(Times, New Week). The internet also has substantially enhanced the 
capacity of NGOs, think tanks, and others to become independent sources of 
71 
information, analysis and advocacy. 
The manner in which television and print media cover news stories 
influences public perception of events and subsequently, their political 
attitudes. This in turn, influences the actions of the policy makers 
themselves. Administration, spokesmen, Congressmen, think tanks 
specialists and other pundits are rarely absent from the screen, usually 
offering instant comment and analysis on the latest developments in a 
72 
crises. 
Television in particular has a major agenda-setting impact. Studies 
by media scholar Shanto lyenger and other shows that when people are 
asked to identify the most significant problem facing the nation, they name 
something that has been on television news recently. The media also 
influence the relative priority the public gives to one issue over another, as 
well as the criteria by which the public makes its judgment about success or 
failure. These framing and priming effects occur both directly through the 
general public's own exposure to the media and indirectly through "opinion 
leaders" - political, business community, educational and other leaders to 
whom the public often looks for cues. Another type of influence is directly 
on policy-makers". What will the press thinks? Is common question inside 
the White House and the State Department. It is asked in an anticipatory 
manner and thus can affect policy as it is formulated. In a more informal 
sense, policy makers draw on dispatches and analyses by the more 
71 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 43, pp. 61 -62. 
72. Ibid., pp. 6\-62. 
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prominent foreign affairs journalists as additional and independent source of 
information to supplement even their own intelligence sources. 
PUBLIC OPINION: Public opinion also exercises profound influence on 
the foreign policy of America. Public opinion influences American foreign 
policy in many ways. First by parameter setting which means that public 
opinion imposes limits on the range of President's policy options. Public 
opinion influences the President through Presidential election. Voting 
analysts identify three factors as key to attributing significant electoral 
nnpact to a foreign policy issue: the issue must be demonstrated through 
survey question to be highly salient, there must be significant differences 
between the positions of the Republic and Democratic candidates; and the 
public's awareness of these differences must be evident. Public opinion also 
has its impact on Congress. Congress is very responsive to the public 
opinion on foreign policy. It responds both to polls on specific issues and to 
more general assessment of whether the public really cares much about 
foreign policy at all. Often this translates into Congress's paying the most 
attention to the groups that are the most vocal and the most politically 
potent.^ "* 
President wants to be liked by the public because the level of their 
popularity with the American people affects their ability to work with 
Congress and achieve policy goals. The more popular president's are 
domestically, the more they are free of constraints to do as they wish 
abroad.^^ Every four years the Pew Research Centre for the People and the 
Press does a survey on what Americans think about their country and its place 
in the world. In November 2005 survey, it polled decision makers, from the 
media, covering news papers, magazine, television and radio, the foreign policy 
and security elites, a sample of governors of Americans states and mayors of 
majority cities, the head of think tanks and leaders of universities, religious 
leaders, scientists and engineers, the military, along with the public. It 
contained a wealth of materials about the present moment and long term trends. 
73 /6/a',pp 61-62. 
74 / W , p p 67-68 
31 
The news survey found that about 2/3 Of Americans were dissatisfied 
with the way things are going in their country today, while 29%were satisfied. 
The report notes that this "the most negative national assessment in nearly 10 
years'". The have different priorities from the Bush administration. There are 
sign of a growing isolationist sentiment. An important part of this unease is the 
sense Americans have of the current standing of their country in the world. 2/3 
of them say the US is less respected by other countries than in past. An 
overwhelming majority of American (71%) and opinion leaders (87%) believe 
the war in Iraq is a major factor for this. 
It is clear that the number of actors involved in the formulation of 
U.S. foreign policy has steadily increased since II world war thus limiting 
the execut ive 's freedom of action to decide and implement policy. 
Far from operating in a vacuum, think tanks participate in the policy 
process alongside a range of resources of research that also include 
academics, private sector consulting firms, interest groups, and government 
bureaus. Think tanks are most numerous organisational forms devoted to 
policy research and they are often among the most focused and visible 
sources of idea and analysis in contemporary policy making. 
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MODELS OF DECISION MAKING AND INVOLVEMENT OF 
THINK-TANKS 
The literature on American foreign policy-making continues to 
grow, but only recently has the participation of think-tanks in the policy 
formulation process been discussed. Contemporary models and theories of 
foreign policy-making need not be supplanted to account for the 
increasingly active involvement of think-tanks in the policy-making process. 
Rather their parameters simply need to be expanded to take into 
consideration the changing role of policy research institutions in the United 
States. By treating think-tanks as important inputs into the policy-makers 
process, instead of passive observers of American politics, foreign policy 
analysts can provide a more detailed explanation of the various actors 
77 
competing for power in the political arena. 
The Rational Actor Model: 
One of the most popular of the simplified models is the black box or 
the billiard ball model. This notion has termed as the "strategic model" by 
no 
Roger Hilsman. It derived directly from the theories of realism as 
propagated by the Hans Morgenthou, Kenneth Waltz, etc. This model was 
termed as the Rational Actor Model by Allison. The rational actor model 
assumes that the state acts as rational, unitary decision-makers, and can 
identify and select a course of action which will maximise its strategic goals 
79 
and objectives. 
However, while the rational actor model provides international 
relations theorists with a relatively straightforward explanation as to how 
states are supposed to make foreign policy decisions, the assumption on 
which the model is based are problematic. To begin with, it is unrealistic to 
77 Donald E. Abelson, n < pp. 117-118 
78 Rosen Hilsman, The Classical Model Analysis A Black Box, in The Politics of Policy Making in 
Defence and foreign Affairs (Englewood Cliffs, New jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 32. 
79 . Graham T Allison, The Essence of Decision • Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Glenview, 
Illinois: Scott, Foresman & comp, 1971), pp. 32-35. 
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assume that states behave as unitary decision-makers. In highly 
decentralised political systems like the United States, where non-
governmental organisations representing a multitude of political and 
economic interests have innumerable opportunities to reach decision-
makers^ '^  the government rarely has the luxury of speaking with one voice. 
According to Herbert Simon, a renowned authority on 
Q 1 
organisational behaviour , the efforts of leaders to reduce the requirement 
for information in part explains why states often make irrational decisions. 
Most theories of individual and organisational choice employ a 
concept of "comprehensive rationality" according to which individuals and 
organisations choose the best alternative taking account of consequences, 
on 
their probabilities and utilities. However Simon argues that the concept of 
'bounded rationality" more accurately reflects how individuals and 
organisations process information. In short, Simon theory of bounded 
rationality states that "The physical and psychological limits of man's 
capacity as alternative generator, information process or, and problem solver 
constrain the decision-making processes of individuals and organisations. 
Because of these bounds, intendedly rational action requires simplified 
models that extract the main features of a problem without capturing all of 
its complexity. 
Simon's theory of bounded rationality only sheds light on the 
limitations of the rational actor model, but more importantly, helps explain 
why leaders often fail to fully explore the potential consequences of their 
actions. Unable to rely on perfect information particularly during periods of 
crisis, policy-makers have few alternatives but to speculate on the outcome 
80 See Alan R. Ball and Frances Millard, Pressure Politics in Industrial Societies A Comparative 
Introduction (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, Inc. 1986). 
81 See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour, (New York: The Free Press, 1965). 
82 Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining, the Cuban Missile Crisis (boston: Little 
Brown, 1971), p. 71. 
83 Ibid, p. 11 
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of their decisions. At times the consequences of their foreign policy decision 
QA 
are favourable. At other times, they can prove to be catastrophic. 
The rational actor model provides a useful point of departure to 
examine how think-tanks can be integrated into formal theories of foreign 
policy decision-making. Assuming, as proponents of the rational actor 
model do that decision makers acting on behalf of the state assess the 
advantages and disadvantage of pursuing certain courses of action before 
making a policy decision, one would expect leaders to rely on various 
sources of policy advice. Since few decision-makers possess expertise in 
every policy area, it is not surprising that they frequently turn to their inner 
circle of policy advisers for guidance. Moreover, as discussed throughout 
this study. Presidents and Presidential candidates, not to mention members 
of Congress and their staff, often solicit the input of think-tanks scholars in 
the process of developing and shaping specific policies. 
However, while the rational actor model provides scholars with a 
relatively straight forward, if not simplistic explanation of how states make 
foreign policy decisions, its proponents have paid little attention to how over 
one thousand think tanks attempt to provide policy advice to decision 
makers. By examining how think-tanks formulate and transmit ideas to 
decision-makers, theorists employing the rational actor model could, at the 
very least, evaluate an important source of policy information. Since think-
tanks constantly provide decision-makers with information and advice on a 
wide range of issues through seminars, publications and other channels, their 
contribution to important policy debates should not be overlooked. Even 
those scholars who have sought to develop more sophisticated theories about 
the nature of foreign policy-making have failed to take into consideration 
how policy research institutions participate in the decision-making process.^ ^ 
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Bureaucratic Models of Decision Making: 
Graham Allison, in his study, Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban Missile crises, reveals the inherent weakness of the rational actor 
model by constructing two alternative paradigms to explain how foreign 
policy decisions are made; the organisational process models and the 
government (bureaucratic) politics model. For Allison, proponents of the 
rational actor model overlook two important features of the policy-making 
process; the extent to which bureaucratic departments limit the policy 
options available to political leaders '^' and the intense competition between 
government officials to advance their political and personal interests. The 
Bureaucratic politics model views the policy-making process as a game 
involving players competing for high personal and political stakes.^ ^ 
Although flow charts of the foreign policy making process illustrate 
how the executive and legislative branches of government share 
responsibilities in international affairs they rarely reveal the political 
bargaining which takes place among key players in the white House and on 
Capital Hill. For Allison, unless foreign policy observes pay attention to the 
political struggle among high-level decision-makers to promote their 
institutional and personal interests, they cannot possibly paint an accurate 
portrait of the decision-making process. Allison's governmental 
(bureaucratic) politics model focuses on the competition between decision 
makers to promote their political and bureaucratic objectives. By identifying 
key players in the policy-making process and the importance they assign to a 
particular issue, the bureaucratic politics model attempts to explain what 
motivates certain individuals to influence the outcome of policy debates.^" 
87 Other than Allison, on Bureaucratic Model see, Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic politics and 
foreign policy (Washington D.C : The Brooking Institution, 1974) and Roger Hilsman, The 
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According to Allison the Governmental politics model sees no 
unitary actor but rather many actors as players-players who focus not on a 
single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; 
players who act in terras of no consistent set of strategic objectives but 
rather according to various conceptions of national, organisational and 
personal goals, players who make government decisions not by a single 
rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.^' 
By reviewing the decision-making process as a policy game Allison 
attempts to demonstrate how government officials throughout the 
bureaucracy rely on various tactics to assert their influence in major policy 
debates. Although the extent to which policy-makers influence key decisions 
is difficult to quantity, Allison argues that their success in the policy making 
arena ultimately depends on a number of factors including the importance of 
their position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the amount of expertise they 
possess in a particular issue area and their ability to persuade colleagues to 
support their position.^^ The policy positions individual leaders advocate is 
not difficult to predict. According to Allison, 'where you stand depends on 
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where you sit . 
The organisational process and bureaucratic politics models focus 
on important aspects of the policymaking process, that it is to say, how 
individual leaders and departments attempt to advance their interests in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. Nonetheless, they virtually ignore the individuals 
and organisations operating outside the formal parameters of government 
who also have a vested interest in influencing decisions at the highest levels 
of government. As organisations committed to influencing public policy and 
public opinion, think-tanks have made a concerted effort to expand their lies 
throughout government. By developing, their own areas of expertise and 
91. Allison, «S7,pl44 
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establishing contacts with officials in various departments and agencies, 
think-tanks have attempted to ensure long-term access to decision-makers. 
Some think-tanks such as the Rand co-operation the Hudson Institute and 
the Urban Institute, by virtue of their contractual relationship with particular 
federal departments, considerable access to key government officials. On the 
other hand, think-tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Institute for 
policy studies which do not solicit government contracts must employ a 
number of other strategies to capture the attention of decision-makers.^'* 
Consequently, both the organisational and bureaucratic models of 
decision-making neglected to explore in any detail the relationship between 
bureaucratic departments and think-tanks. Despite this oversight, the 
involvement of think-tanks in the policy-making process could easily be 
incorporated into the parameters established by the organisational process 
and bureaucratic politics models.^^ 
Since many high-level government officials come from or return to 
think-tank after leaving office, it is possible to comment further on the 
political motivations of decision-makers. For instance, Edwin Meese's fund 
raising efforts for the Heritage Foundation, could explain why he was 
offered a position at the Washington-based think-tanks after leaving the 
Reagan administration. In other words while the bureaucrafic politics model 
examines how and why leaders attempt to advance the interests of the 
departments they represent, it could also take into consideradon the benefits 
high-level officials derive by promoting positions supported by prominent 
think-tanks. The appearance of cabinet officials and members of Congress at 
think-tanks seminars and lunches may enhance the visibility and prestige of 
research institutions but it also provides government officials with an 
opportunity to solidify their ties to potential employers.^^ 
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Although the rational actor model assumes that states select a 
course of action which will maximise their objectives, Allison argues that 
the inability and unwillingness of bureaucratic departments to perform 
certain tasks constrains the policy alternatives available to decision-makers. 
According to Allison's organisational process model, since individual 
departments are required to adhere to standard operating procedures (SOP), 
they may also have the flexibility to alter their behaviour in such a way as to 
satisfy the objectives and preferences of decision-makers. As Allison points 
out in his analysis of the events which led to the decision of Kennedy's 
Executive Committee '^' to order a naval blockade around Cuba, Decision-
makers strongly favoured an air strike but were forced to reconsider this 
option when high ranking officials in the US Air Force expressed 
reservations about the success of such an operation. In other words Allison 
argues that while political leaders may prefer to adopt a particular strategy, 
bureaucratic constraints may compel them to pursue alternative courses of 
action.^  
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION-MAKING: 
According to Steinburner, policy-makers do not engage in 
sophisticated mental calculations before making value maximising decisions 
as the rational actor model suggests. Rather, he argues that political leaders 
instinctively rely on survival mechanisms to resolve policy problems. 
Bombarded by information from multiple directions and sources, policy 
makers can possibly digest all pertinent data before making critical 
decisions. As a result, Steinburunber argues that they must develop a highly 
structured and stable environment in which to address and examine policy 
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issue. 
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Steinbruner's cybernetic theory of decision making is useful in 
explaining how decision-makers attempt to reduce uncertainty in their 
environment by screening out certain types of information. However, his 
contention that policy decisions are the result of programmed responses 
requires closer scrutiny. Although individual leaders may attempt to 
immerse themselves in stable and protective environments, the views they 
promote and the ideals they embrace may be influenced by a multitude of 
factors. For instance, surrounded by political advisers and policy experts 
from various government departments and think-tanks, decision-makers may 
be forced to alter their most preferred course of action, despite having 
previously processed highly selective information.'°^ 
Recognising that decision-makers rarely have the time to digest all 
information necessary to make rational policy decisions, several think tanks 
have attempted to provide them with concise analyses of major domestic and 
foreign policy issues. The Heritage, RAND Corporation, Carnegie etc are 
most effective think tanks at inundating members of Congress and the 
executive with synopses of domestic and foreign policy issue. By providing 
elected officials and their staffs with information that can easily be 
incorporated into briefing notes, memos, and speeches, think-tanks have in 
some respect helped reduce uncertainty in the decision-makers environment. 
This is not to suggest that think-tanks directly influence specific policy 
decisions but rather that they provide a valuable source of policy 
information and advice which can help shape the environment in which 
leaders make decisions."'' 
In this way, Steinbruner's framework provides additional 
opportunities to observe how think-tanks attempts to shape the policy 
environment in which political leaders make policy decisions. 
100. ibid. p. 112 
101 . James Sundquist, 'Research Brokerage: The Weak Link' in Lurance E. Lynn jr (ed.) knowledge 
and Policy: The Uncertain Connection (Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences., 
1978), ppl26-144, quoted in Donald E. Abeison, n.5, pi 13 
40 
Elite and Interest Group Models of Decision-Making: 
By examining the formulation and conduct of policy elites, Robert 
Dhal and C. Wright Mills among others, have provided much-needed insight 
into how elites in different policy-making circles attempts to influence the 
content and direction of public policies. Moreover, David Truman among 
others, has written extensively on how interest groups in pluralistic societies 
immense themselves in policy debates. 
Contrary to the assertions of some theorists who argue that the 
political process is controlled by a group of elites committed to the 
promotion of corporate interests, Dahl's'*'^  research indicates that leaders 
responsible for overseeing important community issues do not necessarily 
share the same goals and objectives. In fact, as his study demonstrates, 
groups or organisations often engage in a bitter competition to advance their 
institutional interests. Dahl's observations about the presence of multiple 
elites and their participation in the policy making process sheds additional 
light on the domestic sources of public policy. Sections are often unable to 
monopolise the attention of government officials in every conceivable 
policy area. The presence of several hundred policy research institutions 
competing for power might give the impression that think-tanks are 
influential players in the policy-making process.'^ '* 
C. Wright Mills'*'^  in Power Elite, argues that the American 
political process is dominated by what is commonly referred to as the 
military-industrial complex. Political leaders, in cooperation with the 
military and defence contractors, formulate and implement domestic and 
foreign policies which will fiirther promote their common interests. Mills 
study presents a rather conspirational view of the political system, yet his 
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insight into the intimate relationship between the military and defence 
contractors can not be casually dismissed. Similarly the relationship between 
the military and individual think-tanks must be taken into account, the 
reliance of the military on such think-tank as the Rand Corporation and the 
Hudson Institute provides policy research institutions with considerable 
opportunity to help shape vital national security policies.'°^ 
William Domhoff'^ ^ and Thomas Dye'°^ contend that non-military 
focused think tanks also form an integral part of a more extensive institution 
in the United States called the ruling elite. As institutional composed of 
academics whose research is supported by corporations philanthropic 
foundations thin tank such the Brooking Institution and the Council on 
Foreign Relations, play a vital role in furthering corporate interests in the 
US. Still, it is difficult to argue that the sole objective of think tanks is to 
advance the economic interests of their clients. Since think tanks differ 
significantly in size, scope, and political leavings, their agenda are often 
influenced by multiple concerns.'°^ 
The intense competition between think-tanks for influence in the 
market place of ideas has led some scholars to treat policy research 
institutions as another type of interest group committed to influencing public 
policy. However, by reviewing the group theory approach to decision-
making the fiindamental differences between think-tank and interest or 
pressure groups can be revealed. 
Contrary to Truman's assumptions, the government or for that 
matter decision-makers, do not simply behave as referees moderating 
between competing interests. In developing and formulating policy ideas, 
decision-makers do not simply await the views of interest groups, but 
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actively draw on and solicit the opinions and advice of a wide range of 
individuals and organisations. As a result while think-tanks could be 
incorporated into studies on interest group behaviour, their active 
involvement in the policy formulation process distinguishes them from the 
thousands of other organisations which may have a more visible presence in 
the public arena, but whose access to decision-makers is for more limited. 
Similarly, thousands of interest groups lobby decision-makers to introduce 
legislation which is compatible with their institutional interests, very few are 
actually called upon by the Executive or Congress to develop and shape 
policy ideas. Although members of interest groups often give testimony 
before Congressional committees and subcommittees, they rarely provide 
decision-makers with detailed blueprints on how to develop a particular 
policy idea. Think-tanks, on the other hand, are approached by decision-
makers to provide them with practical advice on how to develop and 
implement domestic and foreign policies. Furthermore during Presidential 
elections and the transition period that follows. Presidential candidates have 
surrounded themselves with advisers from think tanks. While the positions 
of influential interest groups are often taken into consideration in developing 
election platforms and in shaping public policies, think tank scholars, not 
interest group representatives are called upon to advise political leaders on 
how to govern effectively. 
CONCLUSION: The recent decades have witnessed much progress in the 
study of foreign policy, particularly of American Foreign policy. One of the 
consequences of this renewed interest in foreign policy analysis has been the 
emergence of conflicting opinions regarding the understanding of a 
country's foreign policy. One of the primary assumption which is now 
commonly shared by most foreign policy experts is that foreign policy is not 
an independent variable and as such is conditioned by several factors, While 
it is universally accepted that a states external behaviour is, definitely. 
110. /fc/J. pp. 116-117. 
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conditioned by the international environment, it is equally true that the 
goals, contents and conduct of that behaviour are also to a significant extent 
shaped by the domestic context out of which it arises. As the saying goes, 
"foreign policy begins and ends at home.'" 
The promise and peril of globalisation has transformed how we 
view international relations and opened the policy-making process to a new 
set of actors, agendas, and outcomes. International relations was once the 
exclusive domain of diplomats, bureaucrats, and states, but to days policy-
makers must consider a diverse set of international actors when formulating 
foreign policy that includes CNN, ASEAN, etc. While these actors were not 
born of globalisation, they have been empowered by it. Consider the simple 
fact that in 1950 there were only 50 nation states and a limited number of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations operating in the 
world and one begins to understand the complexity and unique challenge 
policy-makers face when trying to fashion an effective foreign policy. The 
challenges for U.S. policy-makers are even more daunting given America's 
super power status, global commitments and the range of transnational 
actors and issue it must confront on a daily basis. 
Making policy about any particular issue occurs not in a single 
moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over 
a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of 
different actors and different types of decision. 
In addition to the executive and legislative branches of government 
and the media, there are numerous other actors that seek to influence US 
foreign policy. These include a multitude of lobby groups, business 
interests, trade unions non-governmental organisation (NGOS), think-tanks, 
foreign governments and international organisation. Far from operating in 
vacuum, think tanks participate in the policy process along side a range of 
Nalini Kant Jha, Domestic imperative in India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi, 2002), p. 1. 
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other source of information and influence. But think-tanks are among the 
most numerous organisational forms devoted to policy research and they are 
often among the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in 
contemporary policy making."'^ 
Since 1900s, most officials and non-officials in charge of setting 
American foreign policy have consistently sought to engage the United 
States deeply in political and economic affairs beyond the water's edge. At 
the start of twenty-first century, the United States is the World's only 
"superpower, or "hyper power" as French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, 
famously described it. The use of "hyper power aroused considerable 
controversy in the U.S. in the "new era of globalisation there is a real sense 
of uncertainty among many analyst today, even leading some to speculate, 
that the American century is giving way to the era of American decline.""^ 
But on the other hand many like the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 
do not believe in that and are very optimistic about American fiiture. She 
argued that the US will continue to use free trade, foreign aid and all 
elements of its power to promote an open international order based on 
political liberty, free markets, self determination and nation of sovereignty. 
This is not a status quo objective. But that does not make it impractical. 
Indeed, helping states to transform themselves, to improve themselves, is the 
most realistic approach to the problems the America is now facing", Rice 
said."^' 
The recent Russia-China-India meeting in New Delhi (Feb, 2007) of 
the three Foreign Ministers, therefore, assumes a heightened significance. It 
is still early days to predict where this dialogue is headed because each 
country of this evolving triangle seeks better relations with the US. 
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Nevertheless, the idea also is to counter US unipolarity and unilateralism 
through a loose tripartite arrangement seeking to build a more balanced 
multi-polar world. The fact that these three countries, together, account for 
2/5 of the world's population, 1/5 of the economy that is growing rapidly to 
reach 2/5 in the decades ahead, the largest armies in the world and are 
nuclear armed would not be lost on commentators and strategic planners. A 
strategic reorientation may be taking place.''^ 
Like all other countries the US has always acted in defence of its 
national interests but a continuous threat of idealism has also found a place 
in American foreign policy. Throughout its history the US has viewed itself 
as having a unique mission in the world, to promote its values of freedom, 
independence, and democracy" and its market economy or capitalist 
economic system. Other countries, including all other permanent member of 
UN Security Council, (UNSC), France, the UK, Russia and China, share 
their own messianic vision. Few have been in a position to promote their 
values abroad to the same extent as the US, especially in the later half of 
20"^  C. The 1990s were the Climax of "the American century". Not only had 
the US won the Cold War but its economy raced ahead of other industrial 
nations and its culture and technology had spread to every corner of the 
globe."^ 
Of course, even its geographical advantages caimot protect the US 
from terrorist attacks, but the enormous size of the US, plus its population 
and economic base, gives its unique position in the world. True, there are 
countries larger in size (Russia, Canada) and population (China, India) but 
no other country enjoys the panoply of resources that benefit the term "super 
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power" or "hyper power". 
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The main conclusions from these scenarios can be summed up as follows*'^: 
> Most likely for the next decade or two is a continuation of the present 
polarity structure of one superpower and several great powers. 
> It is unlikely during the next 25 or 80 years that the US will face other 
powers actively seeking to assert super status. The EU & China are the 
most plausible candidates but both have much to do before they could 
qualify China has further to go in material term than EU, but is 
probably more plausible on political grounds than EU. 
> It is by no means impossible that the US, could step down from its 
superpower role, producing a world with no superpower and a set of 
great powers. This is perhaps not likely any time soon unless the 'War 
on terrorism' produces such negative consequences as to precipitate a 
major rethink of American foreign policy along the lines of withdrawal 
from forward defence and global engagement. 
At the start of a new millenarian, with a new administration taking 
over in Washington, there were many debates on the future direction of 
American foreign policy. This changed, however, in the aftermath of the 
9/11 Sept. 2001 terrorist attacks on US. Throughout its history, the US had 
veered between isolationalism and internationalism, between idealism and 
realism, between protectionism and free trade. A host of reports poured out 
of Congress, think-tanks, and various national commissions seeking to 
define American external interests and priorities. Given the importance of 
US in World affairs it is important to understand how the debate on the 
global role of the US is evolving, what US priorities are and how the US 
exercises its power and influence on the World stage. The coming chapter 
would discuss these in detail. 
19. Barry Buzanjhe United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty First 
Century, UK: Polity Press, 2004, P. 147 n. 112 
Chapter - II 
American foreign <PoCicy: 
(Bases and (Dynamics 
Chapter - II 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASES AND DYNAMICS 
NEEDS OF FOREIGN POLICY TODAY 
The US moved from being a British colony to being a major 
international actor in less than a century. After a further fifty years in which 
the US played a decisive role in securing allied victories in two world wars, 
the new republic was the number one power in the world. Unlike post 1981, 
when it turned its back on the world, the US became actively engaged in 
world politics after 1945. It became the principal opponent of communism, 
engaged in a continuing ideological battle with the Soviet Union (and 
communist China) and built up a massive national security apparatus to deal 
with the threat. With the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the US had 
clearly won the Cold War. One era and one century ended; a new era and 
new century have begun. But could it change the mindset developed during 
these four decades? What kind of world would wait the sole remaining super 
power? Would the end of Soviet threat usher in a "new world order" or 
would the end of bi-polarity lead to more conflict in the world? All three 
post Cold War Presidents found it difficult to aciculate a new strategy for 
the US. The differences and debates that may be observed through out the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as regards idealism vs. realism, 
unilaterism vs. multilateralism are still on display today and it is unlikely 
that they will be resolved quickly.' 
The remarks and future objective of American foreign policy by 
three Presidents after Cold War are different and reveal the fact that US 
struggles to find a set of guiding principles for its foreign policy after the 
end of the Cold War. George H.W. Bush (1993) in his speech stated: 
Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff}, 
(New York: Ro9utledge, 2002), p. 33. 
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Our objective must be to exploit the unparallel opportunity 
presented by the Cold War's end to work toward transforming this 
new world into a new world order, one of governments that are 
democratic, tolerant and economically free at home and committed 
abroad to setting differences peacefully, without the threat or use of 
force.^ 
William Clinton's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 
September 1994^ 
The dangers we face are less stark and more diffuse than those of 
the cold war, but they are still formidable - the ethnic conflicts that 
derive millions from their homes; the despots ready to repress their 
own people or conquer their neighbours, the criminal syndicates 
selling those arms or drugs or infiltrating the very institutions of a 
fragile democracy; a global economy that offers great promise but 
also deep insecurity and, in many places, declining opportunity, 
diseases like AIDS that threaten to decimate nations, the combined 
dangers of populations explosion and economic decline...., global 
and local environmental threats that demand the sustainable 
development becomes a part of the lives of people all around the 
world, and finally, within many of our nations, high rates of drug 
abuse and crime and family breakdown with all their terrible 
consequences. These are the dangers we face today. 
George W Bush, address to a Joint session of Congress and the 
American people (2002)"*: 
Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in 
the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist 
camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring terrorist to Justice. And 
second, we must prevent the terrorist and regimes who seek 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the 
United States and the World. States like these (Iraq, Iran, and North 
Korea) and their terrorist allies constitute an exist of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world 
George W. Bush "Remarks at the United States MiHtary Academy in West Point, New York", 
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Just as each of three most recent Presidents has given different 
emphases to the U.S. role in this new era, so too have prominent scholars 
and analysts offered a range of views on the nature of this new era. Back 
1989 amid the sense of political and ideological triumph over communism, 
the conservative intellectual Francis Fukuyama envisioned "the end of 
history... and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government".^  A few years later Harvard University 
professor Samuel Huntington offered a much less optimistic view of a 
"Clash of civilizations", particularly between the West and Islam, with 
prospects for political and military conflicts.^  New York Times Columnist 
Thomas Friedman pointed to economics as the driving dynamic, to 
liberalism, clashing civilizations, and power politics as "the old system", 
and to globalisation as "the new system."^ Colombia University professor 
Richard Belts was stressing the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons of mass destruction, including those in the hands of terrorists.^ The 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund stressed the importance of non-military threats to 
peace and security", especially global poverty and environmental 
Q 
degradation. 
Whatever the differences among these perspectives, they all share a 
common view of the importance of foreign policy. For too long too many 
voices have been claiming that the United States can and should turn inward 
and can afford to be careless about and do less with the rest of the world. But 
for five fundamental reasons, the importance of foreign policy must not be 
underestimated. 
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First, the security threats. September 11 drove this home all too 
dramatically. No longer was the threat "over there" in some distant comer of 
the globe; it had arrived right here at home. Moreover, regions such as the 
Middle East, South Asia (India, Pakistan), East Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan) in 
which the U.S. still has significant interests and longstanding commitments to 
allies, are still at serious risk of war. 
Second, the American economy is more internationalized than even 
before. Whereas in 1970, foreign trade accounted for less than 15% of the US 
gross domestic product (GDP), it now amounts to more than 30%. Exports fund 
a larger and larger number of American jobs. When the Federal Reserve Board 
sets interest rates, in addition to domestic factors like inflation, it increasingly 
also has to consider international ones, such as foreign currency exchange rates 
and the likely reactions of foreign investors. Private stock markets also have 
become increasingly globalised. 
Third, many other areas of policy that used to be considered 
"domestic" also have been internationalized. The environmental policy agenda 
has extended from the largely domestic issues of the 1960s and 1970s to 
international issues such as global wanning and biodiversity. The "Just say no" 
drug policy of the 1980s is insufficient as a policy when thousands of tons of 
drugs come into the United States every day from Latin America, Asia, and 
elsewhere. Public health problems like the spread of AIDS have to be 
combated globally. In these and other areas the distinction between foreign and 
domestic policy have become increasingly blurred, as international forces 
impact in more and more ways on spheres of American life that used to be 
considered domestic. 
Fourth, the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the /American 
people has produced a larger number and wider range of groups with personal 
bases for interest in foreign affairs. Some forms of "identity politics" can be 
traced all the way back to the nineteenth century, and some were quite common 
during the cold war. But more and more Americans trace their ancestry and 
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heritage to different countries and regions and are assessing their interests and 
seeking influence over foreign policy towards those countries and regions. 
Fifth, it is hard for the United States to uphold it's most basic values if 
it ignores grievous violations of those values that take place outside its national 
borders. It is not possible to claim to stand for democracy, freedom, and justice, 
yet say "not my problem" to genocide, repression, torture, and other horrors. 
Therefore, the choices it poses are just as crucial for the twenty first century as 
the cold war choices were for the second half of the twentieth century. 
AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Since the US Policy has been changing in the light of new meaning 
given to its national interest by its leadership from time to time, some critics 
have remarked that America lacks any serious tradition to guide its foreign 
policy. The change in American foreign policy orientation from isolationalism 
to total involvement and from 'non-entangling alliances' to alignments galore 
in the post-45 period lend some support to their observation. Priestly maintains 
that "most powerful nation on earth seems to have no continuing foreign policy 
to guide it"."' But it is just a superficial view. Rather, it is more correct to say 
that "throughout its history the United States has pursued a constant foreign 
policy". Generally speaking, physical security, material wealth, international 
prestige - these and other tangible and intangible values actuate all foreign 
policies and so is the case with American foreign policy. 
Action by the government of the United States in the conduct of the 
nation's foreign relations takes place within a framework of broad aims of 
policy and principles of international behaviour. Some of the aims and 
principles are traditional; others are relatively new. Some have been formulated 
and declared, while some are apparent only from official actions. All of them, 
however, reflect the present beliefs of the American people regarding the kind 
of world they want to live in and the conditions that are most likely to assure 
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their security and well being. It is within this frame of reference that the 
specific policies that govern the current action of the United States in world 
affairs are determined. 
The foreign policy of any nation comprises the objective that it seeks 
in its international relations and the means and the methods by which it pursues 
them. In the study of a nation's foreign policy, therefore, it is of basic 
importance to know what the nations objectives are in its relations with its 
neighbours. 
If the United States grew to maturity in happy era, it nevertheless 
passed its infancy amid scenes of turmoil and violence. Emerging as a nation 
from the throes of one major European war, it enjoyed a scant ten years of 
peace before the opening of another, which lasted more than two decades. 
Small in numbers, poor in liquid wealth, weak in military power, the United 
States had perforce, in those years of international disorder, to direct much of 
its attention to its own security. In the long run, the European wars of century 
and a half ago worked to the advantage of the United States. This is a fact that 
is clear enough to historical students today; it was less clear to Washington, 
John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, the Presidents who piloted the 
young nation through those perilous years. They had sufficient cause to worry 
over threats to the security and the vital interests of the United States.'^  
Objectives of American foreign policy may be listed in the early twentieth 
century as follows: 
1. To secure independence with satisfactory boundaries-boundaries that 
would contribute to the national security. 
2. To extend those boundaries in the interest of security, navigation and 
commerce, space for a growing population, and the spread of democracy. 
10 . Priestly, in Palmer & Perkins, International Relations (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1969), 
p. 678. 
11 . Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, The Brooking Institution, 1949-1950, p. 21 
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3. To promote and protect the rights and interests of American citizens in 
Commerce with and investments in, foreign lands; to safeguard trade on 
the high seas, in peace and war; and as a special application of this aim in 
the nineteenth century, to open the Far East to American trade and 
American influence. 
4. To preserve neutrality and peace to keep out of wars of Europe (and Asia) 
as long as non-participation is compatible with preservation of American 
security and vital interests and to devise means for the peaceful settlement 
of all international controversies. 
5. To prevent the powers of Europe (and later of Asia) from further 
colonizing in the Western hemisphere and from interfering in the affairs 
of the United States and of the America in general. In the twentieth 
century this has involved the maintenance or the restoration of the 
"balance of power" in Europe, even by the throwing of American weight 
into the scales. In 1940s the effort to protect the American from the spread 
of totalitarianism in its Nazi form involved a struggle to protect all 
western civilization from the same peril. 
6. To these fairly specific objectives of American foreign policy may be 
added one more general and pervasive-humanitarian desire to do good in 
the world; to spread democracy to put an end to the slave frade, to halt the 
massacres or persecutions of racial and religious minorities, to relieve the 
victims of flood, fire, earth-quack, famine, and civil war to raise standards 
of living in backward countries. Yet they have, from time to time, deeply 
influenced that policy - upon occasion with important consequences. In 
the 1950s, the government itself entered the international campaign 
against poverty, ignorance, and disease as a means of combating 
communism.'^ 
12 . Julias, W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (N.J.: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice 
HaJilnch, 1955),p.3. 
13. Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
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The events of the Second World War, especially the development of 
air power, forced the American people to realise that the United States is no 
longer immune from attack. Moreover, the war and the subsequent 
developments have also forced them to realise that any serious controversy or 
disturbance anywhere in the world inevitably concerns the United States from 
the viewpoint of its own peace and security. These changes have profoundly 
affected the attitude of the American people toward world affairs. They have 
come to understand that political isolation from Europe and Asia is no longer 
possible. They have accepted the fact that the immense power and influence of 
their country involve it in responsibilities of world leadership, which it must 
exercise in its own best interest.'"* 
The broadest aim of United States foreign policy is the maintenance of 
enduring peace, provided that the peace is based on justice and is achieved 
through the orderly accommodation of differences among nations. In pursuit of 
this aim, American policy and action have been directed toward the attainment 
of a peaceful world order, the establishment and preservation of democratic 
institutions throughout the world, and the promotion, through international co-
operation, of a thriving and expanding world economy. Before the Second 
World War, the prevailing American view did not regard an international 
organization as necessary to the maintenance of peace. An overwhelming 
majority of the American people were convinced by the Second World War 
that a peaceful world order was possible only if it was based on a world 
organization of states (UN). And US government therefore became the leading 
advocate of an organized system of international relations. It was the United 
States, more than any other country, which saw the world in these terms and 
rushed for the creation of the UN. It was in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, 
that the UN charter was signed with 51 original signatories.'^  
14 . Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, n. 11, p. 20. 
15 . Ibid., p. 20. 
_^>/A««. Urn. ; . ' 
The early Cold War Years were a peri%$lDf crucial choices rtfor 
American foreign policy. During the World War II the'UriH,&d.Siat£S-a'3^^5Qviet 
Union had been allies yet, fundamentally, the American Soviet Wartime 
alliance was based on the age-old maximum that the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend. "I can't take communism", was how FDR put it, "but to cross this 
bridge I'd hold hands with the Devil".'^ The end of the Second World War 
brought in train a new perspective. The world was almost bifurcated into two 
concerted blocs of states presided over by two powers - the USA and the 
Soviet Union, rightly called the super powers. The strained relations which 
steadily developed between the super powers in the aftermath of the Second 
World War are known as cold war in international Relations. The policies 
pursued in these years not only addressed the immediate issues, they became 
the foundations and framework for the decades that followed containment and 
nuclear deterrence were the central foreign policy doctrines by which American 
power was exercised. The United Nations was the main political diplomatic 
institutional structure for the pursuit of peace. The liberal international 
economic order (LIEO) was the main institutional structure for the international 
economy and the pursuit of prosperity. Anticommunism was the dominant set 
of beliefs by which American principles were said to be manifested.'^ 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, no country could match or balance the 
United States. It had unsurpassed global military, economic, and cultural 
power. But American was largely indifferent and uncertain about how to shape 
a foreign policy to guide this power. As a global power with global interests, it 
was the United States that stood to lose the most if they retreated. Only the 
United States had the capacity and the vision to consolidate these gains as long 
as American remains engaged, and lead. American had begun to reshape 
Europe's security architecture. Brought the Middle East closer to a 
comprehensive peace. Set up the framework for the most open global trading 
16 . Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 38. 
] 7 . Bruce W. Jentelson, n 8., p. 142 
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system in history - through the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs trade 
(GATT) and the new World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and helped secure democracy from 
central Europe to Asia, and from Southern Africa to Haiti and the Americas. 
After the September 11, the war on Terrorism became that defining issue for 
the Bush administrations foreign policy. America had to deal with both the 
September 10 agenda and the September 11 one.'^  
American Strategy for foregoing a world in which America can thrive is 
guided by four main principles. First, America leads. Second, must seek to 
maintain productive political and economic relations with the world's most 
powerful states. Third, must adapt and build lasting institutions to enhance 
cooperation. Fourth, must support democracy and human rights to advance our 
interests and our ideals. 
Whatever the issue, and whether past, present, or future, American foreign 
policy has been, is and will continue to be about the dynamics of choices. The 
core goals of American foreign policy in different phase of time may be 
defined as power, peace, prosperity and principles (4 Ps).^ ° The 4 Ps 
frameworks helps to see the complexity and to analyse how priorities get set 
and to locate the corresponding debates over what American foreign policy is 
and what it should be. 
The "Four Ps" framework indicates the major "School" of international 
relations theory to which each is most closely linked. These distinctions are not 
strict categories in which this policy goes in one box and that one in another. 
The national interest almost always combines one or more of the 4 Ps. Indeed, 
although sometimes all four core goals are complementary and can be satisfied 
18. Ibid. 
19 . Warren Christopher, "America's Leadership, America's opportunity" Foreign Policy, 95-96, no. 
98, pp. 7-8. 
20 . Bruce W. Jentleson, «. 5, p. 13. 
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through the same policy, more often they pose trade-offs and tensions, and 
71 
sometimes fundamental contradictions. 
Power: 
Power is the key requirement for the most basic goal of foreign policy, 
self-defence and the preservation of national independence and territory. It is 
also essential for deterring aggression and influencing other states on a range of 
issues. Power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his 
interests, professor Samuel Huntington states, "in particular it enables a state to 
protect its security and prevent, deflect or defeat threats to that security".'^ ^ 
Realism is the school of international relations theory that most emphasizes the 
objective of power. International relations is a "struggle for power" the noted 
Realist scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote.^ ^ The principal foreign policy 
strategies that follow from this line of reasoning are largely coercive ones. The 
ultimate coercive strategy of course is war. Starting with its own Revolutionary 
War and then through the nineteenth century (e.g. the war of 1812, the 
Mexican-American War, the civil war the Spanish-American war) and the 
twentieth century (e.g., World War I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, 
the Persian Gulf War) and into the 21 '^ century with the War on terrorism, the 
Wars fought by the United states have had varying success in achieving the 
Clausewitsian objective of "compel opponent to fulfil will". Military 
interventions are the "Small Wars", the uses of military force in a more limited 
fashion, as in the overthrow of governments considered hostile to U.S. interest 
and the protection or bringing to power of pro U.S. leaders, of which there also 
are numerous historical as well as contemporary examples.^ '* 
2 1 . Ibid, p. U. 
22 . Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters", International Security, 17:4 (Spring, 
1993), pp. 69-70. 
23 . Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Knopf, 1948), p. 5. 
24 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n.8, p. 15. 
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Power is also a key to maintaining a strong defence and credible 
deterrence. The particular requirements to provide the United States with 
defence and deterrence have varied dramatically over time with changes in the 
identity of the potential aggressor - Great Britain in early U.S. history. 
Germany in the two World Wards, the Soviet Union during the cold war, and 
terrorism today. But the basic strategy always has been essentially the same to 
deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to ensure the defence of the nation. 
Alliances against a mutual enemy is a key component of both defence 
and deterrence strategies. For most of American history, alliances were formed 
principally in war time: for example, with Britain and France in World War I, 
with Britain and Soviet Union in world war II, with twenty-six other nations in 
the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War; with an even wider coalition in the 2001 
Afghanistan war; but with a less broadly based coalition in 2003 Iraq War. 
During the Cold War the United States set up a global network of alliances, 
including multilateral ones like the North Treaty Organisation (NATO), the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO).^ ^ 
Peace: 
The certain sense, all four of the national interest ultimately are about 
peace for that is what power is supposed to safeguard, what prosperity is 
supposed to contribute to, what principles are supposed to fix. But in this 
particular analysis category, the study has specifically in mind theories of 
International institutionalism and two types of foreign policy strategy. 
International Institutionalism views world politics as "a cultivable garden", in 
97 
contrast to the Realist views of a global "Jungle". International institutions 
may be formal bodies like United States, but they also can be more informal, in 
what are often called "international regimes". Keohane defmes international 
institutions both functionally and structurally, as those rules that govern 
25. Ibid,p.\5. 
26. Ibid., pp. l5-\6. 
27 , Michael W. Doyle, Wa)>s of War and Peace (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 19. 
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elements of world politics and the organisation that help implement those 
TO 
rules". This definition encompasses norms and rules of behaviour, procedures 
for managing and resolving conflicts, and the organizational bases for at least 
some degree of global governance, albeit well short of full global government. 
We can identify five principal types of international institutions'^ ^ (a) 
global, such as the league of Nations and United Nafions, (b) regional such as 
the Pan American Conference of the late century; (c) international Legal, such 
as the International Criminal Court; (d) arms control and non-proliferation, 
such as the international Atomic Energy Agency (e) economic, International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In none of 
these cases has the United States been the only state involved in establishing 
the institutions and organizations. But in most, if not all, the United States has 
played a key role. 
The other type of foreign policy strategy that fits here is the "peace 
broker" role the United States has played in wars and conflicts to which it has 
not been a direct party.•^ ' Familiarly contemporary examples include the 1973-
75 "Shuttle diplomacy" in the Middle East by Henry Kissinger, the 1978 Camp 
David accord between Egypt and Israel brokered by President Jimmy carter. 
Prosperity: 
Foreign policies motivated by the pursuit of prosperity are those which 
place the economic national interest above other concerns. They seek gains for 
the American economy from policies that help provide reliable and low-cost 
imports, growing markets for American exports, profitable foreign investments, 
and other intemafional economic opportunities. Some of these involve policies 
that are specifically foreign economic ones, such as trade policy. Others 
involve general relafions with countries whose significance to U.S. foreign 
28 . Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Can Independence Work?" Foreign Policy 110, 
(Spring 1998), p. 82,. 
29 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 17. 
30. Ibid, p. 11. 
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policy is largely economic, as with an oil rich country like Saudi Arabia. Most 
generally they involve efforts to strengthen global capitalism as the structure of 
the international economy.^ ^ 
Among those theories that stress the economic factor in American 
foreign policy, there are two principal schools of thought. These schools share 
the emphasis on economics but differ on whether the prime motivator of policy 
is to serve the general public interest or the more particular interests of the 
economic elite. The first school of thought, ojften referred to as economic 
liberalism, emphasizes the pursuit through foreign policy of general economic 
benefits to the nation: a favourable balance of trade, strong economic growth, a 
healthy macro economy. Radicalism includes a number of theories most 
notably theories of imperialism and neo-colonialism, that see such policies as 
dominated by and serving the interests of the capitalist class and other elites, 
such as multinational corporations and major Banks.^ "^  
In sum their differences notwithstanding. Economic liberalism and 
Radicalism share an emphasis on economic goals as driving forces behind U.S. 
foreign policy. They differ over whose prosperity is being served, but they 
agree on the centrality of prosperity among the 4 Ps.^ ^ 
Principles: 
The fourth goal, principles, involves the values ideals, and beliefs that 
the United States has claimed to stand for in the world. As a more general 
theory, this emphasis on principles is rooted in Democratic idealism. 
Democratic idealist hold to two central tenets about foreign policy. One is that 
when trade-offs have to be made, "right" is to be chosen over "might". We find 
31 lbid,p 18 
32 Ibid,p 18 
33 See Joan E Spero and Jeffery A Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations (New 
York St Martin's, 1997), and Richard N Gurdner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy The Origins and 
Prospects of our International Economic Order (New York Columbia University Press, 1980). 
34 See, V I Lenin, Imperialism The Highest Form of Capitalism (New York International 
Publishers, 1939), and Richard J Bamet and Ronald E Muller, Global Reach The Power of the 
Multinational Confrontations (H^v^ Yoxk Simon and Schuster, 1974) 
35 Bruce W Jentleson,« S, p 20 
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assertions of this notion of "American exceptionalism" throughout U.S. 
history."''' President Woodrow Wilson's famous declaration that U.S. entry into 
World War I was intended to make the world safe for democracy". Idealism 
was also claimed by many a Cold War President from Democrats such as John 
Kennedy with his call in his inaugural address to "bear any burden, pay any 
price" to defend democracy and fight communism, to Republican such as 
Ronald Regan and his crusade against" the evil empire". It also was part of 
President Gorge W. Bush's launching of the war on terrorism as not only a 
matter of security but also a war against "evil.... The fight of all who believe in 
progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom".^ ^ 
The other key tenet of Democratic idealism is that in the long run 
"right makes for might", that in the end interests like peace and power are well 
served by principles. One of the strongest statements of this view is the 
democratic peace theory, which asserts that by promoting democracy we 
promote peace because democracies do not go to war against each other. Given 
its strong and exceptionalist claims to principles, American foreign policy often 
has been criticised at home and abroad for not living up to these values. We are 
seeing this in the post September 11 "why do they hate us?" debate over 
America's image in the Muslim world.^ * 
Table: 2.1 
A Foreign Policy Strategy Typology 
Core national 
interest goals 
Power 
Peace 
Prosperity 
Principles 
International 
relations theory 
Realism 
International 
Institutionalism 
Economic 
Liberalism, 
Radicalism 
Democratic 
Idealism 
Conception of the 
International system 
Competition for power 
World order 
Global capitalism 
Global democracy 
Main types of 
policies 
Coercive 
Diplomatic 
Economic 
Political 
Source Burce Jentleson, American Foreign Policy The Dynamics of Choices in the 21st Century, p 22. 
36 Ibid, p. 20. 
37 Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
38. Ibid,p.2\. 
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The table 2.1 summarise the 4Ps of foreign policy strategy, 
highlighting differences among core national interest goals, school of 
international theory, principal conception of international system, and principal 
types of policies pursued. It is important to emphasise again that these are 
distinctions of degree and not inflexible one-the-other categorisation. They 
provide a framework for analysing foreign policy strategy in a ways that push 
deeper into general conceptions of the national interest and get at the "essence 
of choice" over what Americans foreign policy is and should be. 
The alteration of the position and interpretations of these goals over 
different times may be summarised as in fig: 2.1. To represent the smaller 
number of issue in the earlier time periods, the rectangles for security, 
prosperity, and moral principles are small. The larger size of the rectangles in 
later time periods reflects the expanding number of issues affecting these goals 
during these periods. The number of U.S. security interests and concerns has 
increased since the 1840s. In addition, the relative priority assigned to some 
issues, which we would generally consider to be security issues, has changed. 
Certain issues that might be considered prosperity issues are now of equally 
high priority. For example, unimpeded access to important markets for U.S. 
products has become an increasingly important consideration for U.S. policy 
makers. In the post-world war era, the number and priority issues affecting the 
prosperity goals of U.S. foreign policy expanded as policy makers perceived 
that domestic prosperity was becoming increasingly linked to the health of the 
international economic system. Successive U.S. administrations believed that 
government should more actively promote the development of an international 
economic system. 
39 . Ibid, p. 22. 
40 . Christopher Herrick and P.B. Macrae, Issues in American Foreign Policy (New York: Longman, 
2003), p. 5. 
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Figure 2.1Changing Primacy and Scope of Core Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy 
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Figure 2.1 also indicates the increasing overlap between security and 
prosperity foreign policy goals or interests of the United States since 1940. 
Finally it illustrates perceptions of the extent to which issues facing the United 
States have had a meaningful impact on moral principle goals and interests in 
U.S. foreign policy over more than two centuries. It also shows the somewhat 
increased overlap of moral principles U.S. foreign policy goals and core 
interests with core security and prosperity goals and interests."*' 
At any given time, specific issues may be identified as having a 
significant impact on one more of the basic, or core goals, of security, 
prosperity and moral principles. When this occurs, those issues begin to move 
onto the U.S policy agenda."*^  
America Foreign Policy: From Isolationalism to Internationalism 
American foreign policy has a history and a long and complicated one 
at that, present day Americans are in large measure the heirs of the record, 
good or bad, made by their ancestors. 
In studying history, change often is more readily apparent than 
continuity. In so many ways the twenty first century and its foreign policy 
challenges are vastly different from those of even the recent past, let alone 
those of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Yet many of 
foreign policy choices we debate today, at their core, are about the same 
fundamental questions that have been debated over two centuries of U.S. 
history. Can the U.S. best fulfil its national interest in all its components 
through isolationism or internationalism? How big a military and how much 
defence spending are needed to ensure U.S. power and assure the peace? How 
true to its democratic principles does U.S. foreign policy need to be? Are those 
who criticize U.S. foreign policy as imperialistic right? How is the record of 
relations in such major regions as Latin America and Asia to be assessed? 
4 1 . Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
42 . Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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Every one of these questions of foreign policy strategy has a long history that 
provides important context for current foreign policy choices. It is, therefore, 
crucial that as American considers the foreign policy challenges today, they not 
only seek to understand what is new about world, but also seek to learn from 
the prologue that is the past. 
Britain's American Colonies broke with the mother country in 1776. 
They were recognised as the new nation of the United States of America, 
following the treaty of Paris in 1783. During the 19* and 20* centuries, 37 new 
states were added to the original 13 as the nation expended across the North 
American continent and acquired a number of overseas possessions. The 
Spanish in Florida, the French in Louisiana, and the Mexicans in the southwest 
became citizens on equal terms with the citizens of the original States. 
Sovereign states were organised in the newly acquired regions and admitted to 
equal partnership in the Union."*^  
The US was not always keen to play a global role. After gaining its 
independence from Britain, the US sought to limit its involvement in 
international affairs and avoid competition with foreign powers. In particular, a 
clear majority of the Founding Fathers of the new Republic insisted that 
America should avoid involvement in the political intrigues and power rivalries 
of Europe (one can imagine how shocked they would be today to learn of the 
global environment of the U.S. from Afghanistan to Argentina from Kosovo to 
Korea).'*'* In his farewell address in 1996, President George Washington, set out 
guidelines for American foreign policy that found widespread approval "The 
great rule of conduct for US in regard to foreign nations is in extending our 
commercial relations but to have with them as little political connections as 
possible. It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any 
portion of the foreign worid."'*^ 
43 . Lilian T. Mowrer, and Howard H. Cummings, The United States and World Relations (N.Y.: 
Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 310. 
44 . Fraser Cameron, n. /, p. 4. 
45 . George Washington, "Farewell Address", September 17, 1796, reprinted in Congressional 
Record, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., February 22, 1999, p. S11673. 
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By 1823, the policy of non-intervention moved a step further it was 
based on the Monroe Doctrine.''^  The Doctrine established a fundamental 
principle of American policy-implying two aims: (i) No territorial 
aggrandizement on American Soil will be allowed and (ii) No intervention in 
European Politics. The uherior motive behind this Doctrine, however, was to 
serve a warning to European powers that the American Continents are 
henceforth not be considered as subject for colonisation and to assert 
hegemony over the whole western Hemisphere. The Doctrine gave the US a 
vast hinterland in control and South American bloc served both as a source of 
raw material and a captured market. With such 'natural colonies' the US had so 
little interest outside America. American isolationism was thus the political 
reflection of economic self-sufficiency. From its original concept the Monroe 
Doctrine was essentially defensive. But it became expansionist by 1840s, when 
the US became strong enough to implement it. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine 
became the comer stone of American foreign policy. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the US continued to proclaim that 
its ideas were universal but did little to export them to other countries. This 
would change in the twentieth century; President Theodore Roosevelt was the 
first occupant of the White House to acknowledge the importance of the 
balance of power and a keen proponent of a more robust American approach to 
world affairs. 
The reasons for this change in policy were complex. For some 
American, it was simply time for their country to enjoy the fruits of being a 
great power. The US had developed a strong economy; it should therefore have 
an international voice commensurate with its new status. Others argued that 
this was the spring time of open door" and manifest destiny" which involved a 
moral mission to promote liberty and democracy around the world, and to 
protect Latin America from European imperialism. The increased power of 
46 . James Monroe, "Seventh Annua) Message", December 2, 1823, The Writings of James Monroe, 
vol, 6, ed. Stanis Laws Murray Hamilton (New York: G.P. Putonam, 1912), p. 325-342. 
47 . Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 5. 
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the federal government after the upheaval of the civil war also played a role. 
National leaders were able to allocate more resources to support the military, a 
necessary buttress to a more assertive foreign policy. 
With the out break of the World War I, President Wilson's initial 
response was to remain neutral. However after German submarines began 
sinking American merchant ships, the President did not however, seek to win 
support for the war by appealing to American national interests. Rather he sold 
the war to the American public in idealist terms, speaking of the US" making 
the world safe for democracy"."*^  America was unlike other powers pursuing 
narrow national interests. Wilson saw the war as an opportunity "to end the 
failed balance of power system and replace it with a community of power and 
an organized peace". '^' Wilson made much of America's idealist traditions 
setting out in 1918 "fourteen points" or principle that should guide US policy. 
These included a call for open diplomacy, self-determination, general 
disarmament, and the abandonment of the balance of power principle in favour 
of a system of collective security. Once an allied victory appeared inevitable, 
Wilson devoted his presidency to negotiating the Versailles peace treaty and 
designing the League of Nations, the organization that he hoped would ensure 
America's permanent involvement in safeguarding global stability. Despite his 
huge personal efforts Wilson was unable to convince the senate or a majority of 
Americans. His opponents argued that the US should look after its own 
interests and not become involved in settling disputes around the world. The 
inter war years saw the US retreat into an isolationist and protectionist stance. 
America Largely turned its back on the world and raised tariffs to protect its 
own industries from foreign competition.^ ' 
Twenty-five years after rejecting the League of Nations, the US Senate 
ratified almost without objection (89-2 votes) America's entry into another 
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global collective Security organization, the United Nations (UN). This striking 
turn about in American policy was the product of years of careful planning and 
shrewd political maneuvering by President Franklin Roosevelt to build 
domestic support for America's participation in a post-war security system. 
The US had again remained neutral at the onset of the Second World War but 
Roosevelt made clear his sympathy for Britain and its allies fighting against 
Nazi Germany. It was not until the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in 
December 1941, however, that the US was able to join the hostilities. 
Surprisingly it was Hitler that declared war on the US and thus made his own 
defeat inevitable. The US dropped two atomic bombs on the cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, thus ensuring Japan's defeat.^ ^ 
From late 1943 until the end of the war, the administration carefully 
mapped out detailed plans for the UN, involving a restricted security council of 
the major powers and an American veto, while working to strengthen the 
bipartisan consensus supporting US participation. The President's clever 
political and public relations campaign resulted in overwhelming public and 
congressional support for American participation in the U.N. support for US 
engagement was helped by the fact that America had become such a dominant 
political, military, and economic force in the world. In global affairs, most 
nations now looked to Washington first. 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE COLD WAR CONTEXT 
Different views are reflected in the debate over origins of the Cold 
War. This debate is marked by two main schools of thought, the orthodox and 
the revisionist. In the orthodox view principal responsibility is put squarely on 
the shoulders of Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union.^ '* "We know", historian 
John Lewis Gaddis contends, that "as long as Stalin was running the Soviet 
Union, a cold war was unavoidable". The Soviets used the Red Army to make 
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Eastern Europe their own sphere of influence. They supported communist 
parties in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and within Africa anticolonial 
movements' indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of Soviet communist 
ideology was to aid revolution everywhere. And in the United States they ran a 
major spy ring trying, among other things, to steal the secret of the atomic 
bomb.^ ^ 
In the revisionist view of the origin of the cold war the United States 
bears its own significant share of the responsibility.^^ Some revisionists see the 
United States as seeking its own empire, for reasons of both power and 
prosperity. Its methods may have been less direct and more subtle, but its 
objectives nevertheless were for domination to serve American grand 
ambitions. In citing evidence for U.S. neo-imperialist ambitions, these critics 
point as far back as the 1918-19 U.S. "expeditionary force" that, along with 
European forces, intervened in Russia to try to reverse the Russian Revolution. 
Other revisionists see the problem more as one of U.S. miscalculation. They 
maintain that the Soviets were seeking little more than to assure their own 
security by preserving Poland and Eastern Europe as a cordon Sanitaire to 
prevent future invasions of Soviet soil. What transpired in those early post 
World War II years, these revisionists argue was akin to the classic "security 
dilemma", often present in international politics, in which both sides are 
motivated less by aggression than by the fear that the other side cannot be 
trusted and thus see their own actions as defensive while the other side sees 
them as offensive. Had U.S. policy been more one of reassurance and 
cooperation, rather than deterrence and containment, there might not have been 
a cold War." With this debate in mind, this study now analyse the dynamics of 
foreign policy choice for the United States as played out during the Cold War. 
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After a century and half, the US had finally committed itself to play a 
continuing role on the world stage. But now it was faced with the challenge of 
communist expansion. As the Soviet Red Army moved toward Berlin in the 
spring of 1945, it liberated Eastern Europe from the Nazis and became the 
dominant power factor in the region. Poland was the traditional invasion route 
to Russia; Stalin had no intention of allowing Western-style democracy to take 
root in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or anywhere else under his control. Partly as a 
result of Winston Churchill's warming in 1946 of an "Iron Curtain" descending 
in the middle of the European continent, the US became increasingly concerned 
at the prospect of a communist takeover in Western Europe as well as Eastern 
Europe. These rival views about the future of Europe led to confrontation 
between the US, which was in the midst of a massive demobilization of its 
armed forces, and the Soviet Union, which had maintained its huge army, and 
which would also soon possess the atomic bomb. This confrontation led to an 
unprecedented arms race between the US and the Soviet Union that would lead 
to a fundamental change in American foreign policy. 
In that circumstances, the policy makers put forwarded the idea that 
the US should pursue a patient, but firm, long term policy of containment of 
Soviet power. The containment strategy of America was designed to destroy 
Soviet communism over time, by isolating it and exposing its economic and 
social weakness. President Harry Truman took up the containment idea. In a 
speech to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, the President laid 
down the policy that became known as the "Truman Doctrine".^ ^ 
It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who 
are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures. The free people of the world look to us for support in 
maintaining their freedom.... If we falter in our leadership, we may 
endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the 
welfare of our nation. 
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This was a blanket commitment by the American President that would 
define US foreign policy for the next forty five years. For the first time in its 
history, the US had chosen to intervene in peace time outside the Americas. In 
May 1947, Congress approved $ 400 million in assistance for Greece and 
Turkey, the two countries perceived as most threatened by communism.^ ^ The 
following month, Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced that the US 
was also ready to supply Western Europe with economic and financial 
assistance (the Marshall Plan) in order to help economic recovery and thus 
slave off the communist threat. Marshal state^ :^ 
It is logical that the United State should do whatever it is able to do to 
assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without 
which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our 
policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, 
poverty, desperation and chaos. It purposes should be the revival of a 
working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political 
and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. 
American aid had also been offered to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe but Stalin had rejected the offer. The US also moved decisively away 
from its protectionist trade policies of the inter-War years and helped to 
establish international organizations aimed at promoting free trade.^' 
In July 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, which 
provided for a single Department of refuse to replace the three independent 
services and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act also created the 
National Security Council (NSC) to advised the President, and set up the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather information and to collate and 
evaluate intelligence activities around the world. Truman further extended US 
commitments with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty organization 
(NATO) in 1949, and sent troops to fight in the Korean War in 1950. The US 
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was able to gain UNSC approval to repel the communist, North Korean 
invasion of South Korea as the Soviet Union was then boycotting UN 
meetings. Truman worked closely with the Republican chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), Arthur Vandenberg, to secure bipartisan 
support for his radical new departure in foreign policy. The President's 
achievements were remarkable, when Truman became President in 1945 he led 
a nation anxious to return to peace time pursuits and non-involvement in global 
affairs. When he left office eight year later, his Legacy was an American 
presence on every continent, an unprecedented number of alliance 
commitments, and an enormously expanded armaments industry. The basis for 
the militarization of US external policy can be found in NSC 68, a famous 
memorandum of April 1950, stressing the importance of a strong global 
military posture. 
The Cold War dominated American foreign policy for the next four 
decades. Leaders of both parties (Republican and democrat) supported the 
containment strategy and a special American leadership role in world affairs. 
Eisenhower, in a message to the Congress on 5* January 1957, annoimced the 
U.S policy for the Middle East known as the Eisenhower doctrine. This 
doctrine proclaimed the American intention to use armed forces against any 
communist aggression in the region. In fact, it was directed against any 
intervention by the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Speaking at his 
inauguration in January 1961, President John F. Keimedy stated that the US 
"would pay any price and bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any 
friend, oppose any foes" to keep the world free from communism. President 
Jimmy Carter reiterated Wilsonian idealism in proclaiming that the US "ought 
to be a beacon for nations who search for peace, freedom, individual liberty 
and basic human rights". His successor, Ronald Reagan, was equally eloquent 
asserting that "the US was by destiny rather than choice the Watchman on the 
walls of world freedom".^ '^  
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After 1947, opposition to communism thus became the guiding 
principle of American foreign policy and although these were substantial 
differences over the conduct of the Vietnam War, there was no serious 
opposition to the containment strategy that the US followed from the late 1940s 
until the end of the 1980s. During this period, the US developed into a global 
superpower, unlike any other in history. It established over 200 military bases 
around the world and committed several hundred thousand troops overseas to 
defend both Europe and Asia. It also engaged in a public relations and 
clandestine battle with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the third 
world spending huge sums in the process. The defence and intelligence 
agencies expanded enormously and became important players in the 
formulation as well as the execution of US foreign policy. They also had a 
major impact on domestic policy, not least because of the number they 
employed.^ '^  
There were various stages of the cold war that resulted in period of 
high tension and periods of detente between the US and Soviet Union. One of 
the most dangerous periods was the "thirteen days" of the Cuban missile crisis 
in 1962 when President Kennedy faced down the Soviet leader. Nikita 
Khrushchev, over the issue of soviet missiles being installed in communist 
Cuba.^ ^ One of the most significant periods of detente was during Richard 
Nixon's presidency when the US engaged in several rounds of arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
gave rise to a further period of confrontation with the US supporting groups in 
Afghanistan fighting to restore the country's independence.^ ^ 
In 1985, however, the accession to power in Moscow of Mikhail 
Gorbachev opened the prospect for an end to the cold war. He withdraw Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan, stated that Moscow would not use the Red Army to 
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support communist government in Eastern Europe; and his policies of glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (economic reform) led to fundamental changes in 
the Soviet Union. President Reagan, who contributed to the collapse of the 
Soviet system by being ready to launch a new space arms race (star wars), 
something he knew that the bankrupt soviet economy could not afford.^ ^ 
Strangely, the US was not directly involved in any of the seminal events that 
led to the end of the cold war, the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, the 
"velvet revolutions" in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet system in 
1990-91. The end of the cold war was a demonstration of the new found 
importance of "people power". Indeed the US, and its huge expensive 
intelligence agencies, had failed to predict the sudden collapse of 
communism.^^ 
Many wondered how the US would react after it was suddenly 
deprived of the enemy that had dominated US foreign policy thmking and 
structures for over forty years. Perhaps because the collapse of commimism 
came so quick and perhaps because President George H.W. Bush was such an 
establishment figure, there was no questioning of the containing rationale for 
the cold war national security structures that had been established back in 1947. 
Even the think tanks found it difficult to adjust to the new world that was no 
longer black and white but different shade of grey.^ ^ 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A NEW ERA: 
The end of cold war did not lead to any rejoicing in Washington. There 
were no victory speeches, celebration?, or models. A certain justified, quiet 
satisfaction was apparent, but President George H.W. Bush rightly held that 
there was no need to rub Soviet faces in the mud, particularly as there were 
many daunting problems to overcome. President Bush was delighted at the 
military success in the gulf, believed that the Vietnam syndrome had been 
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buried in the desert sands, and considered that the world was on the verge of a 
new era. In his state of the union address in January 1991, the President 
proclaimed that: 
There was the very real prospect of a new order in which the 
principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong 
... a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home 
among all nations... a world in which the United Nations -free from 
Cold War statement - is poised to folfil the historic vision of its 
founders. In the wake of the Cold War, "as the remaining super power, 
it is our responsibility - it is our opportunity - to lead.^° 
The international system in which U.S. foreign policy operates is being 
shaped by five sets of broad historical forces: (i) the geopolitics of the end of 
the cold war; (ii) the "politics of identity" of ethnic, religious and related 
conflict; (iii) globalisation; (iv) global democratization and himian rights; and 
(v) terrorism as a strategic threat in the wake of September 11.''' 
(i) Post cold war Geopolitics: Relation with other major powers and persisting 
regional conflict: The cold war defined the international system and dominated 
American foreign policy for most of the half-century following the end of 
World War II. The structure of the international system during this time was 
bipolar, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers at 
each of the poles. U.S. relations with most other countries in the world were 
based in large part on this bipolarity. With the end of the cold war the 
alignments and dynamics of major power geopolitics were put in flux. We see 
this today in U.S. relations both with its former adversaries Russia and China, 
and with its major allies, the countries of Western Europe and Japan. In sum, 
the end of the cold war has forced adjustments and in some instances 
fundamental changes in U.S. relations with the other major power. Yet, there is 
much 'old' in the geopolitics, notably three regional conflicts that persist from 
the cold war era and that still carry the potential for major war: India and 
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Pakistan, North and South Korea, and the Middle East. Making matters worse 
than before is the danger that the next war in any of these regions could be a 
nuclear one, since one or more of the parties to each of these conflicts now 
possesses nuclear weapons.^ 
The Politics of Identity: 
Whereas many of the wars and other violent conflicts of the cold war 
were driven in part by differences in ideology, the post Cold War world has 
been driven more by differences of identity. The politics of "identity about" are 
about who I am, who you are, and what the differences are between us. 
Although the politics of identity extend far back in history and were at work in 
the cold war as well, extreme mass violence has especially characterised it in 
post-cold war era. The break up of Yugoslavia and the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, 
Kosovo, and Macedonia in the decade that followed left close to a million 
people dead or wounded and almost two million displaced, and added a new 
term, ethnic cleansing to the lexicon of warfare. In Rwanda, for all the semantic 
hoops that the Clinton administration and other international leaders jumped 
through trying not to use the "g" word, there was no denying that genocide 
occurred. In just one month in April 1994, rival ethnic Hutus killed over 
700,000 ethnic Tutsis. The politics of identity also fuelled deadly conflicts in 
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Iraq, Kashmir and other world hot spots.''^  
Globalisation: 
Globalisation is not the only thing influencing events in the world 
today, but to the extent that there is a North Star and a worldwide shaping 
force, it is this system.^ '* Globalisation can be understood in terms of its 
dynamics, its dimensions, and its dilemmas. The basic dynamics of 
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globalisation is the increasing interconnectednesar^ythe across natigtfSjrate 
boundaries interconnections that affect governments, tHi^ i»|& !^]^ "j^ 5li5^ iJfnities, 
and people in their everyday lives. Before even getting into whether 
globalisation is good or bad in policy terms, the analytic reality that 
globalisation exists has to be recognized. Policies can shape it, but they cannot 
stop or reverse it. 
One key consequence of this reality is the broadening of the foreign 
policy agenda through the internationalization of many issues traditionally 
considered domestic. For example, the environment. Environmental issues are 
now part of the international agenda because, when it comes to problems such 
as global warming, neither the United States nor any other single country can 
resolve the issue on its own, and environmental problems arising in one 
country do not stop at that country's borders. The same point applies to other 
issues that have a global dimension, such as AIDS and other global public 
health issues.''^  
This dynamic is further impetus for the rethinking of traditional 
concepts of state sovereignty. States are not as insulated or self-contained as 
traditional conceptions of state sovereignty presume. Even in an economy as 
large as that of the US, when the Federal Reserve Board sets interstates it has to 
give greater weight to international factors such as exchange rate etc. For 
smaller economics, the external pressures are even greater, often including 
requirements imposed by the International Monetary Fund or other 
international institutions. Globalisation also features technological, cultural, 
political, and human dimensions. Communications technologies bring news 
instantaneously from one end of the world to other, be it through the BBC, 
CNN, Al-Jazeera or internet. Cultural influences intermix across the globe. 
American culture at times seems omnipresent. 
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Global Democratisation and Human Rights: 
The Berlin Wall, that starkest symbol of the cold war, crumbled as 
young Berliners from East and West danced on it. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned 
for almost thirty years by the apartheid government of South Africa, was set 
free, and four years later he was elected President of a post-apartheid South 
Africa. A coup attempt in the Soviet Union was put down by the Russian 
people. Amid these and other events there was a sense that the world was 
witnessing "end of history", as scholar Francis Fukuyama termed it not just the 
end of cold war but" the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of human govemment".^ ^ 
A very different view from Fukuyama's was offered by Harvard's 
Professor Samuel Huntington in his 1993 article "The clash of Civilization". 
Huntington wrote, that 
the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will be not be 
primarily ideological or primary economic. The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be 
cultural.... The paramount axis of world politics will be the relations 
between "the West and the Rest.^ ^ 
All told, as the World entered what had been proclaimed as the 
"democratic century", the record was more mixed and the outlook less clear 
than it had seemed in those heady days of 1989. The policy choices facing the 
United States thus were more complicated than they had seemed. At one level 
the issue was how much priority to give to democracy promotion and human 
rights protection in defining the U.S. national interest. Even to the extent that 
principles were given priority, the next issue was how to ensure that policies 
aimed at democracy promotion and human rights protection were effective. 
The holding of free and free elections in countries that had never or rarely had 
them before clearly was an important goal. But the consolidafion and 
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institutionalisation of democracy and human rights were broader and long-term 
challenges.^ ^ 
September 11 and Terrorism: 
It is true that terrorism goes way back in history, "as far back as does 
human conflict itself," as historian Caleb Carr has written.^ ^ It is also true that 
terrorism has been part of the contemporary U.S. foreign policy agenda since at 
least the early 1970s. In the 1990s, although terrorism overall declined, the 
percentage of incidents involving the United States and its citizens increased. 
Still, most of US always will remember the shock of the crashing twin towers 
and the gashes in the walls of the Pentagon - seared deeply into the American 
Psyche. Beyond the immediate shock and crisis, September 11, affected U.S. 
O 1 
foreign policy strategy in four fundamental ways. First, more than ever before 
in its modem history, the United States was proven vulnerable right at home. 
Second, the dangers for the futures are even more ominous. Government and 
non-governmental experts alike increasingly assess the terrorist use of weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear, chemical, or biological - as matter of 
when, not if Third, terrorism shifted from being a problem that came and went 
with this or that incident to becoming the top strategic priority for U.S. foreign 
policy. Fourth, was a major shift in doctrine on the use of force from an 
emphasis on deterrence to one on pre-emption. Since terrorist did not have 
capitals, regular military installations or major population centres against which 
to threaten retaliation, there could not be the same confidence in deterrence. 
The U.S. doctrine on using force, therefore, would have to shift fi-om 
relying on after the incident retaliations to pre emptive action. "If we wait for 
threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long..." Our Security will 
require all Americans to be forward looking and resolute, to be reedy for pre-
emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. 
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The challenge facing the United States today is dealing with both the 
September 10 agenda and the September II one. The new era as among the 
most complex that the United States ever has faced. The paradox of the post-
cold war era is that international affairs affect America and Americas at least as 
much, if not more than, during the cold war. It is because of many reasons.^ ^ 
The United States still faces significant potential threats to its national security. 
- The US economy is more internationalised than ever before. 
- Many other areas of policy that used to be considered "domestic" also have 
been internationalised. 
- The increasing ethnic diversity of the American people makes for a larger 
number and wider range of groups with personal bases for interest in 
foreign affairs. 
- It is hard for the US to claim to be true to its most basic values if it ignores 
their violation around the world. 
Although there was some basic agreement on foreign policy between 
the mainstream forces in the Democratic and Republican parties, the Clinton 
and Bush administrations placed different emphasis at different time on various 
countries, regions, international organisation, global issues as well as missile 
defence. Under Clinton, the US became closely involved in a new global 
agenda even if he was unable to persuade Congress to ratify agreements on arm 
control, climate change, and the creation of the ICC. George Bush was less 
keen on this global agenda but under prodding from Collin Powell and 
Condoleezza Rice, his administration slowly began to re-engage in multilateral 
for, a process that was accelerated after September 2001. External spending has 
focused more on the military than non-military programme. Under Clinton, 
Europe was perhaps the top priority given the importance of issue such as 
NATO enlargement and Balkans. Clinton also devoted considerable attention 
to the Middle East and paid more consistent attention to Africa than any 
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previous President. When Bush came into office in January 2001 he declared 
that missile defence and the Western hemisphere would be his top priorities. 
His defence officials also made no secret that Asia would be a greater priorities 
than Europe in terms of Security issues. 
Clinton's informal campaign slogan was: "It is the economy - Stupid". 
Clinton had also sniped at the Republicans for failing to do more on the human 
rights front in China and in the Balkans but in reality there were no major 
foreign policy differences between Clinton and Bush Sr. Perhaps as a sign of 
the public's lack of interest in foreign affairs. American were worried about the 
economic challenge from Japan. These were, however, numerous foreign 
policy challenges awaiting Clinton, including the spreading conflict in the 
Balkans, the economic collapse in Russia, the breakdown of law and order in 
Haiti, several 'rogue states' attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction 
and rising tension in the Middle East. Clinton elaborated on these challenges 
and introduced globalisation and cyberspace as two central features of his 
foreign policy.^ ^ The President said that his priorities would be^ :^ 
To restore the American economy to good health, as essential prerequisite 
for foreign policy. 
To increase the importance attached to trade and open markets for 
American business. 
To demonstrate US leadership in the global economy. 
To help the developing countries grow faster. 
To promote democracy in Russia and elsewhere. 
The President also acknowledge the other challenges like ethnic 
conflict, drugs, crime, AIDS and the enviroimient for good measure. 
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Clinton could claim a number success on the international economy 
front. Apart from leading the rescue of Mexico after its financial crisis and 
securing passage of NAFTA through Congress, Clinton oversaw the 
completion of the Urguay Round of trade negotiations, moved China closer 
toward membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), negotiated new 
trade deals for African and Caribbean States and supported debt relief for poor 
countries. 
Clinton supporters would also claim many other achievements for his 
presidency. On the European front, the President had upgraded relations with 
the EU, re-vitalised, adapted and expanded NATO, and led the alliance in 
military operations to end the killing in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Asia, the 
President had reduced the North Korean threat through a mixture of deterrence 
and diplomacy and helped bring China into global mainstreams. As regards 
Russia, Clinton had supported its transition to a market economy and its 
membership of the G8 and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum 
(APEC), and helped it establish a new relationship with NATO. Clinton also 
helped secure the removal of nuclear Weapons fi-om Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan. Clinton also made major efforts to promote peace in the Middle 
East, the Balkans, North Ireland, East Africa as well as tackling a host of new 
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international issue. A President's national security adviser contrasted the 
concerns about America's place in the World in 1992 with the situation in 2000 
when the US: 
Was not only the unrivalled military and economic power in the 
world, but was also a catalyst of coalition a broker of peace and a 
guarantor of financial stability. Furthermore, the US was widely seen 
as the country best placed to benefit from globalisafion.^^ 
Clinton, however, deserves mixed marks for his conduct of US foreign 
policy. This was clear from the vote to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), to withhold American UN dues and to micro-manage Balkan 
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policy. His administration was divided on the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse 
gas emissions with the result that it never reached the Senate for approval, and 
it was reluctant to sign up to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 
89 
land mmes convention. 
The September 11 attacks changed priorities over night for the US and 
led to a solid bipartisan front in the effort to combat the terrorist threat. 
Immediately, State were Judged on how they responded to the Call for 
international co-operation to fight terrorism. In the weeks and months after 
September 2001, attention was focused more on the Middle East, Persian Gulf, 
and South Asia at the expense of Europe, Latin America, and Africa. This was 
likely to continue for some time. According to one NSC Staffer, the next 
decade would see the US focusing on the "arc of crisis" from the Middle East 
and Caucasus to the Gulf and South Asia. As the US continued to debate its 
foreign policy priorities, there was a parallel debate on the extent to which the 
US should engage with the outside world.^ ^ 
Up until September 11, 2001, the post-cold War foreign policy agenda 
had a long list of issues but no single definition one like anfi-communism 
served as during the Cold War. The war on terrorism became that defining 
issue for the Bush administration's foreign policy. Foreign policy shift fi"om 
ABC (any thing but communism) to ABT (any body but terrorist).^ * 
The Iraq war was the first major application of the Bush Doctrine. The 
rationale was the anticipatory Pre-emptive one. Some allegations were made of 
Iraqi connections to Al-Qaida, but the main contention was that if Saddam 
Hussain were not soon disarmed of his weapons of mass destruction.(that 
proved wrong), and if he were not removed from power, the threat he posed 
would escalate from potential to actual. Pre-emption means striking first based 
on credible evidence that the adversary is likely to attack you. 
89 . Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 27. 
90. Ibid.,p.\ll. 
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No strategy links means to ends, designing tactics capable of achieving 
goals. Bush's foreign policy is vulnerable to criticism not because it departs 
radically from previous administrations but because it can not succeed. The 
goals are unachievable because the means and ends are out of sync. 
Condoleezza Rice says the Bush administration's strategy rests on 
three pillars: First, thwarting terrorist and rogue regimes; second, harmonizing 
relations among the great powers; third, nurturing prosperity and democracy 
across the globe. But the effort to crush terrorists and destroy rogue regimes 
through pre-emption, hegemony, and unilateralism shatters great power 
harmony and diverts resources and attention from the development agenda. An 
effective strategy can not be sustained when the methods employed to erect one 
pillar drastically undermine the others. 
Consider, for instance. Bush's quest for a democratic peace. He says 
that peoples everywhere, including the Middle East, yearn for freedom and 
coexistence. The democratic peace theory, which postulates that democratic 
societies do not wage war against one another, is appealing. But the war on 
terrorism, as presently conceived makes it more difficult to democratize the 
Arab World. Waging preventive wars required basing rights throughout the 
Middle East and central Asia. To satisfy its military needs, the United States 
must sign agreements with a support repressive, even heinous, regime that 
despise democratic principles.^ "* 
Democratizing the Middle East is a noble goal, but it is one unlikely to 
be achieved through unilateral initiatives and preventive war. Democratisation 
required far more resources, imagination, and patience than the Bush 
administration, or perhaps any US administration, is willing to muster. The 
ends of Bush's foreign policy can not be reconciled with domestic priorities 
that call for lower taxes. A recent Rand Co-operation study concludes that the 
93 . Melvyn P. Leffler, Bush's Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, (September-October 2004), pp. 22-
28. 
94 . Ibid, pp. 22-28. 
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most important determinants of a successful occupation are related to the "level 
of effort measured in time, man power, and money". Bush's domestic agenda 
simply does not allow for this level of effort, and he shows no inclination to 
alter his programme at home in order to affect his strategic vision abroad.^ ^ 
Foreign Policy Approach: Unilateralism Vs Multilaterism: 
The debate about the US role in this changing world often is cast in 
terms of Unilateralism Vs Multilateralism. Unilaterism can be defined as an 
approach to foreign policy that emphasizes actions taken by a nation largely on 
its own, or acting with others but largely on its own terms. Multilateralism 
emphasizes acting with other nations through processes that are more 
consultative and consensual as structured by international institutions, 
alliances, and coalitions.^ ^ Although the distinction is one of degree and not a 
strict dichotomy, this contrast helps frame the debate over how to define the US 
role in the world. 
The contrast also concern through in comparing the foreign policies of 
the Clinton and second Bush administrations. The Clinton approach was 
largely multilateralism whenever possible and unilateral only when necessary 
whereas the Bush approach is largely unilateralist whenever possible and 
multilateral only when necessary. 
There is, however, no simple inter-party split on foreign policy. There 
are unilateralists and multilateralists in both major parties but on the whole 
there are more unilateralists in the Republican ranks and more multilateralists 
within the Democratic Party. Unilateralists, a different breed from isolationists, 
may be divided into two schools. The first school (neo-isolationists) advocates 
a fundamental retrenchment and a limited balancing role for the US. The 
second, and larger, school (Primacists) seems to preserve America's current 
95. Ibid, pp. 22-2S. 
96 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 305. 
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hegemony and prevent any challenges from arising. Neither school sees any 
real gains from security co-operation. 
There was considerable speculation following the September 2001 
terrorist attacks that the US would be a convert to multilateralism. Now that it 
had seen the benefits of international co-operation, it was argued, the US would 
change its approach on other issues. There was little evidence, however, of the 
Bush administration changing its policies on any of the other issues of major 
concern to the international community such as Kyoto, the ICC, the CTBT and 
other arms control treaties. Indeed, in the midst of the campaign against the 
Taliban, Bush announced a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty. An apt 
description of the Bush approach to international co-operation might to 
"unilaterian multilateralism". In other words, the US would be prepared to 
work with other countries if necessary to achieve a US foreign policy goal, but 
the general preference would be to operate without any international 
98 
constramts. 
As the top dog in the international arena, the US has no wish to see 
radical changes in international relations. It prefers the status quo, hence no 
tempering with its alliance system or the international financial and economic 
mechanisms that it helped establishes. The US fells comfortable operating 
through NATO, the UNSC, the G8, IMF, World Bank and, for most of the 
time, the WTO.^ ^ 
ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 
The twentieth century saw the United States rise to become one of 
many great powers; then one of two superpowers; and finally, the sole 
superpower - the global hegemon. Americans leaders and followers, in and out 
of government, in groups and as individuals achieved a dozen fiindamental 
successes in the twentieth century world. ^ '^^  
97 . Fraser Cameron, n. 1, pp. 176-177. 
98, Ibid.,p.nS. 
99. Ibid.,p.U5. 
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Future, (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 24-25. 
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1. Force: The United States and its partner prevailed in botli world war and 
ensured peace in different part of the world including, Korea, Kuwait and 
Afghanistan. 
2. Governance: Americas helped forge institutions and habits of collective 
security and strengthened world order. 
3. Interdependence: They helped rebuild Europe and Japan and formed a 
trilateral community for trade and security. 
4. Containment: They won the cold war without a US-Soviet hot war and 
handled crises such as the Cuban confrontation without suffering a defeat 
or a major loss of life. 
5. Conflict control: They learned, with the USSR and communist China, 
how adversaries can mitigate conflict and collaborate for parallel 
objectives. 
6. Arm and arm control: They developed the world's most powerful armed 
forces but also made arm control an integral part of security planning. 
7. Peacemaking: They mediated the peaceful settlement of other's disputes 
and contributed to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
8. Free trade and economic development: They promoted free trade and 
institutions fostering economic development and financial stability. 
9. Modelling a third way: Their market based liberal democracy served as a 
model not just for many former communists but also for statistics in Japan 
and Europe. 
10. Human Rights: Americans kept alive and spread the ideals of freedom and 
fostered human rights - political, economic, cultural, and religious. 
11. International Understanding: They promoted international exchanges - in 
science, in culture, and other realms - and open communication. 
12. Dependability: They forged a strong reputation for reliability as allies. 
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Americans learned how to cope with complex challenges at home and 
abroad, with globalisation and the information age, meeting these challenges 
mainly by self-organisation. U.S. successes in world affairs demonstrated that 
value creating strategies for mutual gain enhance the deep, long term interests 
of all parties' more than value-claiming exploitation for one-sided rewards. 
Failures of United States Foreign Policy 
Successes and failures often overlapped and fed one another. 
1. Force: Washington sometimes resorted to force too early without good 
cause or too late. America's Indochina adventure and Iraq crisis became 
its greatest debacle in world affairs. But a stronger U.S. stance might well 
have prevented or limited some wars. 
2. Governance: Washington undermined the League of Nations and did 
much to weaken the United Nations and international law. 
3. Interdependence: Stalin's USSR and Boris Yeltsin's post-Soviet Russia 
did not join the first World. 
4. Containment: The strategy to contain Soviet expansion became a global 
crusade against leftists or nationalists posing little challenge to U.S. 
interests. 
5. Conflict control: Washington failed to explore some opportunities to 
reduce tensions with Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and other adversaries. 
6. Arms and arms control: US and Russia overkill out paced arms control. 
7. Mediation and peacekeeping: Washington should have acted earlier and 
more forcefully to curtail conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans, 
Northern Ireland, and elsewhere. 
8. Free trade and economic development: America's trade and aid policies 
did little to help Third World development. 
9. Modelling a Third way: A rising GDP and stock market left the United 
States with severe domestic problems. 
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10. Human Rights: Many American policies hurt Hberty at home and abroad. 
11. International Understanding: Most Americans remained apathetic to the 
world, while many U.S. cultural exports gave an unbalanced picture of 
American life. 
12. Dependability: Some U.S. leaders weakened the country's reputation for 
honesty, integrity and dependability. America's credibility suffered 
greatly when Woodrow Wilson could not win senate approval for the 
Versailles treaty and eighty years later when William J. Clinton failed to 
win senate approval for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. ^ °' 
There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US 
foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the 
beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a 
high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force 
structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 
transnational organized crime, and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of 
issues associated with environment-environmental degradation and biodiversity 
- since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US security. 
These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be significant US 
foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the prosperity of US 
citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these issues are energy, 
international trade and international financial management. Finally, there are 
wide ranges of issues - sustainable development, pandemic disease control, 
international resource management, and democratization - that are important 
general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are important not 
only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, but also 
because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country has a 
responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a 
better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by 
101 . lbid.,pp.6\-62. 
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US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy 
influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they 
relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy.'^^ 
Making policies about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, 
by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of 
moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different actors 
and different types of decisions. Think Tanks are among the most numerous 
organizational forms devoted to policy research, and they are often among the 
most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy 
making. The focus of this study, therefore, is that how think-tanks generally 
• become important and influential at different points in the policy process. 
Besides obtaining visibility with Congress and Journalists, expertise is 
understood to play active, important but quite different roles in each stage of 
the policy process. What policy research institutes are, what they do, why they 
have proliferated and how they makes ideas matter in policy circles are aspects 
that would be discussed in the next chapter. 
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THINK TANKS AND US FOREIGN POLICY MAKING 
PROCESS 
In the process of revealing the inner workings of the decision making 
process to explain why rational leaders often make irrational policy 
decisions, observers of foreign policy have paid little attention to the role of 
think tanks in the policy making process. In part, this may be attributed to 
the growing tendency of political scientists to concentrate more on 
explaining policy outcomes than evaluating policy inputs. As Joseph Peschek 
points out, since political scientists have a propensity to explain policy 
decisions as an outcome of a host of intergovernmental processes, they tend to 
overlook the vital contribution think tanks make to the development and 
refinement of policy ideas. He notes:' 
The acceptance of a split between 'private and public' uses of 
power may help to account for this dismissive attitude. Political 
scientists who examine policy as the outcome either of 
intergovernmental process or of overt interest group pressure from 
outside the government will miss the significance of policy planning 
groups in the political process, for it is at the more subtle levels of 
identifying and defining problems, shaping public understanding of 
issues, and constructing a political agenda that their impact is felt. 
Ideas matter. At the same time, ideas need organisations that propel 
them within the hearing range of decision-makers. Organisational 
infrastructure plays a significant role in the influence of ideas alongside the 
individual agents of ideas-scholars and intellectuals. Accordingly, the 
independent policy research institution-better known as think-tanks, have 
become increasingly visible policy actors. They attempt to participate 
directly in policy-making through the provision of analysis for policy 
makers and more indirectly by fashioning ideas in ways to mould public 
understanding of issues and problems. 
1 Donald, Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: St. 
MartinsPress, 1996, 81 
2 Diane Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, 
Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996, p.l 
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Think tanks may be defined as independent, non-interest based, 
non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and 
ideas to obtain support and to influence the policy making process. 
Operationally, think-tanks are non-profit organizations that conduct and 
disseminate research and ideas on public policy issues. Politically, think 
tanks are aggressive institutions that actively seek to maximise public 
credibility and political access to make their expertise and ideas influential 
in policy making. 
As the consequences of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, 
began to unfold, network executives and journalists in the United States 
scrambled to find policy experts capable of answering two critical questions: 
why were two of America's greatest symbols of economic and military 
installations - the World Trade centre and the Pentagon- attacked? And who 
ultimately was responsible for orchestraking and coordinating these heinous 
acts?^ 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the researchers have refocused to 
concentrate on generating ideas and insights that will lead to the 
development or revision of policies concerning relations between the West 
and Muslim World; the proper balance between vigilance against terrorism 
and protection of civil liberties; the conflict between Israel and Palestine; 
the need to adjust traditional state diplomacy to take into account the rise of 
non-state actors; the development of a long- term international security 
strategy for the Post-Cold War period; the future of arms control; the case 
for a missile defence system etc. 
Andrew Rich, Thmk Tanks, Public Policy and the Politics of Expertise, New York Cambridge 
University Press, p 11 
Donald Abelson, "Think Tanks and US Foreign Pohcy A Historical View", VS Foreign Policy 
Agenda International Informations Programme, Electronic Journal of the US Department of 
states 7(3), November2002 
Strobe Tallbott, "The Brooking Institution: How Think Tanks Work", US Foreign Policy 
Agenda International Informations Programme, Electronic Journal of the US Department of 
states 7(3), November2002 
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To provide millions of viewers with answers to these and other 
questions, journalists quickly flipped through their rolodexes to locate 
policy experts at dozens of American think tanks. Their frantic search soon 
paid off. Indeed, even before the initial shock of what had transpired suck 
in. policy experts from some of America's leading foreign and defence 
policy think tank began to appear on the major television networks to share 
their insights. 
The willingness of think tanks to participate in the media frenzy 
surrounding September 11 came as no surprise to scholars who have 
witnessed their increasingly active involvement in the policy making 
process. Since think-tanks are in the business of developing, repackaging, 
and marketing ideas to policy-makers and the public, they could hardly pass 
up an opportunity to comment on one of the most tragic days in 
contemporary American history.^ 
In March 2003, the journalist Jochen Bolsche wrote an article 
in the German news magazine Der Spiegel entitled "the war designed in a 
think tank". Blosche pointed out that the blueprint for the war on Iraq had 
been written not after 9/11 or even after the showdown between the chief 
weapons inspector Hans Blix, the United States Department and the Iraqi 
government of Saddam Hussein, but in 1998. Only a year old, a U.S. think 
tank, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), sent an andacious 
letter to President Bill Clinton to advise him to change the country's course 
on Iraq. No longer should the U.S. "contain" the Saddam Hussein regime, it 
asserted, but it should now seek to overthrow it. Why? Because "if Saddam 
does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction the safety 
of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the 
moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil 
will all be put at hazard".''The argument from 1998 now appears verbatim 
from the George W. Bush administration. 
6 Donald Abelson, «. 4 
7 Vijay Prasad, The Think Tank War Machine, Frontline, May, 21,2004, p.64 
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The modern state depends on experts whose views on issue can 
provide the theories and rationales for policy and legislation. State structures 
are the dominant but not the only source of policy innovation as there is a 
need to consult other interests for information. Think-tanks seek to provide 
this kind of information and occasionally play a dynamic role in identifying 
problems. Policy research institutions are most likely to inform policy when 
they are part of an epistemic community, a wider policy community or 
discourse coalition. These analytical frameworks are concerned with agenda 
setting, networking, research brokage and the ways in which policy actors 
operate to establish a discourse that frames understanding of problems and 
policy. In particular, institutes help forge common identities and shared 
values among experts and opinion leaders through their conference, 
workshops and study groups and thereby help determine the ubiquitous 
climate of opinion. Ideas about networks allow an assessment of think-tanks 
influence or effectiveness that gets beyond providing or measuring the input 
of some of these organisations into a given policy or legislative act. In other 
words, power is structural and operates through exclusion and non-decision 
n 
making. Through both informal and formal avenues, think-tanks become 
linked to centre of powers such as the state or the cooperate sector.^ 
Making policy about any particular issue occurs not in a single 
moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over 
a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of 
different types of decision and actors. The policy process is conventionally 
analysed in relation to stages of policy development.'° 
Think tanks, experts and expertise generally become important and 
influential at different points in the policy process. Besides obtaining 
visibility with congress and journalists, experts are understood to play 
8 James Smith, The Idea Brookers, (New York: The Free Press, 1999), p.74 
9 Diane Stone, n. 2, pp.219-220 
10 John W. Kingdown, Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd edition,( New York: 
Longman, 1995) 
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active, important but quite different roles in each stage of the policy process. 
During agenda setting, expertise is useful as warning to policy makers of 
impending problems and as guidance to decision makers on how to revise 
policy. Expertise, at this point, can "alter people to the extent a given 
situation affects their interest or values".'^ As Rochefort and Cobb point out, 
policy research can help to define the boundaries of problems and the 
dimensions of interventions before issues even receive serious debate.'^ 
Once an issue is under deliberation and handed towards policy 
enactment, from the point when policy makers are collectively involved 
until final decisions are imminent, elected officials are positioning 
themselves on issues, and expertise becomes valuable as ammunition in 
policy battles and as support for policy makers, already developed views.'"* 
At this point, policy research often plays little substantive role, but it is not 
unimportant either. As Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier observes, policy makers 
•'can seldom develop a majority position through the raw exercise of power. 
Instead, they must seek to convince other actors of the soundness of their 
position concerning the problem and the consequence of one or more policy 
alternatives".'^ Policy research, as they point out, is useful often vital in this 
16 
process. 
Finally, when issues are resolved and especially after new 
programmes have been created, research becomes useful for those 
implementing policies and programmes. At this stage, policy research can 
serve as assessment and further guidance. Assessment is work that might 
11 Carol H.Wesis, "Congressional Committees as User of Analysis," Journal of Analysis and 
Management, 1989, pp.411-431 
12 Hanck C. Jenkins, Smith and Paul Sabatier, " They Dynamics of Policy - Oriented Learning ," 
in Policy Change and learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach , ed. by Paul A. Sabatier and 
Hank C. Jenkms-Smith (Boulder, Colo: Western Press, 1993) p.45 
13 David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, The Politics of Problem Definition: Sharing the policy 
Agenda (Lawrence: University Press ofKarisas, ) 994), ppA0-}5 
14 Andrew Rich, «. i, p. 108 
15 Sabatier and Jenkines- Smith, Policy Change and Learning, p.45 
16 AndrewRich,/iJ, p.l08 
17 Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy ,( Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1989), 
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point to desirable adjustments to the administration of programmes. This 
work directs policy and guides policy actors towards new issues. Research at 
this point provides substantive guidance on where and how policy makers 
might proceed next. 
Think tanks are an increasingly noticeable mechanism for refining 
and presenting knowledge and expertise in a relevant and usable manner. 
Yet, the study of think tanks is not as extensive as the impact and the 
proliferation of labels. Although the Japanese government deemed 
Washington think-tanks to be so influential that it appointed a diplomatic 
official to monitor their activities, most observers are more doubtful of the 
policy impact of think-tanks. The prevalence of such skepticism is because 
think-tanks are 'hidden participants' in policy, where decision making in the 
formal political areas by political parties, legislatures and executive is a 
more transparent process. While think-tanks do not have a clear, consistent 
or legally designated route to policy influence, their policy entrepreneurship 
in policy and epistemic communities provides informal but haphazard access 
and opportunities for agenda-setting. They invest in a gradual, incremental 
creep of new ideas into prevailing thinking. Despite the absence of proof, 
the impact of many institutes in helping to forge a consensus on foreign 
policy, raising consciousness about environmental, social and other 
problems, or reasserting liberal ideas of free markets, has been and remains 
pervasive. Knowledge and ideas are a source of power. ^ ^ 
Think tanks are an organisational expression of the blending of 
ideas and policies outside formal political arenas. The confluence of these 
elements in institutions other than the executive and legislative warrants 
further investigation. The separation of the public and the private in many 
standard political analyses undermines the requirement to address the role 
played by these non-government organisations which occupy an ambiguous 
18 Andrew Rich, n.3, pp. 108-109 
19 DianeStone,«.2, pp.218-219 
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position between the market and state. Policy institutes are on the margins of 
government but not in government. There is enormous scope for the 
investigation of the mechanisms that connect organizations on the margins 
of government with the conventional structures of government. While the 
approval of public policy remains with elected representatives and appointed 
officials, governments draw upon outside sources of advice and information. 
Think-tanks highlight new problems in need of policy attention and then 
seek to gain legitimacy for such issues on public and governmental agendas. 
Aside from their best efforts to influence policy, think-tanks perform other 
educational and technical role.^ '^  
There is a body of literature which discusses a group of 
organisations variously known as 'imperial brain trusts', 'public policy 
research institutes', 'policy discussion groups', and 'research institutes' and 
'policy planning organisation', 'independent public policy institutes'. More 
often than not they called 'think-tanks'. Yet, the study of think-tanks is not 
as extensive as the proliferation of labels. In the literature that does exist 
there are different disciplinary approaches, differences of opinion on their 
role as well as a lack of definitional clarity and agreement as to what is 
think-tank. The term is problematic, 'think-tanks' was first employed as a 
nickname in the 1940s for the brain - 'brain box'. However, James A. Smith 
reports in his "the idea Brookers", the term 'think tanks' came from World 
War II military slang, when it was used to indicate to a secure room or 
environment where defence scientists and military planners could meet to 
discuss strategy. '^ 
In 1939, chief of the Army Corps H.H. Arnold got involved in a 
discussion with the War Department and with aeronautics faculty members 
at private universities. The consensus among them was the need for the 
creation of an applied aeronautical research laboratory. Arnold's note 
20 Ibid, pp.2-3 
21 James Smith, The Idea Brookers, n.8, pp.xiii-xiv. 
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emphasized the need for co-ordination between the academics, industry and 
the government. The first money for rocket research went to one such 
partnership, between the California Institute of Technology and the 
Guggeheim Aeronautical Laboratory, which successfully developed 
techniques for liquid and solid propellants. After the war, Arnold returned 
to that theme, writing to the Secretary of War that the U.S. government must 
create the framework for "teamwork among the military, government 
agencies, industry, and the universities. Scientific planning must be years in 
advance of the actual research and development work". Arnold's idea for 
think tanks grew out of the experience he had, doing planning work for the 
military in the Second World War. An immense amount of strategic and 
logistical planning came before troops went out into the battlefield. The 
battle tank, in sum, followed the think tank. This approach to warfare 
enabled the troops to be on the ground with maximum efficiency. To do that 
sort of planning, the U.S. government called upon mathematicians and 
engineers and psychologists and an anthropologist to think "outside the box" 
and to devise strategic visions. These ideas, the software of U.S. strategy, 
then had to find their corresponding hardware from the engineers and 
aerodynamicists. Arnold wanted such an entity to survive the end of the 
23 
war. 
What Arnold had in mind was far from the ordinary private research 
institutions that predate the two wars. In the early 1900s, the major 
industrialists set up philanthropic foundations to protect their money from 
taxation and to craft their legacy for generations to come. Ford and 
Rockefeller are the best examples of such foundations. In addition, these 
magnates used their foundations to finance research institutions to play a 
role in the debate over policy. The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (1910), the Institutes for Government Research (1916), The Hoover 
22 Vijay Prasad, «, 7, p.64 
23 Ibid., p.64 
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Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (1919), Council on Foreign 
Relations (1920), The Brooking Institution 91927), and the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (1943), emerged to influence 
the Debates of the day with privately funded research but not work as an 
adjunct to the government. In the early years of Cold War, even these 
groups became "think-tanks". They remained eager not only to influence 
debates, but also to work for the government as contractors and to craft 
policy documents that would go on to become laws.^ '* This rather narrow 
usage of the term has since been expanded to describe over 2,000 US-based 
organisations that are engaged in policy analysis, and approximately 2,500 
•ye 
other similar institutions worldwide. 
As the United States prepared to assume the role of a hegemonic 
power in the aftermath of World War II, a number of think tanks were 
making their presence felt in key policy-making circles. Through their 
publications, conference and meetings with members of the Executive 
Congress and a host of government departments, boards and agencies, think 
tanks such as the Brooking Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations 
were able to develop and expand their networks of influence throughout 
Washington. By the end of the twentieth century think tanks were 
ubiquitous in American policy making. As their numbers grew, think tanks 
came to vary substantially in size and specialisation. Many new think-tanks 
identified with political ideologies - broadly conservative, liberal, or 
centrists. Many relied on aggressive, marketing oriented strategies to 
promote their products and points of view. Think tanks staff often became 
active and visible participants in deeply partisan and divisive political 
debates.^ '^  
24 Ibid., p.64 
25 Donald Abelson,«.'^. 
26 Donald Abelson, n. 1, p.65 
27 Andrew Rich, «J , p.204 
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The trend of think-tanks to become both more ideological and more 
aggressively marketing-oriented is rooted in ideological and institutional 
changes in American politics. The first think-tanks, which formed during the 
progressive era, embodied the promise of neutral expertise. Through the first 
half of the twentieth century, new think tanks largely sought to identify 
government solutions to public problems through the detached analysis of 
experts. Think tanks scholars write on topics relevant to policy makers but 
typically maintained a distance from the political bargaining in the final 
stages of the policymaking process. This analyfic detachment was behaviour 
to which researchers held fast and upon which they prided themselves. It 
was a behaviour that fostered an effective relationship between experts and 
policy makers. Between 1910 and 1960, think-tank experts often influenced 
how government operated. The Brooking Institution informed the creation 
of the Bureau of the Budget at the beginning of the century. The RAND 
Corporation developed applications of systems analysis for the Department 
of Defence at mid-century. In these cases, the influence of think tanks was 
significant, and their research served political purposes. But the policy 
process did not typically compel experts to become directly involved in high 
profile partisan battles. Experts were mobalised by policy makers to 
prescribe possibilities for change. 
Beginning in the 1960, the political environment changed, and the 
forms of and expectations for think tanks evolved substantially. Until the 
1960, large private foundation like the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, in 
combination with the government, had been the principal sources of support 
for think tanks, these were patrons that appreciated, even encouraged, the 
detached and neutral efforts of think-tanks. In the last decades of the 
twentieth century, however, these traditional sources of support were 
partially displaced by individuals, corporations, and smaller, more 
ideological foundations. These new patrons often preferred think tanks that 
28 Ibid, p.205 
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promoted consistent points of view through highly visible, sometimes 
partisan activities. Moreover, in a political environment increasingly 
dominated by anti-government conservatives who posed an effective 
challenge to the statist status quo, the leaders of ideologically consistent, 
particularly conservative think-tanks found an increasingly engaged, 
attentive and reactive audience among poHcy makers.^ ^ 
The opportunities vary, but overall the institutional profile of think 
tanks at the beginning of the twenty-first century looks quite different from 
that of half a century before. Experts behave quite differently from the 
detached, long-range oriented research of previous decades. Present day 
experts, particularly those at think tanks, are often aggressive advocates in 
the hard-fought battles of the policy process. The role of experts changed, 
and the good news for think tanks is that marketing along with other 
international behaviours by experts matters for the degree of exposure their 
research attracts in policy making. So long as these behavours matters, 
think-tanks have something of an advantage with policy makers. Think tanks 
can be sleekly styled marketing machines.'^ ' 
Public policy research organisations, or think tanks, have played a 
significant role in policy-making process and have served as catalysts of 
ideas, innovations and actions. Their greater impact is in generation 'new 
thinking' so that as decision-makes better perceive and effectively respond 
to various issues and challenges. Original insights can alter conceptions of 
the US national interests, influence the ranking of priorities, provide 
roadmaps for action, mobilise political and bureaucratic coalitions, and 
shape the design of lasting institutions. Think tanks play a number of 
critical roles, including: (i) playing a mediating function between the 
29 Ibid, p.205 
30 John W. Kingdon, n. 10, p.228 
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government and public; (ii) identifying, articulating, and evaluating current 
or emerging issues, problems or proposals; (iii) transforming ideas and 
problems into policy issues; (iv) serving as an informed and independent 
voice in policy debates; and (v) providing a constructive forum for the 
exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy 
formulation process/ 
To do so, think tanks need to exploit multiple channels and 
marketing strategies - publishing articles, books and occasional papers, 
appearing regularly on television, op-ed pages and in newspapers 
interviews. Congressional hearings provide another opportunity to influence 
policy choices. Through various institutional channels, think tanks have 
become actively involved in the policy-making process. Whether by inviting 
members of Congress and the Executive to seminars and conference or by 
accepting high-level government or advisory positions, think-tanks scholars 
have established extensive ties to key policy makers.^^ 
Studies on the growth and development of American think-tanks 
reveal that the highly decentralized nature of the American political system, 
combined with the lack of strict party discipline and the large infusion of 
funds from philanthropic foundations have contributed generally to the 
proliferation of think-tanks in the last quarter of the twentieth century.^^ 
Once found almost exclusively in the advanced industrial democracies of the 
west, think tanks now provide information and advice to policy-makers and 
civil society representatives in countries as diverse as India, Lebanon, Chile, 
Bulgaria, Germany, Senegal, and Thailand. Today there are more than three 
thousand think tanks around the world, in almost every country that has 
33 Richard Hass, US Foreign Policy Agenda: International Informations Programme, Electronic 
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more than a few million inhabitants and at least a medium of intellectual 
freedom.^ '' 
While think tanks in recent years have become a global 
phenomenon, US think tanks are distinguished from their counterparts in 
other countries by their ability "to participate directly and indirectly in 
policy-making" and the willingness of policy-makers to turn to them for 
policy advises. 
IDENTIFYING THINK TANKS: UNIQUE FEATURE 
Defining think-tanks and establishing clear boundaries as to which 
organisation fit within the category, is one of the most conceptually difficult 
tasks in analysing these organisations. At the broadest level, one can say 
that think tanks are institutions that provide public policy research, analysis, 
and advice. However, that definition casts the net very broadly. Many 
interest groups, university research centers, and other civil society 
organisation carry out policy research and advice as one of their activities, if 
not the central one. Many government agencies also offer policy research 
and advice as a major function.'*'' In fact, as interest groups have attempted 
to acquire greater policy expertise to enhance their status in the policy 
making community and as think tanks have looked to interest groups to 
learn more about lobbying strategies, the institutional differences between 
think tanks and interest groups have become increasingly blurred.'*' 
Samantha Durst and James Thurber identify traits that are 
attributable to policy research institutes but not to other research 
organisations, thereby adding more details to the character of independent 
37 James McGann and Kent Weaver, n.34, ppl3-14 
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policy research institutes. They note, first, that the majority of them are non-
profit organisations. Second, these think-tanks have minimal levels of 
government funding. Third, the primary orientation of these organisations is 
research. Fourth, unhindered research requires independence. Fifth, they 
stress a strong scholarly or analytic orientation. Yet, Durst and Thurber's 
framework would not meet the satisfaction of all. While some institutes are 
highly academic, not all are 'real researchers' but act as 'policy boutiques'. 
Many think-tanks regurgitate research conducted elsewhere in a simplified 
form. Similarly, it is not clear that policy research institutes function more 
independently with low proportions of government funding. Diverse funding 
sources may well enhance the legitimacy of research result but it is also 
commitment to professional standards that ensures the standing of research. 
Although their study indicates that Washington DC think-tanks do not have 
significant government funding in practice and generally as policy, it does 
not mean that this has always been the case or that it is applicable outside 
the USA.''^ 
Other analysis of think-tanks avoid the dilemmas of models or 
formal typologies by limiting their definition to one or two sentence 
description. James Smith refers to American think tanks as 'private, non-
profit research groups that operate on the margins of ... formal political 
processes."^^ John Gaffney defines the essence of think-tanks as 
'intellectually informed policy proposal structures with the express intention 
of gaining direct access to government. While avoiding the problems of 
categorization, such definitions do not help in establishing the boundaries 
between independent policy research institutes and other organisation. 
In order to narrow the scope of inquiry, the term has frequently been 
limited (especially in British & American usage) to policy research 
organisation that: (i) are independent of government and universities; (ii) 
42 Diane Stone, «.2 pp.11-12 
43 James Smith, «.8, p.xiii. 
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operate on a non-profit basis. This definition, however, has been criticized 
as far too narrow. Dian Stone and Marx Garnett argue that "the notion that a 
think tank requires independence or autonomy fi-om the state and private 
interests in order to be 'fi-ee-thinking' is a peculiarly Anglo-American 
predilection that does not travel well into other cultures".'*^ Certainly 
organisations that are almost totally dependent upon government contracts 
for their revenues, as are many organizations to which the think tanks label 
is routinely applied, cannot be considered fully autonomous. In some 
continental European countries, notably Germany and the Netherlands, think 
tanks frequently have close financial and personnel ties to political parties. 
Moreover, in countries where sponsorship by a government ministry is a 
legal necessity for a think tank to exist, excluding organisations with an 
organisational link to government would convey the misleading impression 
that those regions host no think tanks at all. Similarly, in regions where 
resources for policy research are extremely scare, linkage to university or 
contracting relationship with the private sector may be the only way to cover 
a research institute's core personnel and facilities costs."^ ^ 
Therefore, it would better to pursue a middle course in defining 
think-tanks. Beginning with the core definition of think tanks as a policy 
research organisation that has significant autonomy from govenmient and 
from societal interests such as firm, interest groups, and political parties. 
However, it is also recognisable that autonomy is a relative rather than an 
absolute term. And operational definition of think tanks must differ from 
region to region."*^  
In September 27, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johson remarked on 
Brooking Institudon that: 
44 Diane Stone, «. 2, pp. 11 -12 
45 Diane Stone and Gamett, «J9, p.3 
46 James McGann and Kent Weaver, n. 34, p.5 
47 Ibid, p.5 
106 
The men of the [the] Brooking [Institution] did it by analysing, by 
painstaking research, by objective writing, by an imagination that 
questioned the "going way of doing things, and then they proposed 
alternatives... After 50 years of telling the Government what to do, you are 
more than a private institution .. you are a national institution so important.. 
that if you did not exist we would have to ask someone to create you. 
Speaker of the House, New Gingrich said on Heritage Foundation in 
November 15, 1994 that: 
[The Heritage Foundation] is without question that most far reading 
conservative organisation in the country in the war of ideas, and one 
which has had a tremendous impact not just in Washington, but 
literally across the planet."*^ 
These tributes by a President and a speaker of the House more than 
twenty-eight years apart are high praise for two organisation that are both 
commonly known as think tanks. Yet, in their praise, Johnson and Gingrich 
characterize the accomplishments of these organizations in notably different 
terms. Brooking for its "painstaking research" and "objective writing". 
Heritage for its "far-reaching" efforts in the "war of ideas". These 
characterisation evoke two quite different images and suggest quite different 
understanding of the role of think-tanks in American politics.^" 
Most think tanks share a common objective of shaping and molding 
public opinion and public policy. However, they vary considerably in terms 
of size, resources, area of expertise and the quality and quantity of the 
publications they produce. Another critical set of choices for think tanks 
concerns the breadth of their research agendas. Some institutions define 
their research agendas very broadly to include a range of both domestic and 
international issues, while others confine themselves to one of the two, or to 
a narrower policy sector within domestic or international policy. A broad 
research agenda gives think tanks maximum flexibility to survive changes in 
48 Public Papers of the President of the United Stated Lyndon B. Johson, 1966, Book II 
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the national political agenda and in the interests of funders. At the same 
time, however, lack of specialistion may make it difficult to attract funding 
and attention from donors, the media, and policy makers. Particularly in 
smaller institutions, a broad research agenda may mean that staff lack a 
sufficient critical mass of expertise to undertake large, specialised research 
projects. Moreover, the staff members may not have enough in common to 
benefit from each other's experience. 
Besides focusing on different policy making venues, think 
tanks vary in the scope of their research missions - whether they seek to 
produce research on one, several, or scores of issues. While some think 
tanks, like the Hudson Institute and the Manhattan Institute, spend between 
$7 and $10 million a year to influence broad-ranging policy debates in 
multiple-issue domains, others spend similar amounts but have far narrower 
focuses. Organisafions like the Joint Center for Polidcal and Economic 
Studies and Resources for the Future, for example, are of similar size but 
concerned only with issues affecting African-Americans and the 
environment, respectively.^ 
Nationally focused think tanks fall into three categories with regard 
to the breadth of their research interests. "Full service" think tanks produce 
research and studies that span the broadest array of issue domains, including 
both foreign and domestic policy topics. "Multi-issue" think tanks have an 
identifiable interest in a variety of subjects concerning more than one policy 
domain (e.g., health care and the environmental) but not including all (or 
most) subject areas. Finally, "single issue" organisations, as the label 
implies, limit their focus to only one category of issues (e.g., women's rights 
or low-income housing).^^ 
Amid the growing number of think tanks, no change has been more 
remarkable at both the state and national levels than the association of many 
51 Ibid, p. 17 
52 Ibid.,p.]7 
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new think tanks identifiable ideologies. The emergence of avowedly 
ideological think-tanks, particularly conservative think-tanks, has been 
much remarked upon by journalists and researchers. Yet it is difficult to 
make clear judgement about the presence and nature of organsiational 
ideologies. Andrew Rich in his Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics 
of Experts, classified think tanks as broadly conservative or liberal or as 
organizations with "centrist or no identifiable ideology", based on key 
words and phrases in their mission statements and/or annual reports 
associated with the general, if not always consistent, concerns of 
conservative and liberal ideologies. In classifying conservative organisadon, 
he looked for references to promoting the free market system, limited 
government, individual liberties, religious expression, and traditional family 
values, or to eliminating racial or ethnic preferences in government policy. 
He classified organizations as liberal when they expressed interest in using 
government policies and programmes to overcome economic, social or 
gender inequalities, poverty, or wage stagnation. He also further classified 
calls for progressive social justice, a sustainable environment, or lower 
defence spending as signals of liberal organisations. Finally, Rich classified 
a think tanks as liberal or conservative if its mission was defined as aimed at 
rebuking a counter ideology. Those organisation whose published statements 
either did not readily place them in either broad ideological category or 
qualified them in both categories make up the third group of think tanks 
with centrist or no idenfifiable ideologies. 
53 /Z)/4p.p.l8-19 
Table: 3.1 
A Selected Profile of American Think Tanks 
Think Tanks 
RAND 
Corporation 
Brookings 
Institution 
Council on 
Foreign 
Relations 
Centre for 
Strategic and 
International 
Studies 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Hoover 
Institution 
Hudson 
Institute 
Cato Institute 
Center for 
Reproductive 
Law and Policy 
World Watch 
Institute 
Center for 
Defence 
Information 
1996 Budget 
$117,606,889 
$21,944,000 
$16,930,225 
$14,687,697 
$24,195,189 
$19,500,000 
$9,312,850 
$11,264,791 
$2,782,686 
$2,171,743 
$1,629,387 
Staffs 
525 FTR; 
425S 
80 FTR; 140 
S 
75 FTR; 75 S 
80 FTR; 60 
PTR; 75 S 
80 FTR; 40 S 
80 FTR; 30 
PTR; 200S 
66 FTR and 
S; lOPTR 
17 FTR; 20 S 
16FTR;16S 
18FTR;7S 
Ideology 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Conservative 
Cluster 
Conservative 
Cluster 
Conservative 
Cluster 
Conservative 
Cluster 
Liberal Cluster 
Liberal Cluster 
Liberal Cluster 
Research scope 
Defense, domestic, 
& international, 
mostly government 
contract 
Economic, social, 
political and 
international policy 
Foreign policy and 
International 
relations 
Foreign policy and 
international 
relations 
Economic, social, 
political and 
international policy 
Economic, social 
and international 
policy 
Economic, social, 
political and 
international policy 
Economic, social, 
political and 
international policy 
Reproductive 
rights and health, 
domestic and 
international 
Environmental 
Policy 
Defence policy 
Source: Lynn Hellebust ed. Think Tank Directory: A Guide to Nonprofit Public Policy Research 
Organisations (Topeka, KS: Government Research Service, 1996) 
FTR - Full time researcher; PTR - Part time researcher; S - Support staff 
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Think tanks differ in other important respects as well. Perhaps one 
of the most obvious differences between think tanks is the priority they 
place on research. As research institutions specialising in domestic and 
foreign policy issues, think tanks have often been regarded as disinterested 
observers of political affairs. Committed to scholarly research and 
determined to provide their expertise to decision-makers, early twentieth 
century think-tanks such as the Brooking Institution, the Russell Sage 
Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, were 
rarely viewed as organisations engaged in partisan politics. But think tanks 
have undergone a fundamental transformation in the decades following 
World War II, from institutions that were primarily committed to providing 
impartial advice to government officials in order to enhance decision 
making, to organisation that have in effect become lobbyists for a 
multiplicity of domestic and foreign causes.^ "^  In other words, while think 
tanks may be regarded as 'ivory tower', where scholars can pursue their 
research in relative isolation, that is, in an environment free from the 
administrative and teaching constraints endemic to a university setting, it 
does not appears that these organisation are committed to insulating 
themselves from the policy-making community. On the contrary, though 
many of the studies produced by think-tanks may appears to be divorced 
from reality, individuals affiliated with these institution are actually aware 
of their role in the policy formation process. While some think tanks located 
outside of Washington such as the Hoover Institution may prefer to distance 
themselves from the vicissitudes of American politics, others have willingly 
descended the ivory tower to assume a prominent position in Washington's 
decision-making network.^^ For instance, while the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and the Brooking Institution spent 93% and 60% 
respectively on research in 1989, the Heritage Foundation spent 15.3%. The 
54 John B.Judis, "The Japanese Magaphone: Foreign Influence on Foreign Policy Making," The 
New Republic, 22 January 1990, pp20-25. 
55 Ibid., p.5 
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institute for policy studies, on the hand, did not allocate any of its 1989 
budget to research. Consequently, while some think tanks continue to see 
themselves mainly as research institutions others have assumed different 
roles in the policy-making process, all of these organisations are commonly 
referred to as think tanks.^ ^ 
The organisatonal features of independent policy research institutes 
are too diverse and constantly evolving to be so precisely defined. A flexible 
model that recognizes diversity among policy research institutes would seem 
more appropriate. One way to conceptualise this body of organisation is to 
determine from the outset what they are not. Once the distinctiveness of 
think tanks from other research related bodies is established, then it is 
possible to outline a set of features that characterise the organisations under 
en 
analysis. 
Independent policy research institutes are not interdisciplinary units 
of the type that are found in universities although they have been referred to 
as 'universities without students by scholars like Gray, Critchlow, Weaver 
and Ricci. While think tanks are engaged in research and other scholarly 
activities they do not mimic the universities. They are not involved in 
undergraduate teaching and do not have the same disciplinary range. 
Research fellows are employees and not free to 'follow their intellectual 
priorities without constraints' but are required to pursue organisational 
objective.^ ^ Policy research institutes are also distinguishable from 
philanthropic foundations which tend to fund research rather than do it 
themselves. 'Operating foundations' such as the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) are different from 
foundations that make grants as they use their own funds to conduct policy 
analysis and research. Although consultancies conduct policy research they 
56 Donald E. Abelson, n. 7, p.4 
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operate on a 'for-profit' basis. The primary motivation of the policy research 
institute is research not profit/^ 
They are also very different from advocacy groups, interest groups 
and lobbies. As Carol Weiss notes, while many of these groups undertake 
extensive analysis, it is intended primarily to advance the cause of the 
association and to give them ammunition to use in the policy wars.^° 
Nevertheless, policy research institutes are similar to some public interest 
groups that have a research component to their activities and it can be 
difficult to distinguish between the two types of organisation. However, 
there are still some noticeable differences between thin-tanks and public 
interest groups. The public interest group is more interested in grass-roots 
activity and advocacy whereas the policy research institute is first and 
foremost a research outfit.^' Moreover, unlike single or multiple issue-
oriented interest groups which encourage individuals to coalesce around a 
particular cause, think-tanks perceive themselves as having a much broader 
mandate. While members of think-tanks may embrace a specific concern 
such as the prevention of nuclear war or the protection of domestic 
industries from foreign competition, their interaction with public is far less 
direct. Through their publication and frequent appearances on American 
network newscasts, members of think-tanks attempt to inform the public 
about the potential repercussions of various government policies. However, 
unlike interest groups, think tanks do not encourage mass political 
participation. For instance, while members of Greenpeace and the American 
Medical Association periodically hold protests and demonstrations to 
awaken the public conscience about various concerns, it is doubtful that 
policy analysts from the Brooking Institufion or the Council on foreign 
Relations would resort to the same type of polidcal behaviour to accomplish 
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their objectives. In short, since the priority of most interest groups is to 
influence the political agenda by taking an aggressive stand on a particular 
issue, instead of producing scholarly statics, it would be misleading to 
regard them as think tanks. Yet, given the frequency with which some think-
tanks have become involved in domestic and foreign policy debates, even 
this distinguishing feature is becoming increasingly blurred. 
Think-tanks are also unlike government advisory organisations such 
as policy units, task forces and commissions of inquiry. These government 
bodies often have short life spans and are established at the behest of 
government for the purposes of solving a specific problem. Government 
research bureaus, while they may have some independence, remain tied to 
government objectives and dictates and, hence, can be regarded as part of 
the bureaucratic machinery. 
In sum while think-tanks have many features in common with other 
research organizations, they are different from university centers, 
government agencies, consultancies and interest groups. Accordingly, a 
number of criteria are outlined below as defining characteristics of 
independent policy research institutes. Although, none of the following 
criteria are sufficient in themselves but they provide a guide to some of their 
predominant features and distinguish them from other policy-oriented 
research bodies. 
(a) Organisational Independence and Permanency: 
Policy research institutes usually have formal legal status as an 
entity outside the public sector and independent from corporate and other 
interests. Independence can be determined from their status as a charity or 
non-profit organisation. Generally, they are established on a permanent 
footing. An obvious consequence of their independence is that they have no 
responsibility for the implementation of government policies. Additionally, 
62 Ibid, p.6 
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think tanks have some measures of detachment from government and 
partisan political debate.^'' 
(ii) Self Determination of Research Agendas 
Think-tanks do not have a fixed or dependent policy position - they 
are intellectually independent. The nature of their work is determined by the 
institute rather than any specific interest. 'The research activities and quality 
of work is not controlled by founders or think-tanks managers but by 
internationalized professional standards similar to those of the university 
setting'.^^ Towards this end, think tank managers often require that funding 
be united so that they may be free in determining the questions they address 
and in arriving at their findings.^^ 
(iii) Policy Focus: 
Independent policy institutes are typified by a desire to inform the 
policy process. Their research is not disinterested. They seek some 
involvement with government. Their primary ethos is to establish a 
dynamics between knowledge and policy-making through policy relevant 
analysis. Their strong policy focus differentiates them from university 
research which is often more academic, theoretical and less amenable to 
general consumption. This interplay of knowledge and policy is 
complemented by strategic practices to develop advisory ties to government, 
industry or the public.^^ 
(iv) Public Purpose: 
Think tanks are characterized by public spirit or, at least, the 
rhetoric of contributing to public debate and educating the community. A 
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consistent claim is that they do not represent the interests of any rent-
seeking group but that they desire to conduct research for the sake of 
building a body of knowledge and improving policy. As a consequence, 
think-tanks often have a longer term focus of inquiry than is available to 
policy-makers who must deal with immediate events. One feature of their 
public interest motivation is a heavy emphasis on communication, that is, on 
public, not private inquiry. Publications and research are accessible to the 
public and a premium is placed on plain and concise English, executive 
summaries and practical policy recommendation.^ ^ 
(v) Expertise and Professionalism 
Staff or scholars are usually trained in the policy and social sciences 
or have considerable first hand experience from careers in government 
service. Their academic credentials, technical skills and methodological 
approaches are not only the intellectual resources of staff but also a source 
of legitimacy for their research findings and recommendations. Research 
staffs are engaged in the intellectual analysis of policy and are concerned 
with the ideas, concepts and assumptions that inform policy.''^  
(vi) Organisational yield: 
The primary products of think tanks are research, analysis and 
advice. Policy advice comes in a variety of formats ranging from the 
multiple messages of books, journals, newsletters, magazine stories and op-
ed pieces to tapes, videos, radio and television programming. More informal 
but equally important think-tanks activities such as seminars, workshops and 
conferences, social meetings and fund raising functions as well as carefully 
nurtured networks provide the medium for interaction of scholars with 
decision-makers, opinion leaders and sponsors. Additionally, think-tanks 
produce human capital in the form of policy analysts who go into 
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journalism, government or business with think tank experience and, in the 
case RAND, even Ph.D. graduates. Just as the product is diverse, so are the 
forms of conveying the message.^' 
In summary, independent policy research institutes are usually non-
profit organisations engaged in the analysis of public policy issues 
independent from government, political parties and interst groups. Sources 
of funding may come from government but these institutes maintain their 
'academic' or research freedom and are not beholden to any specific 
interest. They attempt to influence policy through intellectual argument and 
analysis rather than lobbying. They are public spirited in the sense of 
seeking to inform and improve policy, and profess to educate the community 
and act in the public interest. While commonly displaying a high level of 
social scientific expertise and/or familiarity with governmental structures 
and processes there is considerable diversity in style and output of think-
tanks. 
The above sets of characteristics do not add up to create an ideal. 
Institutes do not need to display such characteristics in equal measure. Some 
are more academic than policy oriented while others are more accessible to 
the general public compared with relatively exclusive establishments like 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Atlantic Council. Involvement 
with government will not only vary from think-tank to think-tank but also 
from one country to another. After the World War II the number f new 
American research centers and policy institutes increased dramatically and, 
especially since the 1970s, numbers have boomed.'''^  
TYPOLOGY OF THINK TANKS: DIFFERENTIATION AND 
SPECIALISATION 
While it may not be possible to accurately define think-tanks, it is 
useful to establish typologies which classify policy research institutions 
71 ]bid,p.\6 
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according to their research agenda, staff composition and main institutional 
goals. Two of the most frequently cited classifications of think tanks were 
constructed by Kent Weaver and James McGann. According to Weaver, 
there are three main types of think-tanks in the United States which he refers 
to as: universities without students, contract research organisations and 
advocacy think-tanks. McGann however, identifies seven types of think-
tanks: academic diversified, academic specialised, contract/consulting, 
advocacy, policy enterprise, literary agent/publishing house and state-
based'''*. Dian Stone identified five types of think-tanks. These are''^ -
(i) Corporate or business affiliated think tanks' 
(ii) Governmentally created or state sponsored think tanks; 
(iii) Political party (or candidate) think tanks; 
(iv) Independent civil society think tanks established as non-profit 
organization? 
(v) Policy research institutes located in or affiliated with a university. 
Yet, even Weaver and McGann acknowledge that these types of 
classifications do not account for every type of think-tank in the United 
States. University-affiliated and vanity think-tanks could also be added to 
this growing list. 
72 /i/a',ppl6-18 
73 Kent Weaver, The Changing World of Think Tanks , PS: Political Science and Politics , 22(3), 
1989,pp.563-78 
74 James McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholar and Influence, 
75 Diane Stone, " Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Trannsation (Discussion paper)", 
Asian Development Bank Institutes symposium: How to Strengthen Policy Oriented Research 
and Training in Vietnam, 31st August 2005, pp4-5, http://www.adbi.org/files/2005.dp36.think. 
tanks.jfppt.pdf. 
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While think tanks may perform a number of roles in their host 
societies. However, no all think tanks do the same things to the same extent. 
Over the last eighty-five years, several distinctive organizational forms of 
think tanks have come into being that differ substantially in terms of their 
operating styles, their patterns or recruitment, and their aspirations to 
academic standards of objectivity and completeness in research. A number 
of different typologies of think tanks have been offered by analysts. 
McGann and Weaver argued that most think-tanks can be understood as 
variations on one or more of four basic ideal types: academic (or university 
without students), contract researchers, advocacy tanks and party think 
tanks. ^ ^ 
Academic and Contract Research Think Tanks 
The first two types, academic and contract research think tanks, 
have strong similarities. Both tend to recruit staff with strong academic 
credentials such as PhDs from prestigious universities, and both tend to put 
a strong emphasis on the use of rigorous social science methods and strive to 
have their research perceived as objective and credible by a broad audience. 
They differ largely in their funding sources, agenda setting, and outputs. 
Academic think tanks are typically funded by a mixture of foundations, 
corporations, and individuals. Their agenda is usually set internally, and at 
least in part through a bottom-up process in which the researchers 
themselves play an important role. However, funders are increasingly 
playing an important role in agenda setting, even at academic think-tanks. 
Reflecting the academic training and orientation of their staffs, the research 
outputs of academic think tanks most often take the form of academic 
monographs and journal articles. Contract researchers, on the other hand, are 
usually funded in large part by contracts with government agencies. The 
funding agencies typically play a very large role in setting the agenda, and 
outputs often take the form of reports to those agencies rather than publicly 
no 
circulated books and articles. 
77. McGann and Weaver, n. 34, pp7-8 
78. Ibid.,p.7 
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Advocacy Think Tanks and Party Think Tanks 
The other two types of think tanks also have a family resemblance 
to one another. Advocacy tanks, while maintaining formal independence, are 
linked to particular ideological groupings or interests. They tend to view 
their role in the policy making process as winning the war of ideas rather 
than as a disinterested search for the best policies, and they are more often 
than not staffed by nonacademics that are less interested in basic research. 
They frequently draw their resources disproportionately from sources linked 
to those interests, for example, corporations for conservative think tanks, 
and labour union for liberal ones. Their staffs typically are drawn more 
heavily from government, political parties, and interest groups than from 
university faculties, and are less "credential" in term of social science 
expertise. Their research products are likely to be closer to brief advocacy 
pieces than to academic tomes. Political party think-tanks, similarly, are 
organized around the issues and platform of a political party and are often 
staffed by current or former party officials, politicians, and party members. 
The agenda is frequently heavily influenced by the needs of the party. This 
brand of think tanks is most prevalent in Western Europe, particularly in 
Germany.'' 
Each of these ideal types of think tanks has distinctive advantages in 
its efforts to "speak truth to power", but each also has particular challenges 
and tensions. Academic think tanks, for example, precisely because they 
place a strong emphasis on scholarly objectivity and social science 
credentials for staff, face a particularly strong tension between the 
objectives of scholarly objectivity and completeness in research, on the one 
hand, and policy relevance on the other. Academic authors generally favor 
the former, while policy makers prefer findings that are brief, clear, and free 
of the qualifications and fence-sitting with which scholars normally cover 
their conclusions.^ *^ 
Contract researchers clearly have an advantage over academic think 
tanks in terms of policy relevance, since the policy makers often have 
79 Ibid., p.7 
80 Ibid., p.8 
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outlined in fairly specific terms what types of questions they want answered. 
Their tension is likely to be primarily between the objectives of scholarly 
objectivity and the policy preferences of their clients, especially if they are 
heavily dependent on a particular client. When the funder-client of research 
has clear preferences, there is a risk that the funder may try to influences, 
there is a risk that the funder may try to influence the results of research or 
refuse to release research that does not match those preferences. At a 
minimum, this tension may pose a threat to the perceived objectivity of that 
research.^' 
Advocacy tanks, which tend to have strong value positions and 
often take institutional positions on particular policy issues, face a tension 
between maintaining consistent value positions and perceptions of 
objectivity and completeness; to the extent that their messages are perceived 
to reflect inflexible values rather than objective analysis, they may simply 
be ignored by a large part of their potential audience. Similarly, the party 
affiliation of think-tanks limits their objectivity, credibility, and 
independence; when their party is not in power, their access to policy 
makers and influence on policy makers is likely to be quite limited.^^ 
These ideal types of think tanks have served as models for new 
organizations being established or as points of departure for existing 
institutions that wanted to reinvent themselves. It is also important to keep 
in mind several caveats about these categories. First, most think tanks do not 
fit neatly into one category, but share the attributes of several. The barriers 
are increasingly being challenged as, for example, academic think tanks try 
to imitate some of the marketing savvy of advocacy tanks, while advocacy 
tanks try to bolster their credibility with longer, more carefully researched 
studies.^^ 
Second, hybrids are increasingly common between think tanks and 
organisational siblings that have some similarities to think tanks but stand 
outside the narrow definition of those organisations. These organisational 
hybrids are especially common in the developing and transitional 
economies. 
81 
82 
83 
Ibid.., 
Ibid., 
Ibid, 
,p.8 
p.8 
p.8 
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Table: 3.3 
Think Tanks and Their Organisational Siblings 
Think tank type Organizational 
sibling/ functional 
substitute 
Formal differences Informal differences 
Academic Think 
Tank 
University research 
center 
Formal 
Independence from 
University 
Degree of research 
center autonomy in 
financing, agenda 
setting and staffing 
Government 
research agency or 
bureau 
Formal 
independence from 
government 
Degree of autonomy 
in agenda setting, 
funding, and 
dissemination of 
research results 
Contract Researcher For profit consulting 
firm 
Formal nonprofit 
status 
Temporary 
government 
investigative 
commission 
Presumption of 
perpetuity in 
organizational 
operations, formal 
Independence from 
government 
Advocacy Tanks Interest groups Formal status as a 
nonprofit tax 
exempt organization 
Percent of resources 
devoted to research; 
use of objectivity 
and completeness 
criteria in 
performing and 
reporting research 
results 
Public Interest 
nongovernmental 
organization 
Percent of resources 
devoted to research; 
use of objectivity 
and completeness 
criteria in 
performing and 
reporting research 
results 
Party think tank Research arm of 
political party 
Formal structural 
separation from 
associated political 
party 
Organizational 
autonomy in setting 
agenda and drafting 
policy conclusions 
Source: McGann, and Weaver, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action, New 
Brunswick, Transaction Publications, 2000, pl l 
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Table 3.3, shows the organisational siblings for each of the four 
types of think tanks noted above: university research centers for academic 
think tanks; for profit consulting agencies, government research 
organizations, and temporary government commissions for contract 
researchers; interest groups and public interest lobbies for advocacy tanks; 
and party research departments for party think tanks. This table suggests, 
going back to the earlier discussion of think tank definitions, that there is 
not a rigid distinction between organisations that are think-tanks and those 
that are not. Instead, there is a continuum between think tanks and their 
organizational siblings. Where the dividing line is set along that continuum 
is somewhat arbitrary. Many organisation stand astride the division between 
the narrow definition of think tanks and their organisational siblings.^'' 
Table 3.3 also suggests that the characteristics that separate think-
tanks from their organisational siblings concern informal characteristic of 
financing, agenda setting, staffing and so on as well as formal structural 
attributes. Many research centers, for example, have close financial and 
staffing linkages with universities, but maintain significant independence in 
their governance, financing, and agenda setting as well. 
Finally, the table suggests that organisational siblings of the various 
types of think tanks may also be functional substitutes for them: in other 
words, if a society seems to have an unusually low number of academic 
think tanks and contract researchers in comparison to similar societies, it 
may be because it is rich in university research centers, government research 
agencies, and for-profit consulting firms that are performing the same tasks 
while falling outside the formal definition of think-tanks. Similarly, some 
countries may have a political tradition of udlizing temporary government 
research commissions, established by and reporting to government, but 
operated independently of government, to perform many of the programme 
84 Ibid, p.9 
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evaluation and fundamental policy rethinking roles that in countries like the 
United States might be performed by contract research think tanks.^^ 
WAVE OF AMERICAN THINK TANKS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Public policy research institutes are twentieth century phenomenon 
that has their origins in the advanced industrial democracies in United States 
and Western Europe. The rise of modern think tanks parallels the rise of the 
United States. Rooted in the social sciences and supported by private 
individuals and foundations, think tanks began to appear around 1900 as a 
part of a larger effort to bring the expertise of scholars and managers to bear 
on the economic and social problems of this period. The growth of think 
tanks since that time appears to be at least partially tied to a series of major 
political, social, and economic events that shattered the conventional 
wisdom of the period and forced policy makers and the public to find 
innovative solution to complex policy problems.^^ 
In the early part of this century, the challenges of managing an 
advanced industrial economy and increased commitments abroad created a 
demand to bring science and reason to government. The earliest wave of 
think-tanks shared this objective of bringing expert, nonpartisan, 
disinterested advice to governments. The period following World War II 
saw an increased demand for defence experts and technocrats to help 
manage the defence establishment and its new security arrangements around 
the world. In the United States, the RAND Corporation, along with many 
other research organistions, provided a ready supply of what have become 
known as 'defence intellectuals' to help develop the defence hardware and 
systems that were put in place after World War II. They served as the 
models for a new generation of contract research think-tanks. The social 
turmoil of the 1960s and its attendant political pressures provided the 
85 Ibid., p.9 
86 Richard Hass, n. 33, iip 
McGann and Weaver, n. 34,-p\2 87 „ . .^„ ,„ . . . . 
88 Smith, n. 8. 
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impetus for the creation of the Urban Institute, and many other organizations 
that were the architects of social and environmental programmes during this 
period. More recently, crises of the welfare state, a collapse of the 
Keynesian consensus on macroeconomic management, and the rise of a 
worldwide conservative movement has contributed to the rapid expansion in 
advocacy oriented think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation from which 
have organized in order to advance a particular philosophy or issue.^^ 
The end of the Cold War and the political and economic reforms 
that it unleashed created another wave of new institutions, which were 
created to provide intellectual and political muscle for the transition taking 
place in eastern and central Europe and the former Soviet Union.^^ 
Breaking with the tradition established by Robert Brookings, 
Andrew Carnegie and the other founders of early twentieth century think 
tanks who were determined to insulate their scholars from partisan politics, 
several contemporary research institutions often described as 'advocacy 
think tanks'^' because of their ideologically derived policy agendas, have 
consciously avoided erecting a barrier between policy research and political 
advocacy. Rather than promoting scholarly inquiry as a means to better 
serve the public interest, a goal embraced by think-tanks in the progressive 
era, advocacy think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the institute 
for Policy Studies have come to resemble interest groups and political action 
committees by pressuring decision makers to implement policies compatible 
with their ideological beliefs and those shared by their generous benefactors. 
No longer content observing domestic and foreign affairs from the comfort 
of their book-lived offices, think-tanks have made a concreted effort to 
89 McGannand Weaver, n.i4,p.l2 
90 Ibid., p. 12 
91 R.Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks" .PS: Political Science and Politics, 
22(3), 1989, p.567 
92 Frank Fisher, "Policy Elites and the Politisations of Experts", Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy and Administration, 4(3), 1991,pp.332-353 
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become part of the political process.^ ^ Change in the ideological and funding 
environment since the 1960s have stimulated the growth in number of more 
ideological and marketing oriented think-tanks.^ "^  
Think tanks that formed at the beginning of the twentieth century 
reflected an ideological environment that valued neutral expertise and 
believed in its potential for devising rigorous solutions to public problems. 
Those who supported the first think-tanks valued their capacity for 
producing credible research that attracted the interest of policy makers 
without involving the experts or organisations directly in high profile 
controversies or ideologically changed political debates. Sources of support 
for think-tanks changed somewhat through the first half of the century and 
confidence in social science expertise evolved, but until the 1960s, think 
tanks generally emerged in a political environment that encouraged and 
fostered a balancing of organizafional credibility and political access.^ ^ 
As the number of think tanks has grown, they have become notably 
more diverse with regard to their size, scope of research and intended policy 
making audiences. 
There is little consensus on when the first think tank was created in 
the USA. While some maintain that the proto-typical think-tanks were 
established during the early 1990s, others contend that the seeds of 
contemporary think-tanks were planted well before the end of the nineteenth 
century.^ ^ According to Paul Dickson, who wrote the first major study on the 
think tanks in 1970s, there is evidence to suggest the research institutions 
began to advise the US government as early as the 1830s. Dickson maintains 
that the relationship between think tanks and government started in 1832, 
when the Secretary of the Treasury, confronted by pesky steam boilers that 
93 Donald E. Abelson, n.l, p.3 
94 Andrew Rich, «J , p.72 
95 Ibid, p.72 
96 Donald E. Abelson, n.l, p.23 
97 See,Paul Dickson, Think Tanks, (New York: Atheneum), 1970 
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kept exploding in American steamboats, contracted with the Franklin 
Institute of Philadelphia for a study of the problem. Since then, the 
government has been paying for more and more outside brainpower each 
decade.^^ Dickson selected 1832 as his point of departure to study the 
government's growing dependence on think tanks to resolve various 
political, economic, social, technical and security problems. Yet fails to 
offer any justification for beginning his analysis on this particular date. 
Moreover, since Dickson neglects to provide any documentation to support 
his chronology of the earliest think-tanks, it is questionable whether the 
Franklin Institute was the first organisation which provided scholars with an 
opportunity to share their research finding with government officials.^^ 
The development, refinement and disseminadon of ideas did not 
begin with the creation of the Franklin Institute as Dickson argues but 
preceded the founding of the American Republic. However, like many 
studies which followed the publication of his pioneering work, Dickson 
devotes only passing reference to the historical evolution of think-tanks 
before proceeding to analyse in detail such high profile research centers as 
the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute. Yet, while it is difficult to 
determine with any degree of certainly which organisation, association, or 
political movement deserves to be regarded as the first think-tanks, it is 
nonetheless possible to shed light on those organisations which may have 
served as models for such venerable policy research institutions as the 
Brookings Institution and the Council on foreign Relations.^ *^° 
Published two decades after Dickson's sweeping over view of 
American think-tanks, James Smith's informative study on the emergence of 
policy experts in twentieth-century America fills in many of the historical 
gaps left by his predecessors. Through Smith agrees with Dickson that the 
origin of contemporary think tanks can be traced to the nineteenth century. 
98 Ibid., p.9 
99 Donal E. Abelson, n.l, p.23 
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he argues that it was not until six months after the civil war ended that 
academics began to take the first steps toward creating independent research 
organsiations. According to Smith, when approximately one hundred people, 
including writers, journalists, educators, scientists and government officials, 
met at the Massachusetts state House in Boston in October 1865 to discuss 
ways to improve the economic and social well-being of individual states 
slowly recuperating from the ravages of war, intellectuals began to 
recognize the benefits which could be derived by sharing their expertise.'"' 
For William Domhoff, the author of several books on the formation 
and composition of policy elites in the United States, the creation of 
professional associations played an important role in fostering closer ties 
between social scientists however, he argues that it was the establishment of 
two business reform organizations near the turn of the twentieth century that 
enabled research institutions to gain access to the policy-making 
community. According to Domhoff, the Chicago Civic Federation (CCF) 
founded in 1894 and its successor, the National Civic Federation (NCF) 
established in 1990, were among the first research institutions to establish 
formal institutional links with local, national, federal government 
102 
departments. 
While the activities of the NCF, the CCF and several other smaller 
research institutions deserve to be recorded in the early history of American 
think-tanks, it was during the first two decades of the twentieth century that 
the impact of policy research institutions began to be felt. Five think-tanks 
in particular left a lasting impression on domestic and international politics 
prior to and in the aftermath of World War I:'''^ The Russell Sage 
Foundation (1907), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910), 
100 Ibid.p.24 
101 James A. Smith,«. 5„ p.24 
102 DonaldE. Abelson, n.7,p.25 
103 James McGann, "Academics to Ideologies: A brief History of the Public Policy Research 
Industry" , PS: Political Science and Politics. 25(4), December, 1992, pp. 733-40 
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the Institute for Government Research (1916), the Hoover Institute (1919) 
and the Council on foreign Relations (1921).'*^ '* 
THE FIRST GENERATION: Think Tanks as Policy Research 
Institutions 
The first major wave of foreign policy think-tanks in the United 
States began to emerge in the early 1990s, largely as a result of the desire of 
leading philanthropists and intellectuals to create institutions where scholars 
and leaders from the public and private sectors could congregate to discuss 
and debate world issues. Five institutions in particular began to make their 
presence felt in the first decades of 20"" century, Carnegie Endowment for 
Internationals Peace (1910), established by Pittsburg Steel baron Andrew 
Carnegie; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (1919), 
created by former President Herbert Hoover, and the Council on Foreign 
Relations (1921), an institution which evolved from a monthly dinner club 
to become one of the most respected foreign affairs institutions in the world. 
Two other think tanks, the Institute for Government Research (1916), which 
later merged with two other institutes to create the Brookings Institution 
(1927), a Washington icon, and the American Enterprise Institute for public 
Policy Research (1943), a highly respected conservative think tank, would in 
time begin to focus considerable attention on a wide range of foreign policy 
issues.'^ ^ 
These and other organisations were established under different and 
often unusual circumstances. However, each was formed for the purpose of 
providing an atmosphere in which to encourage scholars to investigate 
social, economic and political issues.'°^ These public policy research 
institutes are committed to applying their scientific expertise to a host of 
policy issues. Functioning, in the word of Brookings scholar Kent Weaver, 
104 Donald E. Abelson, n.l, p.227 
105 Donald E. Abelson. «.< iip 
106 Donald E. Abelson. n. /, p.28 
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as "universities without students", think tanks like the Carnegie Endowment 
and Brookings assign the highest priority to producing quality academic 
research. They publish books, journals, and other material that is intended 
for different target audiences. Although scholars from these institutions 
occasionally provided advice to policy makers when they were first 
established, their primary goal was not to directly influence policy 
decisions, but to help educate and inform policy-makers and the public 
about the potential consequences of pursuing a range of foreign policy 
operations. In part, the willingness of policy research-oriented think tanks to 
remain detached from the political process stemmed from their commitment 
to preserving their intellectual and institutional independence, something 
many contemporary think tanks have been prepared to sacrifice.'^^ 
The Second Generation; The Emergence of Government Contractors 
In the aftermath of World War II, the need for independent foreign 
policy advice became even more critical for American policy-makers. Faced 
with the increased responsibilities of becoming a hegemonic power in a bi-
polar world, decision-makers in Washington required the insight and 
expertise of think-tanks that could help them develop a coherent and sound 
national security policy. By 1948, policy-makers knew where to turn. The 
RAND Corporation was created in May 1948 to promote and protect U.S. 
security interest during the nuclear age. 
In addition to filling a void in the external policy research 
community, RAND ushered in a new generation of think-tanks government 
contractors - policy research institutions largely funded by government 
departments and agencies whose research was intended to address specific 
concerns of policy makers.'*^^ While philanthropic foundation, corporations 
and private citizens played an integral role in establishing and supporting 
107 Donald E. Abelson, «. 4. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid 
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many of the earliest think-tanks, following World War II, the US. 
Acknowledging the invaluable contribution of defence scientists during the 
war, the American government recognized the enormous benefits that could 
be derived by continuing to fund private and university based research and 
development centers. My tapping the expertise of engineers, physicists, 
biologists, statisticians and social scientists, government officials hoped to 
meet many of the new challenges confronting the United States as it 
assumed the role of a global hegemonic power. Leading the new generation 
of think-tanks or government contractors was the RAND Corporation in 
Santa Monica, California having branched office in Washington D.C.^^^ In 
the ensuing years, RAND would inspire the creation of several other 
government contractors including the Hudson Institute (1961) and the Urban 
Institute (1968).'" 
The Third Generation: The Rise of Advocacy Think tanks 
The Brooking Institution, the Council on Foreign Relation and 
several other research institutions continued to devote considerable 
resources to examining public policy issues in the decades following the 
war. However, it soon became apparent that their desire to provide impartial 
policy expertise to government officials in order to serve the public interest, 
would not to be inherited by the next generation of think-tanks. Indeed, 
while many of the newly emerging think-tanks established legitimate 
research programmes, their primary goal was not to pursue social science 
research, but to advance their ideological agenda in the polifical arena. By 
relying on a variety of lobbying techniques to market their ideas, advocacy 
think-tanks began to take root in and around the nation's capital. 
The virtual explosion of advocacy think-tanks since the early 1970s 
has not only contributed to the politicisation of policy expertise, but perhaps 
more importantly, it has altered the relationship between think-tanks and 
ilO Donald E. Abelson, «, 7, p.47 
111 DonaldE. Abelson, «. 4. 
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government. As more think tanks began to participate in the policy-making 
community, the strategies they employed to increase their visibility changed 
dramatically. Not other type of think tank has generated more media 
exposure in the last three decades than the so-called advocacy think-tanks. 
In an environment where think tanks now had to "compete for ideas'',"^ in 
the political arena, their priorities began to change. Providing decision 
makers with timely and policy relevant advice, rather than engaging in long-
term scholarly research, became the primary concern for many new think-
111 
tanks. Combining policy research with aggressive marketing techniques, a 
function they share in common with many interest groups, advocacy 
oriented think tanks have fundamentally altered the nature and role of the 
think tank community. Unlike think tanks in the early part of the 20* 
century that were reluctant to become embroiled in policy debates, advocacy 
think tanks including the center for strategies and International studies 
(1962), and the Heritage foreign policy. As the US think tanks industry has 
become more competitive, most think tanks have come to realise the 
importance of capturing the attention of the public and the minds of policy-
makers.""* 
The Fourth Generation : Legacy-Based Think Tanks 
The newest type of think tank to emerge in the foreign policy-
making community is what some have referred to as "Legacy-based". 
Although they may not truly constitute a new wave, they nonetheless 
represent a new and interesting development. Created by aspiring office 
holders (or their supporters) and by former Presidents intent on advancing 
their political and ideological beliefs well after leaving office, these think 
tanks are beginning to attract some attention in the policy making 
community. While legacy-based think-tanks such as the (Jimmy) Carter 
112 Donald E.AbeIson,A7.7, p.52 
113 Ibid.p.52 
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center"^ and the (Richard) Nixon Centre for Peace and Freedom have 
developed a wide range of research programmes, some vanity think tanks 
appear more concerned with engaging in political advocacy. Vanity think 
tanks are particularly interested in generating or at the very least 
repackaging ideas that will help lend intellectual credibility to the political 
platforms of politicians, a function no longer performed adequately by 
mainstream political parties."^ As the U.S. think tanks industry has become 
more competitive, most think tanks have come to realise the importance of 
capturing the attention of the public and minds of policy-makers."' 
THE AMERICAN THINK TANKS: EXPLANATION FOR THE 
PROLIFERATION 
The American political system has provided a fertile environment 
for the establishment of think tanks. American writers often assert that 
independent policy research institutes are unique to their political system. 
Think-tanks are often portrayed as a 'quintessentially American institution'. 
Many go so far as to say they are 'unique' to America. Dror describes think 
tanks as an 'invention' emerging from the peculiarities of the American 
political system. Studies on the growth and development of American 
think-tanks reveal that the highly decentralized nature of the American 
political system, combined with the lack of strict party discipline and the 
large infusion of funds from philanthropic foundations have contributed 
generally to the proliferation of think tanks in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century."^ 
Carol Weiss has developed the most comprehensive set of 
explanations for the proliferation of policy analysis organisations in the 
115 For Detail See, Road Troester, Jimmy Carter as Peace Makers: A Post Presidential Biography , 
(New York: Preager Publishers, 1996); and Douglas Brinkley, " Jimmy Carter's Modest Quest 
for Global Peace", Foreign Affairs, 74(6), November/ December 1995, pp.90-100 
116 Winand Gellner, " Political Think Tanks and Their in the US - Institutional Setting", 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 25(3), Summer, 1995, Pp497-510 
117 Donald E. Abelson, n.4. 
118 Diane Stone, n. 2, p.50 
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USA.'^ ° It is on these points that some American discussants of think tanks 
base their claim that they are unique or peculiar to America. 
The first and probably most important reason that Weiss offers is 
the fragmentation of the US governmental system. The separation of powers 
allows both Congress and the President to initiate legislation. A divided 
government with neither the Republicans nor Democrats controlling both the 
white House and Congress for much of the past 25 years - has fuelled 
demand for intellectual ammunition on both sides. Executive branch 
departments are also fragmented. They are 'made up of strong component 
agencies, each with its own interests, client and policy preferences'. '^'These 
circumstances mean that secretaries have difficulty controlling their 
'Balkanised' departments. Additionally Congress is fragmented. Both the 
Senate and House of Representatives operate independently when fashioning 
legislation. Power is dispersed over a large number of committees and sub-
committees. As party discipline is weak, members of Congress formulate 
many of their own policy priorities and pursue their agendas with 
considerable independence. The final point of fragmentation in the USA 
system is the division of powers between the state and federal governments. 
The consequence of fragmentation for policy institutes is two fold. 
Numerous policies are created and demand from several audience for policy 
analysis and research has grown in what McGann calls the 'hyper pluralistic 
nature of American society'.'^^ 
Second, Weiss argues that few bodies aggregate interests in the 
American political system. Political parties have not played as preeminent a 
role in policy development as in other countries. There are few sanctions 
with which American parties can control their members and force adherence 
to party platforms. Nor are there strong corporatist structures and peak 
] 19 Donald E. Abelson , n.4. 
120 Wesis, 1992, n. (50, p.6 
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associations representing sectors of society such as labour, business and 
other interests that are evident in some European countries. As a 
consequence, there are no formal mechanisms to bring these sectors into 
negotiation with government over policy.'^^ 
Weiss's third point also identified by Dror Marsh and Ricci is the 
increasing complexity of government. Policy problems cannot be treated in a 
vacuum as they are interconnected with other issues. Furthermore, 'finding 
an appropriate expert or consultant has become difficult because problems 
do not present themselves in configurations that match the specialisations of 
the academic disciplines.'^'' Policy-makers are frequently encountering 
situations in which uncertain conditions prevail. Big government, 
globalisation and the flood of information from interest groups, industry and 
new government programmes mean that think-tanks become one source of 
expertise able to explain the nature, causes and remedies of problems. They 
can be functional for governments and bureaucracies in conditions of 
cabinet and ministerial overload. They augment in-house research 
capacities, circumvent time and institutional constraints and alert elites to 
changing global circumstances.'^^ 
Fourth, the executive branch of government draws on unelected 
officials to staff many policy-making posifions which weakens the 
'prerogatives, privileges and power of the bureaucracy'. Appointed 
administrators have turned away from the bureaucracy for alternative 
« 
sources of advice. In a similar vein, Nelson Polsby argues that the 
growth of policy research institutes has been the result of 'certain 
characteristic of American Government, most notably its permeability'. 
Polsby was referring to a continuous reciprocal flow of senior staff in and 
123 Ibid.,pAl. 
124 Wesis, n. 60, p. 7. 
125 DianeStone, n. 2,p.41 
126 Wesis, «. 60, p.8. 
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out of government service. The policy institute 'acts as a revolving door for 
individuals to come and go from administrative agency to think-tanks to 
agency, to media, back for a Sabbatical at [the think-tanks] and finally into a 
high level policy making position in a sympathetic administration'. 
Alongside the propensity of US government to contract out research, 
permeability also encourages a dependency on outside organisations for 
intelligence, advice and analysis. 
Fifth, the openness of the American system to external sources of 
advice has evolved over the last half century. The Presidency became 
increasingly institutionalised under Truman and Eisenhower when many 
positions of a policy advisory nature were created in bodies such as the CIA, 
the National Security Council, and the Council of Economic advisers and in 
the State Department. After the World War II, Congress expanded existing 
bodies such as the Congressional Research Service or created new bodies 
like the congressional Budget office. Far from displacing advisers outside 
government in universities and think-tanks, the institutionalisation of advice 
presented new opportunities. The new advisers, often with academic 
backgrounds, and put in command of large financial resources, expanded 
links to think-tanks and universities. The Johnson Administration's Great 
Society programmes, for example, generated contract research work for the 
urban and social policy think tanks on poverty and racial issues. The Urban 
Institutes, in particular, was set up by seven individuals handpicked by 
President Johnson, to study the needs of US cities. The new think-tanks 
mirrored the rise of a new managerial, expert or technocratic class in areas 
such as health, finance, the environment, defence, intellectual property, 
trade, communications and transport. Keynesian-inspired public spending 
and technocratic prescriptions spurred government involvement in and 
129 Ibid., pp. 40-4\. 
130 Ibid,,p.41 
131 Smith, n.8,pp. 113-116 
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responsibility for these increasingly technical fields of public policy.'^^ With 
increasing industrialisation, economic interdependence and government 
intervention, there was, and remains, a greater role for the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge. 
The American think-tanks industry is not unique. Admittedly, the 
scale of think-tanks development is extensive and there is greater 
diversification. This may be as much the consequence of extensive grant 
giving by American foundations as the more permeable character of, and 
points of access into, the US governmental system. However, just as the 
American system of think tanks has grown and evolved so this is occurring 
in Britain, al-beit slower and on a smaller scale. Assertions of American 
exceptionalism do not explain the presence of many well established policy 
institutes outside the USA, nor account for the significant growth in the 
number of policy research institutes in other countries. Such arguments 
detract attention from the requirement for comparative study and neglect the 
emerging international networks among think tanks.'^'^ 
Once found almost exclusively in the USA and Europe, think tanks 
now provide information and advice for policy makers around the world. As 
think tanks have expanded geographically, they have had to adapt to new 
conditions. Think tanks have faced different challenges that have forced 
them to develop innovative ways to maintain their operations. Outside US, 
most countries do not have strong philanthropic tradition or tax laws that 
encourage private philanthropy; therefore, think tanks in these countries are 
primarily funded by governments, political parties, or international donors. 
This makes these institutions particularly dependent on sources of support 
that may be very unstable. The lack of independence support also raises 
questions about both the long-term validity of these institutions and their 
132 Diane Stone, n. 2, pp. 40-41. 
133 Ibid.,p.4\. 
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ability to provide truly independent research and analysis. Nevertheless, 
many think tanks in these regions have attained a highly visible presence 
and participate actively in their countries' policy debates.'^ ^ 
The growth of public policy research organizations over the last two 
decades has been nothing less than explosive. Not only have these 
organizations increased in number, but the scope and impact of their work 
has expanded dramatically. Still, the potential of think-tanks to support and 
sustain democratic governments and civil societies around the world is far 
from exhausted. The challenge for the new millennium is to harness the vast 
reservoir of knowledge, informations, and associational energy that exist in 
public policy research organisation in every region of the world. It is 
essential that the US state Department and other international agencies of 
the US government take immediate steps to work with, and through think 
tanks, to help develop and sustain a global network of policy institutes that 
will span physical, political and disciplinary boundaries in the pursuit of 
solutions to some of the emerging and enduring policy problems of US.'^ ^ 
THINK TANKS: INSTITUTION AND OPERATION 
The effectiveness of independent policy research institutes is 
dependent on the way they are managed and adjust to change. The health of 
a think tank affects its ability to innovate and respond to changed external 
conditions. To know the effectiveness of different think tanks, investigation 
about their funding, leadership, staffing, research and publication policies 
are desirable. Some institutes are shown to be better equipped than others by 
virtue of an activist director, financial security or specialisation to succeed 
in the market place of ideas. 
135 James McGann and Kent Weaver, n. 34, p.3 
136 James McGann, "Think Tanks and the Transnationalisation of Foreign Policy", US Foreign 
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Funding: 
With an expanding market for ideas and their legitimacy 
established, think tanks still require money to operate. Policy research 
institutes cannot rely on membership dues to cover operating costs. Nor can 
they rely upon the sales of publications and services. Philanthropy, 
corporate supports are essential to survival. Attracting money has always 
been difficult. In United States, many prominent think tanks, including the 
Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute not accept government 
funding; foundation, corporate, and individual donations represent major 
source of funding " . A select group of think tanks, including the Brooking 
Institution, the Hoover Institution, and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, and the Russell sage Foundation, are the beneficiaries 
of sizeable endowments. 
Table 3.4 provides the funding profiles of selected think tanks. It is 
evident that only in a few cases are institutes reliant on a single source of 
funding. In the main cases, institutes tap several different sources to promote 
financial stability. Unsprisingly, the corporate sector is a significant source 
of financial assistance. But as a proportion of think tank income rarely does 
it rise beyond one-third.'^^ 
137 Edward H. Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundation on 
American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy (New York: E.P Dutton,), 1989 
138 Donald E.Abelson.w, 7, p.51 
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Foundations are a major source of support, especially for the 
American Institutes. In many cases, it is more important than corporate 
support. In the case of American institutes, support from any single 
foundation is highly unlikely to exceed 33% of its income. Since the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, a foundation providing more than a third of an 
organizations budget is subject to 'expenditure responsibility'. This not only 
involves increased reporting obligations for both the grant giving and 
recipient organisations, it may also involve the foundation in legal liability 
for the actions of think tank.''**^  Foundations have been major forces in the 
establishment of think tanks, providing 'bricks and mortar' grants to assist 
in capital projects and general support. As there is now no shortage of policy 
research institutes in the USA, American foundations are more inclined to 
fund specific projects directed towards immediate ends rather than provide 
capital grants. They also show greater interest in the outcomes of research 
and its public impact. 
Individual sifts, fees and donations also represent a sizeable portion 
of income. The contributions of individuals are highest in organisations that 
are membership bodies. Endowment funds are a significant factor in the 
financial security of only a small number of policy institutes. Aside from 
Heritage, it is the old guard institutes that have endowments. The Carnegie 
Endowment draws most heavily on its assists, and along with Russell sage, 
has a degree of financial independence that is atypical. For more than half of 
the institutes endowment funds represent less than fifteen percent of 
revenue. Endowments often afford greater research flexibility. 
Ownership of facilities provides long-term security for an institute 
as well as cultivating an image of stability and security. Again, it tends to be 
the old guard institutes that possess land and buildings whereas the newer 
institutes occupy leased offices. 
140 Diane Stone, n. 2, p.54. 
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As the figures for publications, conferences and sales reveal, think 
tanks can not survive from the sale of their services and product. Policy 
research is not a profitable endeavour. For none of the organisations tabled 
does such income rise beyond one third of total income. For most institutes, 
such income is less than 10 per cent. 
Many institutes are reliant on voluntary labour in the absence of 
adequate funding. In the USA the well-established student intern system 
provides a stream of volunteer labour. Another avenue of support is cross 
subsidisation from universities. Some institutes, such as CSIS have been 
located on or affiliated with a university, sometime receiving free office 
space and secretarial support if not academic support by association. It is 
also accepted practice for academics to write for a think tank while in 
university employ. Other forms of support come from the business sector 
which might provide services free of charge or on a cost basis only. While 
difficult to quantify, such forms of support are essential to the survival of 
many organisation.'"^' 
To minimise the impact of the loss of foundation, individual or 
corporate support, it is in the interests of policy centers not only to build 
numerous supporters but also a mix of different kinds of financial support. 
Management and Leadership: 
Leadership is a vexed issue but of critical importance to policy 
institutes. A significant number of institutes are dominated by charismatic 
personalities. Ideally, a director of a policy institute is one with a blend of 
academic and practical experience, a potent public speaker and fund raiser, 
comfortable with the media and able to project a reputable image for the 
institute. The person needs the necessary managerial acumen to deal with 
trustees and staff while directing research activity, outreach and committee 
141 Ibid, pp.60-6\ 
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work. In short, institutes require strong leadership or 'policy entrepreneurs' 
at the helm.'"'^  
Boards of trustees have the power to temper and moderate the 
control of executive of directors. The conventional wisdom on non-profit 
boards is that they are: (i) policy-making and monitoring entities; and (ii) 
build a partnership of mutual trust and communication with management.'"*^ 
In theory, trustees are responsible for hiring directors determining operating 
policies, budgeting and fiscal control, fund-raising, recruitment, public 
outreach and resolving internal conflicts. Practice often falls short of theory. 
The larger the board the less likely it is to meet. If trustees are 
geographically dispersed, as is often the case with federally structured or 
international institutes, it is all the more expensive and difficult to bring the 
board together. A disincentive also operates against trustees becoming 
closely involved in the affairs of an institute as they usually serve on a 
voluntary basis with, at most, an honorarium as recompense.''*'* Boards of 
trustees are not subject to the test of the market, they are not answerable to 
Congress, and the public is relatively unaware of them. Hence, a properly 
functioning board is very important in establishing credibility for the 
organization and as the guardian of its philosophy'.''*^ 
Ideally the relationship between executive and trustees is 
harmonious but tension can be the norm. Different conceptions of the 
'philosophy' of an organisation create conflict between the board and the 
executive. Raising basic questions of organisational mandate, character and 
identity can provoke internal disunity. A financial crisis can have the same 
effect as conflict over organisational mission. It is during crises that boards 
intervene. 
142 Diane Stone, n. 2, p. 61. 
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At some point in their existence, most organisations face crises or 
divisive internal disputes. The difficulties can often be resolved by splits or 
mergers, sacking directors and appointing new personnel or by redefining 
organizational mission to suit contemporary circumstances. When funding 
problems and feuding are more intractable, then an institute is likely to 
close.'^' 
Personnel: 
The nostalgic vision of think tanks as composed of an elite group of 
intellectuals dedicated to solving the most challenging economic, social, and 
political problems confronting the nation differs profoundly from reality. A 
small group of think tanks in the United States have the staffing and 
financial resources to sustain organisations engaged in long-term strategic 
thinking. The majority of think tanks in the United States, however, 
maintain relatively small staff consisting of researchers, administrators and 
individuals offering technical support. 
The staffs of an institute are its strength. It is paramount that an 
institute maintains its financial stability and credibility so that the future 
career prospects of its staff are not endangered, hence triggering a flight of 
intellectual resources. Staffs are generally attracted for reason, other than 
pecuniary reward. The incentive are intangible the chance to participate in 
policy politics, the possibility of media exposure, the opportunity to see 
ideas translated into policy and working with people who share the same 
principles. People do not work for the salaries but because of commitment to 
the values represented by the organisation.''*^ 
Unlike universities the older institutes also display a mix of 
personnel. Fellows come from universities, the business community, and 
overseas. The previous work experience of former senior public servants or 
146 Ibid, p.64 
147 Ibid.,p.66 
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retired politicians is used to enhance the analytic skills of the institute.''*^ As 
they are often stepping stones in people's careers, think tanks occasionally 
experience fluctuations in staffing. In some instances these fluctuations can 
be a positive force of 'cross-fertilisation of people among like minded 
organistions. However, high turnover of staff brings instability in an 
organistion. 
Output: Studies, Meetings and Networks 
Depending on the states of their funding, as well as the talents of 
their staff, the quantity and quality of the outputs think tanks market vary 
enormously. Nonetheless, the basic types of products distributed are very 
similar. Think tanks generate books, newsletters, conference reports, 
working papers, and brief commentaries for elected officials. 
What distinguishes one think-tank from another, in addition to the 
nature of the outputs produced, are the values and priorities they assign to 
performing particular functions. If, for instance, think tank seeks to 
influence public opinion and public policy in the United States, it may 
develop a strong research programme and invite policy manners to 
participate in regular policy seminars, rather than to try to reach them 
through opinion magazines. Conversely, for those think tanks that are less 
concerned about having a long-term impact on the national agenda, creating 
and sustaining a research programme may be less important. In other words, 
each think tank must, in the increasingly competitive and crowded policy 
research community, locate its specific niche. It must determine who its 
target audience is and over what time horizon it is seeking to make an 
impact. 
The research and publications is the most tangible product of think-
tanks. Books are emblematic of the old guard institutes and endowed both 
the author and the institute with credibility. While an important symbol, a 
148 Ibid, ppM-67 
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book requires long term financial investment which may or may not pay off 
in the bookshops. Some small institutes do not produce books because it is 
too expensive. Institutes are pursuing more economical and immediate 
avenues of diffusion through television interviews, opted pieces and 
newsletters.''*^ 
Journalists are significant source of demand and contact think tanks 
for three reasons: information; a source of opinion; and a credible source for 
independent analysis that a lobby or political party does not possess. Think 
tanks make the jobs of journalists easier. Most institutes issue press releases, 
some arrange press conferences for major reports as well as produce 
registers of public experts that journalists can contact. Think tanks scholars 
act as a 'bridge between political journalists and political science'.'^^ 
At the dawn of the 21^' century, more than 1,200 think tanks dot the 
American political landscape.'^' They are a heterogeneous lot, varying in 
scope, funding, mandate, and location. Think tanks have emerged as visible 
and, in many respects, important players in the policy-making community. 
Think tanks are in the business of developing and promoting ideas, and like 
Corporations in the private sector, they devote considerable resources to 
marketing their product. Unlike corporations, however, think tanks measure 
success not by profit margins (after all, they are registered as independent 
non-profit organisations) but by how much influence they have in shaping 
public opinion and policy. In this sense, think tanks have come to resemble 
interest or pressure groups that compete among other non-governmental 
organisations for political power and prestige. 
Publicly, think tanks those only on a host of strategies to convey 
their views to policy makers and the public. These may include: holding 
public conferences and seminars to discuss various foreign policy issues; 
149 Ibid.,pM 
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encouraging resident scholars to give lectures at universities, rotary clubs, 
etc., testifying before legislative committees, enhancing their exposure in 
the print and electronic media; disseminating their research; and creating 
web pages on the internet. 
Privately, experts at think tanks may seek to become involved in 
foreign policy by accepting cabinet, sub-cabinet, or other positions in the 
federal government (following government service, many policy-makers 
return to or take up residence at a think tank); serving as advisers during 
presidential elections, on transition teams, and on Presidential and 
Congressional advisory boards; inviting selected policy-makers from the 
Department of Defence, the State Department, the National Security 
Council, the CIA, and other intelligence gathering agencies to participate in 
private workshops and seminars; and by providing policy-makers in 
Congress, the Executive Branch and throughout the federal government with 
policy briefs and relevant studies on current foreign policy issues - the 
trademark of the Heritage Foundation, known as the quintessential advocacy 
think tanks.'^ "^  
The close ties that have been established between several think 
tanks and recent administrations raise several interesting questions regarding 
the role and influence of think tanks in American politics. Among other 
things, it begs the question of why some think tanks succeed and others fail 
in exercising policy influence. 
By undergoing a transformation from organisation, committed to 
providing government officials with impartial policy advice to institution, 
dedicated to advancing their own political mandate, think tanks have 
become active participants in the policy-making process. Through various 
governmental and non-governmental channels, think tanks have been able to 
expand their networks of influence throughout the policy making 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid 
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community.'^^ As the following chapter will show, while it is difficult to 
accurately measure the extent to which think tanks influence specific policy 
decisions, it is possible to identify the various strategies and channels they 
rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. By doing so, one can begin 
to observe how and to what extent think tanks have become entrenched in 
Washington's decision-making network. 
155 Ibid.,p.64 
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CHAPTER -IV 
MAJOR THINK TANKS AND THEIR STRATEGIES 
Jimmy Carter, Ronald Regan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush shared 
much in common before entering the Oval office. Besides having served as 
state governors, each assumed the Presidency with little experience and 
especially in Clinton's case little interest in foreign policy. To remedy this, they 
relied in varying degree on a select group of think tanks, for policy advice and 
on their personnel to fill key posts in their administration.' 
Amid the galaxy of think tanks in and around Washington, Carter 
turned to the Trilateral commission, the Brookings Institution and the 
Business Roundtable, to name just a few, for advice and guidance. He paid 
special homage to the Trilateral commission by noting in his autobiography 
that the "commission has provided me with a splendid learning opportunity, 
and many of the members helped me in my study of foreign affairs.^  
His successor also acknowledged the invaluable contribution several 
think-tanks made to his 1980 election victory and to his administration. 
President Regan stated that he called on more people from the Hoover 
Institution to help in his campaign and in the transition than from any other 
institute. Several other think tanks including the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) and the Committee on the Present Danger have also been 
credited with helping Regan bring about America's rightward tum.^  
President Clinton appeared less confused about which think tanks were 
helping to prepare him to govern, indeed, to remind himself that the 
Progressive policy Institute (PPI), the policy Arm of the Democratic 
Leadership Council, which he chaired from 1990-91, was advising him on a 
Donald. E.Abelson, Trends in Search of Policy Influence: The Strategies of American Think 
Tanks, National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) Review, Spring, 1998, p. 1 
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host of domestic and foreign policy issues, he publicly endorsed Mandate 
for change, PPI's blueprint for changing America. There are unusual bodies 
of people behind many of George Bush's ideas. Their influence is partly a 
matter of ideas. Two of the brainwaves of the 1990s-welfare reform and zero-
tolerance policing-were incubated in conservative think-tanks. The Cato 
Institute has been arguing for privatising Social Security reform for years; the 
AEI was protesting about rogue states long before anybody had heard of 
Osama bin Laden. But it is also a matter of people. Donald Rumsfeld and 
Condoleezza Rice are both Hoover veterans. Dick Cheney and his wife have a 
longstanding relationship with the AEI.^  
Think tanks are appealing to policy makers for three main reasons. 
First, unlike university professors - who are often engaged in esoteric 
research with little relation to policy think tanks, are in the business of 
providing policy-relevant expertise to elected officials. In short, think-tanks 
perform an educational function. Second, think tanks, especially those with 
ideologically - driven policy agendas, can offer intellectual reinforcement 
and indeed promote the political platforms of aspiring office holders and 
elected officials. And third, several prominent think tanks can provide talent 
pools of scholars and former government officials for incoming 
administrations to draw on, and can also serve as retirement homes for high 
level policy makers after they leave public office. 
To varying degrees, think tanks in the United States rely on some, 
and at times all, of the following strategies to enhance their presence on the 
political landscape. They hold open public forms and conferences to discuss 
key policy issues and encourage their scholars to give lectures at 
universities, service clubs, and other civic organizations. Many of these 
lectures are broadcast to viewers via satellite. Think tanks scholars also 
testify before committees and subcommittees of Congress and frequently 
4 Ibidp.l 
5 http://www.h0over.0rg/ab0ut/report/l 8978274.html 
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submit op-ed articles to major American and international newspapers. If 
they are too preoccupied with their own research, think-tanks have been 
known to hire ghost writers to write up-ends on behalf of certain scholars.^ 
Think tanks also concentrate on gaining access to the broadcast 
media, especially to network newscasts and political talk shows. If viewers 
happen to miss an on-screen appearance of their favourite think tank 
personalities they can usually discover what was said by accessing the 
institute's web site. Dozens of think-tanks have created websites in recent 
years, complete with photographs of think-tanks scholars and information on 
their recent publications and speeches. American interested in being 
indoctrinated on their way to work can even pop audio taps into their 
cassette players and listen to the wisdom of leading political pundits from 
Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute. For policy makers and members 
of the attentive public who can get along without briefing tapes but are still 
interested in what think-tanks say, copies of institute publications can be 
readily obtained. Depending on the state of their financial resources and the 
talents of their staffs, think tanks may produce a variety of publications 
ranging from books, Journals, and opinion magazines to conference papers 
o 
and newsletters. 
Think tanks with some degree of expertise in foreign and defence 
policies rely on several strategies to convey specific recommendations to 
high level policy makers. The best opportunity for think tanks to influence 
US foreign policy is during a presidential election and the transition period 
that follows. If "people are policy", as Edwin Feulner, the head of Heritage 
likes to say, then the think tanks are becoming America's shadow government.^  
The think-tanks' influence is partly related to the intellectual barrenness of 
America's two main parties. The Democrats and Republicans are little more 
6 Donald. E. Abelson, n. 7, pp. 1 -2 
7 Donald .E.Abelson, American Think Tanks and Their Role in US Foreign Policy Making, 
MacMillan Press, !996, p. 
8 Donald. E.Abelson, n. /.p.3 
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than vehicles for raising and distributing campaign contributions. They have no 
ability to generate ideas of their own, and little control over individual 
politicians trying to burnish their reputations with new thinking. For instance, 
in the week and days leading upto the 1992 Election, dozens of articles 
outlining the individuals and organizations, who assembled to advise the then 
Governor Clinton appeared throughout major American newspapers and 
opinion magazines. Moreover, on several network newscasts and political talk 
shows, individuals advising Clinton on various economic, social and security 
issues were invited to share their insights on what a Clinton administration 
would mean for America.'° 
By serving on foreign policy task forces think tanks scholars are 
well positioned to be recruited into high-level foreign policy posts in the 
new administration, a development that usually allows them to further 
extend the influence their institute. Several think tanks scholars have taken 
this route, including Jeanne Kirkapatrick (AEI), Richar Allen (Hoover 
Institution), Zbigniew Brzezinski (CSIS), and Madline Albright (CSIS), 
Other think tanks scholars have been asked to serve on important advisory 
boards such as President's Intelligence oversight Board (PIOB) and the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), which provide 
the President with long term strategic advice on foreign policy and defence 
issues. The transition period following the election also offers think tanks on 
opportunity to influence those in positions of authority. The Washington 
based CSIS, home to such luminaries as Zbiguiew Braezinki, Harold Brown, 
James Schlesinger, and Admiral William crowe, has organised transition 
seminars for several incoming administrations. The Heritage Foundation 
also offers seminars to newly elected Congressmen and Senators. 
9 ]bid.p3 
10 Donald .E.Abelson, «. 7, p. 122 
11 Donald E.Abelson,«./, p. 
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The efforts of think tanks that hope to influence policy makers do 
not stop there. Some, including the Hoover Institution at Stanford University 
invite members of Congress and Congressional Committees and their staffs 
to attend the Washington seminars run by the institution's staff since 1980 
to educate and inform participants on domestic and foreign policies. The 
Heritage Foundation has even taken steps to guarantee private donors assess 
to the President and to senior members of the administration. Several think 
tanks, including Heritage and CSIS have relied on other channels to 
establish close ties with key departments engaged in foreign policy. Through 
the Diplomat in Residence Programme, overseen by the State Department, 
several ambassadors have gone to think between assignments, to conduct 
research. At times, state department officials have even been sent to think 
tans to help improve relations between the administration and think tanks 
overly critical of white House policies. This occurred, for instance, when 
Secretary of State George Shuttz directed one of his staff to go to the 
Heritage Foundation to mollify some of its more vocal cities of US foreign 
policy.'^ 
The ones that emerged in the first decades of the 20"' century were 
committed to bringing scienfific expertise to bear on public policy issues. 
The advancement of knowledge for the purpose of improving governmental 
decision-making was their main priority. Much has changed however. Many 
think-tanks have become more committed to influencing policy than to 
improving it. They are run like business whose performances are measured 
on how successful they are in mass marketing their ideas. However, only 
these think-tanks that maintain a healthy balance between scholarship and 
aggressive Salesmanship will remain well entrenched in the policy-making 
13 
process. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid, pA 
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MAJOR THINK TANKS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Most think tanks share common objectives of shaping and moulding 
public opinion and public policy. As the United State prepared to assume the 
role of a hegemonic power in the aftermath of the World War II, a number of 
think tanks were making their presence felt in the policy making circles. 
Through their publications, conferences and meetings with members of the 
Executive, Congress, and a host of government departments, boards, and 
agencies, think thanks were able to develop and expand their network of 
influence throughout Washington.''' 
By relying on various governmental and non-governmental 
channels, think-tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in 
the political process, have attempted to influence the content and outcome of 
majority policy initiative.'^ 
Yet, despite their appeal, only a fraction of the estimated 1,200 
think tanks in the United States have made their presence felt in key policy-
making circles. The Brooking Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise 
Institute, Rand and the Heritage Foundation, among others, are frequently 
referred to in the media.'^ For example, the media watchdog group Fairness 
and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) released a report in 2006 which listed the 
25 think tanks which were mentioned most often in the mainstream media news 
in 2005. The most-mentioned think tank was the center-left Brookings 
Institution. The next two most-mentioned think tanks~the Heritage Foundation, 
the American Enterprise Institute, are center-right while the fourth, the Cato 
Institute, is libertarian. Of media citations, a plurality, 47% were centrist, while 
40% were conservative and 13% were progressive. 
14 Donald.E.Abelson, n. 7. p.65 
15 Ibid., .«.7,p.90 
16 Donald E.Abelson, n. I, p.4 
17 Fairness and Accuracy Reporting, Media Watch Dog Group, Report 2006 
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Among those concentrating on foreign policy, is the Council on 
Foreign Relations. The CFR is non-partisan and regarded itself as the most 
prestigious and influential think tanks. The Brooking Institution pursues a 
liberal research agenda and hosts regular seminars and working lunches to 
discuss foreign policy issues. The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) is also non- partisan but regarded as leaning centre right. 
RAND built its reputation in defence policy research for the US air force but 
now covers a wide range of domestic issues in addition to national security 
themes. The Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, the Institutes of 
Peace, and Woodrow Wilson Center, are leading liberal think tanks with a 
strong focus on conflict resolution issues. On the right of the political 
spectrum are the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the 
Cato Institute and the Nixon Centre. Other more specialist think tanks 
include the Atlantic Council of the US, the Centre of Defence Information, 
and the Institute for international Economics, the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy and the Middle East Institute.'^ 
The following U.S think tanks have been selected to show a 
representative range of views, with budget, staffs size, reputation for doing 
high quality research analysis and frequent media citation. 
BROOKING INSTITUTION: 
Of the 200 most prominent think tanks in the U.S., the Brookings 
Institution's studies are the most widely cited by the media, and the third most-
cited of all public policy institutes by Members of Congress. In a 1997 survey 
of congressional staff and journalists, Brookings ranked first in credibility 
among 27 think tanks. It stated principal purpose is "to aid in the development 
of sound public policies and to promote public understanding of issues of 
national importance".'^ Strobe Talbott, the President of Brooking Institution 
stated that: 
18 Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War, (New York: Routledge), 2002,pp.97-98 
19 Brooking Institution,Wikipedia, http://en. wekipidia. org/wiki/Brookinglnstitution 
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The goal of The Brookings Institution, and all other think tanks, is "to provide the policy 
community with analysis and conclusions to use as the basis for developing new policies, 
and for modifying or retiring existing policies," says Brookings President Strobe Talbott. 
"One of our most challenging tasks," he says, "is to identify early on the new and 
important issues our nation and the world will confront in the future" and bring 
them to the attention of policy-makers and the public. 
The Brookings Institution is one of the oldest think tanks in the United 
States. The precursor of the present-day Brookings — the Institute for 
Government Research — was established in Washington in 1916 by a St. Louis 
businessman and philanthropist named Robert Brookings. He later set up two 
related organizations, the Institute for Economics and the Graduate School of 
Economics and Government. 
Robert Brookings established these organizations because he saw that 
businesses in the early part of the 20th century were benefiting from the 
relatively new disciplines of economic research and organizational 
management, and he believed that government also could benefit. The three 
research organizations were combined in 1927 to form the Brookings 
Institution, Which initially focused on domestic social and Economic policy. 
International studies were no added to the Brookings research agenda until 
after World War 11.^ ^ 
Brookings is organized into three major research areas: Foreign Policy 
Studies, Economic Studies, and Governance Studies, though those 
departmental distinctions are increasingly blurred as the Institution takes on the 
cross-disciplinary issues that define globalized world. It's organizational 
structure also includes several research centers, focused on areas such as the 
Middle East or functional issues such as education policy. Strobe Talbott 
became president of Brookings in 2002. Shortly thereafter, Brookings launched 
the Saban Center for Middle East Policy and the John L. Thornton China 
Center. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was founded by a grant from 
20 Strobe Talbott, The Brooking Institution: How a Think Tanks Works, US foreign Policy Agenda, 
Nov, 2002, 
21 Ibid 
22 Brooking Institution, htlp://www. brookinss. edii/about/History. asyx 
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Mr. Haim Saban in 2002.^ '* The Saban Center has helped the Brookings 
Institution to dramatically expand its research and analysis of Middle East 
policy issues. In September 2006, Brookings announced the founding of The 
John L. Thornton China Center, a major new center focused on the study of 
Chinese politics and policy. In November 2006, Brookings announced the 
opening of its first-ever overseas center, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center at 
Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. ^^  
Robert Brookings once said, "Underlying all Brookings activities is a 
belief in the necessity of framing issues accurately and impartially, of 
presenting ideas without ideology." Since its earliest days, Brookings has 
provided policy-makers and the public with timely, applied research that is 
aimed at finding solutions to America's most complex policy challenges. Over 
the decades, ideas emanating from Brookings played a key role in the 
mobilizations for World Wars I and II; the creation of the Federal 
government's budget process, civil service system, and Social Security; the 
development of the Marshall Plan; the imposifion of price controls during 
World War Two; the use of sanctions to punish and influence rogue states; the 
organization of the National Security Council and other foreign policy and 
defense structures; the commitment to promote development in poorer 
countries; the evolution of U.S. policy toward post-Soviet Russia; and many 
other policies.^^ 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, the research here has been refocused 
to concentrate more intently on generating ideas and insights that will lead to 
the development or revision of policies concerning relations between the West 
and the Islamic world; the proper balance between vigilance against terrorism 
and protection of civil liberties; the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; 
the need to adjust traditional state-to-state diplomacy to take into account the 
23 Brooking Institution, http://www. brookings. edn/about/Research. aspx 
24 Brooking Institution, Annual Roport,2007,http://www.brookings.edu/about/~/media/Files/ 
about/annualreport/2007complete.pdf 
25 Ibid 
26 Strobe Talbott,n, 20 
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rise of non-state players; the debate over preemptive or preventive warfare to 
counter threats from terrorists and terrorist-supporting states; the development 
of a long-tenn international strategy for the post-Cold War world; the future of 
arms control; and the case for a missile defense system. 
Brookings is often referred to as "a university without students." Many 
of our 75 senior scholars have advanced degrees, and quite a few come from 
university facuhies. Their research and writing is subject to scholarly review. 
Some of the Brookings Fellows are what we call "scholar practitioners." This 
description applies to researchers who periodically accept positions in 
government where they can test their academic conclusions in real-world 
circumstances, and to former officials who come to Brookings after a period of 
public service and use their government experience to add a practical viewpoint 
no 
to our academic research. For example, more than a dozen Brookings 
"scholar practitioners" have served in the State Department or on the National 
Security Council, including James Steinberg, the Vice President and Director 
of the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings (former Deputy National 
Security Adviser at the White House and Director of the Pohcy Planning Staff 
at the State Department); Helmut Sonnenfeldt (National Security Council 
senior staff member in the Nixon administration and former director of the 
State Department Office of Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); 
and Martin Indyk. Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy (former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and twice U.S. 
ambassador to Israel). Brookings also has expertise from all the other branches 
of government, such as former Congressman Bill Frenzel (Republican-
Minnesota), one of their resident experts on taxes, free trade, and budget 
policy. 
Dissemination of policy analysis and recommendations from Brookings 
takes a number of forms. The conclusions of many research projects are 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
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presented in books and reports. However, a few years ago, when it was realized 
that policy-makers and their staffs don't always have time to read books and 
lengthy reports, Brookings also began publishing its findings additionally in 
shorter, more accessible papers called Policy Briefs. Other think tanks have 
followed suit. Scholars at Brookings often communicate their conclusions 
more directly to policy-makers through Congressional testimony, private 
consultations, and meetings with Congressional and executive branch staff 
members, and to interested non-governmental audiences through forums, 
roundtable discussions, and other public events. Policy-makers are often 
influenced by public opinion, and public opinion is often influenced by 
coverage in the news media. Additionally, much of what policymakers, their 
advisers, and the public know about policy issues they learn through the news 
media. Therefore, it's not surprising that many scholars at Brookings and other 
think tanks devote a good deal of effort to presenting their ideas and findings 
through the news media. This takes the form of interviews on television and 
radio and in print, opinion articles for the op-ed pages of newspapers, press 
briefings, public speeches, and articles for scholarly journals. More than a year 
ago, Brookings built its own TV and radio studio to facilitate media interviews. 
Brookings and other think tanks also publish "media guides" to help reporters 
locate and interview scholars with specific expertise on the policy issue a 
journalist is writing about.^ ^ 
The budget to fund all this research, analysis, dissemination, and 
outreach — and the necessary staff— runs approximately $40 million a year at 
Brookings. The money comes from an endowment which was originally 
established by founder Robert Brookings; from grants and donations by 
foundations, corporations, and individuals; and from such revenue sources as 
the Brookings Institution Press, which publishes more than 50 books a year, 
and the Center for Public Policy Education, which runs executive education 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 
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seminars for government and corporate managers. Elaborate rules are in place 
to guarantee that financial providers have no influence over the design and 
outcome of Brookings research.'^  One of the most challenging tasks of 
Brooking is to identify early on the new and important issues America and the 
world will confront in the future. Then, in the Brookings tradition, it focus 
scholarship on bringing those issues to the attention of the policymakers and 
the public, providing solid research and analysis, informing the debate, and 
offering constructive ideas and recommendations. Busy government policy-
makers have noted the value added in Brookings' ability to combine the 
analysis of long-term trends with the recommendation of short-term policies.^ "^  
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATION: 
The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan 
membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a 
resource for its members, government officials, business executives, 
journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other 
interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the 
foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries since its 
founding in 1921.^ ^ It based at 58 East 68th Street (comer Park Avenue) in 
New York City, with an additional office in Washington, D.C. A central aim of 
the Council, it states, is to "find and nurture the next generation of foreign 
policy leaders." It established "Independent Task Forces" in 1995, which 
encourage policy debate. Comprismg experts with diverse backgrounds and 
expertise, these task forces seek consensus in making policy recommendations 
on crifical issues. Through its membership, meetings, and studies, it has been 
called the most powerful agent of United States foreign policy outside the State 
Department." 
33 Ihid 
34 Brooking Institution, Annual Report 2007. n.24 
35 Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/about/ 
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The Council carries out its mission by:^^ 
> Maintaining a diverse membership, including special programs to 
promote interest and develop expertise in the next generation of foreign 
policy leaders; 
> Convening meetings at its headquarters in New York and in 
Washington, DC, and other cities where senior government officials, 
members of Congress, global leaders, and prominent thinkers come 
together with Council members to discuss and debate major 
international issues; 
> Supporting a Studies Program that fosters independent research, 
enabling Council scholars to produce articles, reports, and books and 
hold roundtables that analyse foreign policy issues and make concrete 
policy recommendations; 
> Publishing Foreign Affairs, the preeminent journal of international 
affairs and U.S. foreign policy; 
> Sponsoring Independent Task Forces that produce reports with both 
findings and policy prescriptions on the most important foreign policy 
topics; and 
> Providing up-to-date information and analysis about world events and 
American foreign policy on its website, CFR.org. 
The David Rockefeller Studies Program — the CFR "Think tank" — is 
the Council's "think tank." It is an important part of the Council's mission to 
produce and disseminate ideas so that individual and corporate members, as 
well as policymakers, journalists, students, and interested citizens in the United 
States and other countries, can better understand the world and the foreign 
policy choices facing the United States and other governments. They do that 
by thinking, writing, and speaking about a broad range of foreign policy 
38 
issues. 
37 Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, 2007,pp.l-4, 
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The Studies Program is home of scholars, called fellows. In addition, the 
Studies Program hosts scholars through visiting fellowships at the Council. 
Taken together, the fellows' expertise covers nearly every issue related to 
international relations. Some fellows are experts on specific countries such as 
China and Egypt or geographical regions like Europe and Latin America. 
Others are experts on functional topics such as global health, homeland 
security, international finance, nuclear proliferation, and trade. They write 
books, articles, and newspaper op-eds on issues in their areas of expertise. 
They also share their expertise with local, regional, national, and international 
media, and they are frequently called upon by government policymakers for 
advice. The Studies Program has three interdisciplinary centers. The Maurice 
R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies works to promote a better 
understanding among policymakers, educators, and the interested public of 
how economic and political forces interact to influence world affairs. The 
Center for Preventive Action works to prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly 
conflicts around the world by addressing the systemic and structural causes of 
discrimination, disenchantment, and political turmoil that are likely to provoke 
armed conflict. The Center for Universal Education focuses exclusively on the 
provision of quality, universal basic education among the world's poorest 
children. These centers seek to accomplish their goals by producing and 
disseminating original research; bringing policymakers, experts, and journalists 
together to address critical issues; and informing the broader public about 
important issues through media interviews and public speaking. 
> Council fellows write books on timely and important policy issues, 
which may be published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
Press or by other trade and academic publishers. Critical Policy Choices 
are books designed to foster debate on key international issues by 
making the best case for each policy alternative in the form of a U.S. 
presidential speech. 
39 Ibid 
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> The Council on Foreign Relations Press publishes a variety of reports 
each year: 
Independent Task Force Reports are consensus documents on U.S. foreign 
policy developed through private and nonpartisan deliberations. 
Center for Preventive Action Commission Reports are consensus 
documents that offer recommendations with incentives—"carrots and sticks"— 
to unite stakeholders and modify the behavior of key local leaders when an 
armed conflict or a potential conflict arises. 
Council Special Reports are concise policy briefs, which provide timely 
responses to developing crises or contributions to current policy dilemmas. 
Council fellows and research staff produce analysis and commentary: 
Articles and Op-eds are published in a variety of newspapers, 
magazines, and journals. 
Testimony before Congress on specific U.S. foreign policy issues, often 
relating to the findings and recommendations of a Council report or paper. 
> Foreign Affairs offers numerous resources online, including an archive 
of articles dating back to 1973. With a circulation of 160,000, the 
bimonthly journal is available by subscription and at bookstores and 
newsstands. The Foreign Affairs Academic Resource Program produces 
customized textbooks and anthologies compiled by the editors of 
Foreign Affairs for classroom use.'*^  
From its inception the Council was non-partisan, welcoming members 
of both Democratic and Republican parties. It also welcomed Jews and African 
Americans, with only women initially barred from membership. Its 
proceedings were almost universally private and confidential. It has exerted 
influence on U.S. foreign policy from the beginning, due to its roster of State 
Department and other government officials as members; as such, it has been 
the focus of many conspiracy theories (Perloff 37, et passim). A study by two 
40 Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/about/publishing.html 
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critics of the organization, Laurence Shoup and William Minter, found that of 
502 government officials surveyed from 1945 to 1972, more than half were 
members of the Council.'*' 
Today it has about 4,300 members (including five-year term members), 
which over its history have included senior serving politicians, more than a 
dozen Secretaries of State, former national security officers, bankers, lawyers, 
professors, former CIA members and senior media figures. Seven American 
presidents have addressed the Council. As a private institution however, the 
CFR maintains through its official website that it is not a formal organization 
engaged in U.S. foreign policy-making. ^ ^ In 1962, the group began a program 
of bringing select Air Force officers to the Harold Pratt House to study 
alongside its scholars. The Army, Navy and Marine Corps requested they start 
similar programs for their own officers. ^^ 
Journalist Joseph Kraft, a former member of both the CFR and the 
Trilateral Commission, said the Council "comes close to being an organ of 
what C. Wright Mills has called the Power Elite - a group of men, similar in 
interest and outlook, shaping events from invulnerable positions behind the 
ii44 
scenes. 
In 1944 and in 1948, the Republican candidate for President, Thomas 
Dewey, was a CFR member. In later years. Republicans Eisenhower and Nixon 
were members of the CFR, as were Democrats Stevenson, Kennedy, 
Humphrey, and McGovem. The American people think that they have a choice 
when they vote for a President, but the truth of the matter is, with few 
exceptions: Presidential candidates for decades have been CFR members. ''^  
41 Council on Foreign Relations, n.36 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid. 
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In one of the CFR's annual reports, published in 1978, it listed a 
membership of 1878 members. Eleven of its members at this time were United 
States Senators, with even more Congressmen belonging to the organization. 
284 of its members listed in this report were United States Government 
officials.'*^  
The CFR not only has its members in the United States Government, but 
its influence has also spead to other vital areas of American life. According to 
Newell: "Its members have run, or are running, NBC and CBS, The New York 
Times', The Washington Post', The Des Moines Register', and many other 
important newspapers. The leaders of Time', 'Newsweek', 'Fortune', 
'Business Week', and numerous other publications are CFR members. The 
organization's members also dominate the academic world, top corporations, 
the huge tax-exempt foundations, labor unions, the military, and just about 
every segment of American life."''^  
The earliest origin of the Council stemmed from a working fellowship of 
about 150 distinguished scholars, called "The Inquiry," tasked to brief 
President Woodrow Wilson about options for the postwar world when 
Germany was defeated. The team produced more than 2,000 documents 
detailing and analyzing the political, economic, and social facts globally that 
would be helpful for Wilson in the peace talks. Their reports formed the basis 
for the Fourteen Points, which outlined Wilson's strategy for peace after war's 
end.^ « 
These scholars then traveled to the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 that 
would end the war; it was at one of the meetings of a small group of British and 
American diplomats and scholars, on May 30, 1919, at the Hotel Majestic, that 
both the Council and its British counterpart, the Chatham House in London, 
46 Council on Foreign Relations, Annual Report, 1977 
47 Council on Foreign Relations, http://www. councilonforeignrelations. net/ 
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were born. Although the original intent was for the two organizations to be 
affiliated, they became independent bodies, yet retained close informal ties. ^^ 
In an anonymous piece called "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that 
appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1947, CFR study group member George Kennan 
coined the term "containment." The essay would prove to be highly influential 
in US foreign policy for seven upcoming presidential administrations. William 
Bundy credited the CFR's study groups with helping to lay the framework of 
thinking that led to the Marshall Plan and NATO. °^ 
Dwight D. Eisenhower chaired a CFR study group while he served as 
President of Columbia University. One member later said, "Whatever General 
Eisenhower knows about economics, he has learned at the study group 
meetings." The CFR study group devised an expanded study group called 
"Americans for Eisenhower" to increase his chances for the presidency. 
Eisenhower would later draw many Cabinet members from CFR ranks and 
become a CFR member himself His primary CFR appointment was Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles. '^ 
On 24 November 1953, a study group heard a report from political 
scientist William Henderson regarding the ongoing conflict between France 
and Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh forces, a struggle 
that would later become known as the First Indochina War. Henderson argued 
that Ho's cause was primarily nationalist in nature and that Marxism had "little 
to do with the current revolution." Further, the report said, the United States 
could work with Ho to guide his movement away from Communism. State 
Department officials, however, expressed skepticism about direct American 
intervention in Vietnam and the idea was tabled. Over the next twenty years, 
the United States would find itself allied with anti-Communist South Vietnam 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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167 
and against Ho and his supporters in Vietnam War. ^^  The Council served as a 
"breeding ground" for important American policies such as mutual deterrence, 
arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation. 
A four-year long study of relations between America and China was 
conducted by the Council between 1964 and 1968. One study published in 
1966 concluded that American citizens were more open to talks with China 
than their elected leaders. Henry Kissinger had continued to publish in Foreign 
Affairs and was appointed by President Nixon to serve as National Security 
Adviser in 1969. In 1971, he embarked on a secret trip to Beijing to broach 
talks with Chinese leaders. Nixon went to China in 1972, and diplomatic 
relations were completely normalized by President Carter's Secretary of State, 
another Council member, Cyrus Vance.^ "* 
The United States faces multiple challenges in the Post Cold War era. 
All of this makes for a unique moment for the Council. It trying to meet 
opportunities and obligations alike by being a trusted, smart, relevant, 
independent, and nonpartisan resource through an extraordinary meetings 
program, the top website devoted to U.S. foreign policy, the leading magazine 
in the field, and a think tank— t^he David Rockefeller Studies Program— that is 
producing and disseminating much-needed analysis and ideas. Events for 
Council members remain an institutional priority. Member programming is 
increasingly organized by series that span New York City and Washington, 
DC, as well as twelve other cities.^ ^ It's "Lessons Learned" series brings 
together small groups of younger members for intimate discussions with 
distingue leaders, and the HBO-sponsored History Makers series focuses on the 
contributions made by a prominent individual at critical junctures in 
international relations. '^' It's popular "Daughters and Sons" events invite high 
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school- and college-age children and grandchildren of members for special 
meetings with high-profile speakers/^ In the past year it have held fiill- and 
half-day symposia on Iraq, making New York safer, Latin America, alternative 
energy, and Nigeria. The annual Term Member Conference brought to New 
York many of our almost 500 term members from across the country. It's 
National Conference attracted 350 participants from around the country and the 
world. And Corporate Program, which encompasses over 240 member 
companies, held 70 events and 30 conference calls on topics such as 
geopolitical risk, climate change, and the competitiveness of global capital 
markets.'^  
Another element of the Council's mission is to serve as a resource for 
traditional constituencies, such as officials in the executive branch, members of 
Congress, and the media. But it is never enough just to produce good work; it 
needs to make sure it gets read and heard. In 2006, Council fellows and staff 
have briefed government officials more than 250 times and have testified 22 
times before Congress. Members of the Independent Task Force on U.S.- China 
relations briefed U.S. government officials, including Treasury Secretary 
Henry M. Paulson Jr. and Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte, as 
well as China's ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong. The 
Council's Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy Program held over fifteen 
meetings with new members of Congress and their staffs. It also held eleven 
briefings with journalists from news outlets such as the New York Times, 
Washington Post, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Reuters, and Los 
Angeles Times, and fellows and staff have been interviewed on Meet the Press, 
in 2006.^ ^ 
The Council's mission also includes reaching a broader range of citizens 
beyond it's membership. It's overall objective is to connect the Council with— 
and make it a resource for—voices that are increasingly important to the 
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national foreign policy debate, including those of students and teachers, 
religious and congregational leaders, state and local officials, and community 
leaders. To date, the Academic Conference Call series has engaged more than 
90 distinct colleges and universities. It held 12 sessions of the Religion and 
Foreign Policy Conference Call series, and 155 state and local officials from 
around the country viewed the webcast of a meeting on the threat of pandemic 
flu. The Council's website, CFR.org, is an important medium for bringing 
analysis and ideas to a broader audience, it is using new technology to its 
advantage. To take one example, CFR.org has launched a series of multimedia 
Crisis Guides—an innovative educational series that offers viewers ready 
access to the current and historical context of the world's major trouble spots 
and challenges. It's first two Crisis Guides were on the Korean peninsula and 
Darfiir, and it plan to produce at least ten additional Crisis Guides over the next 
year on such topics as Kashmir, China and Taiwan, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, climate change, and the United States and Cuba. Ultimately, the 
Council's initiatives translate into impact.^ ^ 
In 2006 Foreign Affairs was again ranked the most influential magazine 
in a survey of policymakers. It also hit an important milestone, with paid 
circulation topping 155,000. CFR.org now regularly draws a monthly audience 
of over 300,000 unique visitors.^' 
Two Council fellows visited and briefed the Multinational Force, Iraq's 
commanding general David H. Petraeus, and the 2006 Council Special Report 
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation was cited in debates on Capitol Hill when 
members of Congress were voting on the nuclear pact with India. 
The David Rockefeller Studies Program has been strengthened year by 
year, with additional focus on the greater Middle East and Asia, Council 
fellows are studying global issues, from climate change, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and trade to worldwide terrorism, homeland security, and 
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global health. And finally, it has assembled a talented group of foreign policy 
generalists who are working on the broader means and ends of U.S. foreign 
policy. In addition, it continues to cover Russia, Europe, Latin America, and 
Africa. " 
The Council expects to play a large role during the 2008 presidential 
campaign. They host each of the presidential candidates and have kicked off 
this initiative with an event featuring former senator John Edwards. It is 
offering the Council to each candidate not only as a venue but also as a 
resource on a broad range of foreign policy issues. Fellows and staff have 
briefed Joseph Biden, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Christopher J. Dodd, Rudolph 
Giuliani, Mike Huckabee, Dennis Kucinich, John S. McCain, and Barack 
Obama.^ ^ 
The Council will also serve as a resource for the public at large during 
the campaign, with a special section of CFR.org delivering up-to-date 
information on candidates' views and positions. In short, the Council is doing a 
good many things to sustain its role as the leading foreign policy organization 
in the world. 
RAND CORPORATION: 
The RAND Corporation (Research and Development) is a 
nonprofit global policy think tank first formed to offer research and analysis to 
the United States armed forces. The organisation has since expanded to 
working with other governments, private foundations, international 
organisations, and commercial organisations. It is known for rigorous, often-
quantitative, and non-partisan analysis and policy recommendations. Its self-
declared mission is "to help improve policy and decision making through 
research and analysis", using its "core values of quality and objectivity." 
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From the beginnings of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), think 
tanks have worked closely with both the civilian and military leadership on a 
wide range of issues, from new technologies to military planning and 
operations, to help better protect American interests from ever evolving threats. 
Like the DOD civilian leadership, the uniformed military services require high-
quality, objective research on geopolitical trends and the implications of 
different foreign policy options. Among other things, such research is 
necessary for realistic scenarios to guide planning and program evaluations, 
and to develop an understanding of probable constraints on operational 
flexibility. To their credit, the military services and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) have used and nurtured a large array of sources for that 
research, ranging from small institutes, such as the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and the Lexington Institute, funded primarily with 
corporate or individual donations, to larger policy research organizations such 
as the Institute for Defense Analyses under contract to the DOD. The oldest 
and largest of these research organizations is RAND, which was established 
with private capital as a non-profit corporation in 1948. About half of RAND's 
current work deals with national defense while the rest deals with a wide range 
of domestic pohcy issues.^ ^ 
RAND publishes The RAND Journal of Economics, a scholarly peer-
reviewed journal of economics. RAND has approximately 1,600 employees 
and four principal locations: Santa Monica, California (headquarters); 
Washington, D.C. (currently located in Arlington, Virginia); Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania (adjacent to Carnegie Mellon University and the University of 
Pittsburgh); and Cambridge, United Kingdom (RAND Europe). RAND has 
several smaller offices in the United States as well, including the RAND Gulf 
States Policy Institute in Jackson, Mississippi and New Orleans, Louisiana. In 
2003, it opened the RAND-Qatar Policy Institute in Doha.^ ^ 
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RAND is also the home to the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate 
School, one of the original graduate programs in public policy and the first to 
offer a Ph.D. The program is unique in that students work alongside RAND 
analysts on real-world problems. The campus is at RAND's Santa Monica 
research facility. The Pardee RAND School is the world's largest Ph.D.-
granting program in policy analysis. 
Approximately 1,600 people from more than 45 countries work at 
RAND, representing diversity in work experience; political and ideological 
outlook; race, gender, and ethnicity; and academic training. This diversity 
reinforces RAND's core values of quality and objectivity by promoting 
creativity, deepening understanding of the practical effects of policy, and 
ensuring multiple viewpoints and perspectives. 
Providing a Forum for Public engagement, RAND hosted a variety of 
events in 2007 to inform the public debate on a broad spectrum of top policy 
problems. Policy Forums in Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Pittsburgh 
brought together RAND experts with prominent local policymakers and 
preeminent thinkers to discuss and debate nation-building in Iraq and beyond; 
the impact and promise of the No Child Left Behind Act; strategies for helping 
youth exposed to violence; America's obesity epidemic; efforts to sustain the 
nonprofit arts sector in U.S. urban centers; new responses to homelessness; 
challenges in funding public transportation; and more.^ '^  RAND also hosted 
lectures by visiting dignitaries including Admiral Thad W. Allen, Commandant 
of the U.S. Coast Guard, who addressed concerns regarding port security and 
how the service is preparing to deliver effective emergency response in the 
wake of natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina.^ ' 
In 2007, more than 2,700 individual media reports featuring RAND 
research or researchers were published or broadcast by newspapers, 
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magazines, news services, and television and radio networks around the 
world. Studies published in 2007 received the heaviest news coverage. In 
2007, more than 70 op-eds were published in influential media outlets 
including the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los 
Angeles Times, Financial Times, The Guardian, and the International Herald 
Tribune. These commentaries provided timely, reasoned assessments of 
issues ranging from mounting ethnic tensions in Turkey and Afghanistan's.^^ 
In 2007, findings from RAND research were made publicly available in 
more than 1,000 published reports and documents. The majority of these 
materials, along with over 10,000 other RAND documents published since 
1946, are available on RAND's Web site for free download. Altogether, more 
than four million copies of RAND publications were downloaded from 
www.rand.org in 2007. 
RAND's commitment to making a difference means that the scholarly 
objectives of expanding knowledge, illuminating issues, and developing new 
ideas are important means rather than ends. Communicating it's research 
findings to decisionmakers who can use them is an essential part of RAND's 
mission. In 2007, its dissemination activities were impressively broad, yet 
effectively targeted to influential decisionmakers capable of using our findings 
to inform their decisions and influence positive change.'"* 
RAND researchers conducted numerous briefings for top military and 
civilian leadership on issues of geopolitics and global security; intelligence 
policy; military force structure; logistics and infrastructure; personnel, training, 
and health; and acquisitions and technology. In addifion, RAND researchers 
> briefed White House leadership on findings from a study on 
counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan; 
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> helped senior staff from the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and other offices and agencies assess the strategic and operational 
challenges posed by Iran and evaluate options for meeting those 
challenges; 
> briefed senior officials in the Department of Homeland Security on 
issues including passenger rail security; 
> briefed Department of Veterans Affairs officials on issues related to 
post-traumatic stress disorder; 
> made presentations to the Secretary of Education, other U.S. Department 
of Education officials, and numerous state education officials on the 
impacts of No Child Left Behind.'' 
RAND delivers research findings and lends analytical expertise to 
Congress to help legislators make better-infonned decisions about the nation's 
many challenges. 
> RAND researchers testified before Congress on 28 occasions, 
contributing objective analysis to debates on issues such as the federal 
role in supporting alternative energy investment, renewal of the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, and understanding terrorist ideology. 
> RAND convened dozens of bipartisan briefings to discuss findings on 
issues at the top of the legislative agenda, including challenges facing 
the global supply chain, the impact of the State Children's Health 
Insurance Program on children's quality of life, and challenges for U.S.-
China relations. 
> Electronic newsletters customized for a congressional audience are 
delivered monthly to present research findings relevant to timely policy 
debates on Capitol Hill. 
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In addition to the outreach conducted by RAND Europe and the RAND-
Qatar Policy Institute to brief their respective policy communities on issues of 
regional importance. RAND staffs regularly engage with senior policymakers 
outside the United States to lend insights on matters of international interest. 
> RAND's acclaimed research on strategies to help a Palestinian state 
succeed once a final status accord is reached was briefed to former U.K. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, now Special Envoy for the Quartet on the 
Middle East. 
> Findings from The Beginner's Guide to Nation- Building were briefed 
to the World Bank and the entire staff of the United Nations' 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and NATO distributed copies 
of the report to 50 top staff members on the ground in Afghanistan. 
r RAND Europe's research on detecting fraud and error in the U.K. social 
security system formed the basis of a World Bank distance-learning module 
that is being used to train Bank clients and staff worldwide on social security 
fraud issues. 
The achievements of RAND stem from its development of systems 
analysis. Important contributions are claimed in space systems and the United 
States' space program, in computing and in artificial intelligence. RAND 
researchers developed many of the principles that were used to build the 
Internet. Numerous analytical techniques were invented at RAND, including 
dynamic programming, game theory, the Delphi method, linear programming, 
systems analysis, and exploratory modeling. RAND also pioneered the 
development and use of war gaming. 
RAND operates three DOD-sponsored, federally funded research and 
development centers (FFRDCs). FFRDCs are research programs operated by 
private non-profit (non-commercial) organizations under long-term contracts. 
The\' develop and maintain essential expertise and capabilities important to 
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their sponsors and operate in the public interest, free from real or perceived 
79 
conflicts of interest. 
RAND's creation enabled the Air Force to retain and extend the 
considerable civilian scientific contributions during World War II. As part of a 
larger program of research on air power at RAND, the Air Force seeded the 
development of a path breaking analytical effort aimed at understanding the 
Soviet Union. Some of RAND's research addressed the development of Soviet 
strategy, doctrine, and military systems. The Air Force also requested analyses 
of the Soviet economy, foreign policy, science and technology programs, 
among many other topics. Soon the Air Force, and then the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, turned to RAND for research on China, Eastern Europe, 
.Japan. Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Western Europe. 
Although smaller in scale than the analyses of the Soviet Union, these studies 
also provided the Air Force — and through RAND's widely-disseminated 
published reports, the rest of the U.S. government and the public — with an 
independent body of research on a broad range of topics. These included 
economic strength, militar}' capabilities, insurgencies, hegemonic intentions, 
and leadership succession possibilities in many nations and regions around the 
world. ^ ° 
In fact RAND is doing an increasing amount of work for governments 
around the world. The pattern of detailed country studies and broader regional 
analyses has been especially effective in work on Europe. RAND has a 
substantial presence in Europe, with three offices and research programs in 
both defense and non-defense fields. A series of analyses of conventional arms 
control using advanced combat models, and of the related question of limits on 
air power, had substantial influence on the U.S. position and ultimately on the 
resulting Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moreover, much of the 
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early thinking about the rationale for alternative paths toward NATO expansion 
was done at RAND and other think tanks. 
Over time, RAND developed complementary lines of research for the 
Ann\. as well as for other federal clients such as the intelligence community. 
And the DOD steadily increased the number and diversity of its external 
sources of research, also using others in the growing world of "think tanks" 
such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Enterprise Institute. 
and the Brookings Institution. 
RAND's federally funded research and development centers have a 
special role in helping to meet the research and analysis needs of their DOD 
sponsors. The FFRDCs are: Project AIR FORCE; the Army's Arroyo Center; 
and the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which primarily serves 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense 
agencies. Each of these centers conducts a broad, integrated program of 
research that addresses emerging security needs and their implications for the 
sponsoring organizations; the development of new strategies, doctrines, tactics, 
and concepts of operations: the application of new technologies; and issues 
related to logistics, manpower, training, personnel, health care, and systems 
acquisition. ' 
For each FFRDC, RAND commits to developing and maintaining a set 
of specified, "core capabilities." This is all done with close familiarity with the 
structure, doctrine, operations, and personalities of the sponsoring 
organizations. Indeed, one of the strengths of FFRDCs, whether operated by 
RAND or other non-profit entities, is their stability and long term, strategic, 
and close-in relationship with their military or OSD sponsors. 
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The research agenda-setting process is an iterative one that begins with 
the development of a long-term research plan that is revised annually. 
Continuous discussions between RAND research leaders and general officers 
or civilians of comparable rank enable RAND to develop an annual research 
program of individual studies, which is then approved by a high-level advisory 
board. In the case of Project AIR FORCE and the Arroyo Center, the advisory 
boards are chaired by the services' vice chiefs of staff; in the case of NDRI, the 
chair is the principal deputy under secretar}' of defense for acquisition, 
technology, and logistics. Individual studies are typically commissioned by one 
or more senior officers or officials, who help shape the scope, phasing, and 
timetable of the research — providing comments, suggestions, and critiques 
along the way. 
Think tanks are now called upon to contribute to a new challenge: the 
emergence of terrorism as a worldwide threat and of homeland security as a 
national priority of the highest order. RAND researchers have been studying 
terrorism for more than 30 years, and are today helping the United States 
government develop a comprehensive analytical approach to defend against 
terrorist attacks. Bigger bombs, better guns, and new weapons systems alone 
are not enough to defeat terrorists, who operate far from traditional battlefields. 
America also need a better understanding of who terrorists are, how they 
operate, what motivates them, and what can be done to stop them from 
expanding their ranks. RAND's research and analysis is playing an important 
role in helping to improve government policy and decision-making in these 
vital areas. ^^  
Think tanks that work with defense and intelligence agencies once focused exclusively on 
regional and functional topics, but these organizations are now also being called upon to 
help the military address the new challenge of terrorism and homeland security, says 
RAND Executive Vice President Michael D. Rich. RAND researchers, who have been 
studying terrorism for more than 30 years, are now helping decision-makers develop a 
comprehensive analytical approach to defending against terrorist attacks and, at the same 
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time, they are doing an increasing amount of research on other issues for governments 
around the world." 
Current areas of expertise include: child policy, civil and criminal 
Justice, education, environment and energy, health, international policy, labor 
markets, national security, infrastructure, energy, environment, corporate 
governance, economic development, intelligence policy, long-range planning, 
crisis management and disaster preparation, population and regional studies, 
science and technology, social welfare, terrorism, arts policy, and 
transportation.^^ 
Since the attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the RAND 
FFRDCs - like those of the other FFRDCs operated by other institutions, such 
as the Center for Naval Analyses, that regularly assist the DOD — have been 
called upon by their sponsors to modify their research agendas. The legacy of 
past work and resulting capabiHties, coupled with the flexibihty of the 
institutional arrangements and close working relationships between sponsors 
and researchers, operators, and analysts, have equipped the FFRDCs for these 
new dimensions in the nexus of foreign policy and defense planning. The "old" 
issues haven't gone away, of course. They have simply been joined and 
complicated by the more recent ones. RAND's experts on a broad range of 
national security issues have been helping America's armed forces defend the 
nation for more than 50 years, dealing both with threats that are now part of 
history and with threats that will be on tomorrow's front pages. ^^  
PRACTICE OF INFLUENCE: 
The administration and Congress rely heavily on the think tank 
community for a great deal of analytical input and public policy advice. The 
frequent personnel movement back and forth among the ranks of the 
administration. Congress, and the think tanks ensures that the input is policy 
orientated. In addition to a vast out put of publications, both of advocacy 
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and independent scholarly nature, the think tanks stage a continuous menu 
of conferences, workshops, seminars, and lectures on a wide variety of 
foreign and security policy issues. They provide a common meeting ground 
for frequent interchange of views and networking among policymakers, 
diplomats, legislators, business, academia, media, and the NGO 
community. 
Despite relatively low profile, think tanks affect American foreign 
policy makers in distinct ways. According to Richard N.Hass: 
From the perspective of U.S policy makers, today's think tanks offer five 
principle benefits- they generate " new thinking" among U.S decision makers, 
provide experts to serve in the administration and Congress, give policy- makers a 
venue in which to build shared understanding on policy options, educate U.S 
citizens about the world, and provide third party mediation for parties in 
conflict."" 
(1) The idea Factory: 
Think tanks have played a substantial role in popularizing and 
legitimizing ideas about the role of government and the proper organization 
of society. As one close observer noted as early as 1989, "if there is a new 
politics of ideas in the United States, these organizations (think tanks) are 
certainly the primary participant in it. " 
There greatest impact is generating 'new thinking' that changes the 
way that US decision makers perceive and respond to the world Original 
insights can alter conceptions of U.S. national interests and influence the 
ranking of priorities, provide roadmaps for action mobilise political and 
bureaucratic coalitions, and shape the design of lasting institutions. It is not 
easy, however, to grab the attention of busy policy-makers already 
immersed in information. To do so, think tanks need to exploit multiple 
channels and marketing strategies. Publishing articles, books and occasional 
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papers, appearing regularly on television, op-ed-pages and in newspapers 
interviews, and producing reader-friendly issue briefs, fact-sheets, and web 
pages. Congressional hearings provide another opportunity to influence 
policy choices. Unencumbered by officials positions, think tanks scholars 
can afford to give candid assessments of pressing global challenges and the 
quality of government responses. ^ 
Certain historical junctures present exceptional opportunities to 
inject new thinking into the foreign policy arena. World War II offered one 
such instance. Following the War's outbreak, the Council on Foreign 
Relations launched a massive war and peace studies project to explore the 
desirable foundations of postwar peace. The participants in this effort 
ultimately produced 682 memoranda for the state Department on topics 
ranging from the occupation of Germany to the creation of the United 
Nations. Two years after the end of the war, the Council's marquee Journal, 
Foreign Affairs published an anonymous article on "The source of Soviet 
conduct." The article, which was in fact authored by U.S. diplomat George 
Kennan, helped establish the intellectual foundation for the containment 
policy the United States would pursue for the next four decades. Then in 
1993 Foreign Affairs published Harvard Political Scientist Samuel P. 
Huntington's "The clash of civilizations" a seminal contribution to the 
debate surrounding American foreign policy in the post-cold war era. Since 
September 11, 2001, studies by CSIS, Heritage, and Brooking have all 
contributed to the discussions within the government over the proper 
strategies and organizations needed to confront the terrorist threat at home 
and abroad.^'' 
Presidential Campaigns and transitions are ideal occasions to set the 
foreign policy agenda. As Martin Anderson of the Hoover Institution 
explains, "It is during these times that presidential candidates solicit the 
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advice of a vast number of intellectuals in order to establish policy positions 
on a host of domestic and foreign policy, issues. Presidential candidates 
exchange ideas with policy experts and test them out on the campaign trail. 
lt"s like a national test-marketing strategy." The most celebrated case 
occurred after the 1980 election, when the Regan administration adopted the 
Heritage Foundation's publication, "Mandate for change", as a blueprint for 
governing. Another instance was a 1992 report by HE and the Carnegie 
Endowment proposing an "economic security council". The Clinton 
administration implemented this proposal in creating a National Economic 
Council. ^^Opportunity 08, a project of the Brookings Institution in partnership 
with ABC News, aims to help Presidential candidates and the public focus on 
critical issues facing the nation, providing ideas, policy forums, and 
information on a broad range of domestic and foreign policy questions. 
Providing Talent: 
Besides generating new ideas for senior government officials, think 
tanks provide a steady stream of experts to serve in incoming 
administrations and on congressional staffs. This function is critical in the 
American political system. In other advance democracies, like France or 
Japan, new government can rely on the continuity provided by a large 
professional civil service. In the United States, each transition brings a 
turnover of hundred of mid-level and senior executive branch personnel 
.Think tanks help presidents and cabinet secretaries fill this void. Following 
his election in 1976, Jimmy Carter Staffed his administration with numerous 
individuals from the Brooking Institution and the Council on Foreign 
Relations. Four years later. Ronald Regan turned to other think tanks to 
ser\e as his brain trust. During two terms in office, he drew on 150 
individuals from Heritage, the Hoover Institution, and the American 
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The current Bush Administration has followed a similar pattern in 
staffing the upper echelous of its foreign policy apparatus. Within the state 
Department, senior officials with think tanks backgrounds include the 
Undersecretary for Global Affairs, Paula Dobriansky, previously senior 
Vice-President and director of the Council on Foreign Relations' 
Washington office; the Under secretary for Arms control and international 
security. John R. Bolton, formerly Vice President of AEI, the Assistant 
Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, James Kelly, previously President of 
the Pacific Forum of CSIS, and the Assistant secretary - designate for 
International Organization Affairs, Kim Holmes, formerly Vice President at 
the Heritage Foundation. At the Pentagon, meanwhile, Peter W. Rodman 
assumed his position as Assistant Secretary of Defence for International 
Security Affairs after a stint as director of national security programmes at 
no 
the Nixon center. 
In addition to supplying experts for incoming administrations, think 
tanks provide departing officials with institutional settings in which they can 
share insights gleaned from government service, remain engaged in pressing 
foreign policy debates and consfitute an informal shadow foreign affairs 
establishment. This "revolving door" is unique to the United States, and a 
source of its strength. In most other countries one finds a strict division 
between career government officials and outside analysts. Not so in 
America. Madekine Albright, Colin Powell's Predecessor as Secretary of 
state, once headed the center for National Policy. Her former deputy, Strobe 
Talbott, is now President of the Brooking Institution.^ ^ 
Convening Professional: 
In addition to bring new ideas and experts into government, think 
tanks provide policy-makers with venues in which to build shared 
understanding if not consensus, on policy options among the "foreign policy 
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public", the opinion makers and shapers drawn from across the professions. 
As a rule, no major foreign policy initiative can be sustained unless it enjoys 
a critical base of support within the broad foreign policy community. 
Among think tanks, the non-partisan Council on Foreign Relations has been 
most adept at this convening role, hosting hundreds of meetings annually in 
New York, Washington, and major cities around the country. For U.S. 
officials, events at major think tanks offer non-partisan settings to announce 
new initiatives explain current policy and launched trail balloons. For 
visiting foreign dignitaries, the opportunity to appear before prominent think 
tank audiences provides access to the most influential segments of the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment.'^'^ 
Engaging the Public: 
Even as they convene elites, think tanks, enrich America's broader 
civic culture by educating U.S. citizens, about the nature of the world in 
which they live. The accelerating pace of globalization has made this 
outreach function more important than ever. As the world become more 
integrated, global events and forces are touching the lives of average 
Americans. Whether the issue is ensuring foreign markets for farm exports, 
tracking the spread of infections diseases, protecting U.S. software from 
piracy abroad, ensuring the safety of American tourists overseas, or 
safeguarding our ports against terrorist infiltration, the U.S. public has a 
growing stake in foreign policy. Eighty world Affairs councils, scattered 
around the United states, provide valuable forums in which millions of 
adults and high school students can discuss international events. But formal 
think tanks, too are increasingly engaging U.S. citizens. In 1999, the Aspen 
Institute launched a Global interdependence Initiative, ''a 10-year effort to 
better inform, and more effectively Motivate, public support for forms of 
U.S. International engagement that are appropriate to an interdependent 
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Bridging Differences: 
Finally, think tanks can assume a more active foreign policy role by 
sponsoring sensitive dialogues and providing third party mediation for 
parties in conflicl. As part of its congressional mandate, the US institute of 
peace has long facilitated such informal, "Track 11" negotiations, as well as 
training US officials to mediate long-running disputes. But other, more 
traditional think tanks have also extended their mandates to participate 
actively in preventive diplomacy, conflict management, and conflict 
resolution. Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Carnegie Endowment hosted a 
series of meetings in Washington, bringing together leading South African 
politicians, clergy, businessmen, labour representatives, academics, and 
exiled liberation figures, as well as members of Congress and executive 
branch officials. These gatherings, occurring over eight years, helped 
establish the first dialogue and built understanding on South Africa's future 
during a delicate political transition. Likewise, CSIS has launched projects 
to improve ethnic relations in the former Yugoslavia, to bridge religious-
secular divisions in Israel, and to facilitate Greek-Turkish dialogue.'°^ 
Such unofficial initiatives are delicate undertakings. But they have 
great potential to build peace and reconciliafion in conflict-prone regions 
and war-torn societies, either as a complement to U.S. government efforts or 
as a substitute when an official American presence is impossible. In the 
darkest corners of the world, they can serve as the eyes, the ears, and even 
the conscience of the United States and international community. 
POLICY EFFECTIVENESS: NETWORKS FOR AFFECTING POLICY 
MAKING 
Many think tanks are said to be influential but what is meant by 
influence is invariably imprecise. Conceptual devices such as policy 
communities explain the routes of influence but can not quantify the impact. 
102 lbid.ppA-9 
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Think tanks are 'hidden participants' in policy. Whereas decision 
making in the formal political arenas by political parties, legislature and 
executive is a more transparent process, while think tanks do not have a 
clear, consistent or legally designated route to policy influence, their policy 
entrepreneurship in policy provides informal but haphazard access and 
opportunities for agenda setting. They invest in a gradual, incremental creep 
of new ideas into prevailing thinking. '"''This process is captured in the 
quoted statement by Keynes-
Practical men, who believed themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. 
Madmen in authority who hear voices in the air are distilling their frenzy 
from some academic scriber of a few years back.'°^ 
Think tanks are in the business of developing, refining, repacking, 
and most importantly, marketing ideas. To this end, they employ a number 
of strategies to convey their thoughts to policy makers and to the public. 
These range from testifying before congressional committees and submitting 
editorial pieces to major newspapers, to inviting elected officials to 
participate in think tank sponsored seminars.'°^ 
However, rarely there is a one - to one correspondence between a 
book or a study and a particular policy change. There are numerous 
intervening forces that mediate and alter the impact of research that shroud 
any cause and effect relationship that may exit between policy institutes and 
government decision making. Hence, influence can not be measured. Proof 
of it is elusive and, at best, unreliable. Think tanks indicators such as media 
citations or appearances of staffs before Congress and various committees 
merely signify that think tanks have attracted the attention of the media and 
politicians. It does not demonstrate that the thinking or perceptions of the 
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public or politicians has been influenced or that some policy initiative or 
reform has resulted. Asking the question, 'How do you measure the 
influence of independent policy research institution?' Misses the point. It is 
more important to ask first, what do they do that is relevant, and how?'^^ In 
nut shell, while it is difficult to accurately measure the extent to which think 
tanks influence specific policy decision, it is possible to identify the various 
strategies and channels they rely on to gain access to the corridors of power. 
By doing so, one can begin to observe how and to what extent think tanks 
have become entrenched in Washington's decision making network. 
Think tanks recognise their specific role in the policy making 
process. Some think tanks find that their ufility will be in helping to frame 
the parameters of public debates. This can be accomplished, as several think 
tanks have discovered, by appearing as regular guests on network newscasts 
and political talk shows, publishing articles in newspapers, producing 
documentaries on cable networks, enlisting the support of high level policy 
makers to endorse their publications, and sponsoring public lectures and 
workshops for academics, students, journalists, elected officials, and 
members of the private sectors. If this is the main objective of some think 
tanks, then it is possible to assess their relevance and relafive influence 
during the agenda setting stage of the policy making process. Though labour 
intensive, data on print and broadcast media visibility of think tanks can be 
obtained. In examining the media visibility of think tanks in the United 
States, Kent Weaver and Andrew Rich offer some interesting observations 
about the various factors that may influence a think tank's media profile. 
Among other things, they discovered that the size and location of think tanks 
correlate highly with the amount of media exposure institutions generate. 
Larae think tanks located inside the Beltway receive considerably more 
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coverage in major US newspapers, many of which are based in Washington, 
than smaller think thanks in other parts of the country.'°^ 
Conversely, if some think tanks regard their primary role as 
influencing Congress, a goal acknowledge by Heritage Foundation President, 
Edwin Feulner then the performance indicators they rely on to assess their 
impact and the strategies they employ to improve them, will differ. Convinced 
that scholarly publications alone could not significantly influence the outcome 
of policy debates, the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation 
and other advocacy think-tanks began to develop a variety of marketing and 
lobbying techniques to capture the attention of decision-makers.'°^ 
Competing in the Market Place of Ideas 
Think tanks vary considerably in terms of size and scope, financial 
resources and areas of specialisation, yet they appear to rely on similar 
governmental and nongovernmental channels to enhance their visibility - in 
the policymaking community. However, the various strategies think-tanks 
employ to market their ideas may depend as much on the audience they are 
attempting to reach and the importance they assign to a particular policy issue, 
as on the financial resources they are able to draw on. For instance, the 
Heritage Foundation has repeatedly stated that its main target audience is Con-
gress.'"^ On the other hand, think-tanks, such as the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and the Brookings Institution, which attempt to reach a 
more diverse audience including policy-makers, civil servants, academics and 
university students, assign a much higher priority to producing scholarly 
analyses than to lobbying members of Congress. As a resuh, they allocate a 
considerably higher percentage of their animal budget to research than to 
marketing. 
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Recognising that all think-tanks do not share the same commitment to 
research or the desire to be lured into the political arena, they continue to rely 
on many channels to transmit their ideas to their target audience. While many 
of- these channels can be pursued. Independently and for a variety of purposes, 
think-tanks frequently rely on a combination of them in an attempt to influence 
the content and outcome of key political debates. The 1993 vote in Congress 
o\'er the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
ongoing discussions in Congress and the Executive over health care reform, 
are but two examples of when think-tanks have sought to influence important 
policy issues. It is difficult to measure the extent to which think-tanks, either 
acting alone or in concert with other actors in policy communities, are ably to 
influence specific decisions in the White House and on Capitol Hill. 
Nonetheless, their efforts to inform policy-makers about the implications 
associated with a wide range of issues deserve closer attenfion. 
Although often overlooked, think-tanks appear to make the greatest 
contribution to the development and refinement of ideas during presidential 
elections. As Martin Anderson of the Hoover Institution points out: 
[I]t is during this period that presidential candidates solicit [he advice of 
a vast number of intellectuals in order to establish policy positions on a 
host of domestic and foreign policy issues. Presidential candidates 
exchange ideas with policy experts and test them out on the campaign 
trail. It's like a national test marketing strategy. "^ 
In several recent elections, presidenfial candidates have even publicly 
endorsed blueprints written by think-tanks which outlined the key domestic 
and foreign policy priorities for the incoming administration. 
In addition to participating in campaigns and contributing independent 
studies for candidates to digest, think-tanks depend on a number of other 
strategies to reach decision-makers. Among the most common methods think-
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tanks employ is to invite members of Congress, the Executive, the bureaucracy 
and their staff as well as journalists and other opinion leaders to lunches, 
dinners, seminars and conferences."^ Since think-tanks are constantly 
releasing new studies and discussing ongoing research programs with 
government officials and academics, these forums offer an opportunity for 
scholars from think-tanks to showcase their ideas."^ 
To reinforce their ideas, some think-tanks offer courses on various 
aspects of American politics and invite policy-makers to participate in their 
programs. For instance in 1978, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) 
established the Washington School to educate policy--makers about a wide 
range of foreign and domestic policy issues. According to Scott Powell, an 
ardent critic of the IPS, the organisation created the Washington School to 
provide a forum for IPS scholars to exchange views with policy-makers. '''' 
To facilitate the exchange of ideas between think-tank scholars and 
Washington policy-makers on critical domestic and foreign policy issues, the 
Hoover Institution established the Washington Seminars in 1980 under the 
direction of Associate Director and Senior Fellow Richard T. Burress. 
According to a Hoover Institution memo circulated in February 1990: 
When the seminars first began, one major fact was evident: many of the 
Washington participants had never met before or were only slightly 
acquainted. The significance of this point was illustrated by one partici-
pant who wTOte, 'I found it particularly useftil to come to know some of 
my colleagues from Washington ... a few days together at Stanford did 
wonders for communication among the Senate staff establishment'. "^ 
Since the program started, the Hoover Institution has held over a dozen 
tvvo-day seminars involving approximately 12 to 15 participants. The sem-
inars, which focus on a specific theme, are led by one or two Hoover scholars. 
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Discussions on foreign policy however, are more broad-based. The seminars 
ha\'e been attended by Democratic and Republican members of the House of 
Representatives and Congressional staff members from the House and Senate 
Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Budget, Armed Services, 
Finance. Foreign Affairs. Ways and Means, Intelligence, and the offices of the 
Senate Majority Leader and the House Speaker, Minority Leader and Majority 
Whip.'^ « 
The seminars are usually followed up by meetings in Washington to 
bring together individuals who have participated in the program, Hoover 
scholars and other government officials. According to the Hoover Institution, 
'these meetings and seminars are now playing a critical role in the ongoing 
dialogue between scholars and policy-makers, which is so important to the 
effective development and implementation of legislative and executive 
department policies and programs'. ' 
By presenting lectures at universities; professional and trade associa-
tions, government seminars and policy research institutions, think-tank 
scholars can also showcase their own ideas. As Howard Wiarda, former 
Director of the Center for Hemispheric Studies at the American Enterprise 
Institute points out, 'at some future time when a policy-maker is looking for 
someone to give him advice, he [may] call on the speaker he heard at one of 
these forums'. " 
Gaining access to various media outlets also provides members of think-
tanks with an opportunity to transmit their ideas to policy-makers and to 
impress potential donors. By appearing as regular guests on network newscasts 
and a host of political talk shows, think-tank analysts are not only able to 
enhance their exposure but that of the institutions they represent. 
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According to Dr N. Glenn Campbell, former director of the Hoover 
Institution, think-tanks encourage their scholars to submit op-ed articles to 
prominent American newspapers on a regular basis. He states: 
In addition to books, a program has been devised to get these ideas 
before the general public in a timely fashion in daily newspapers 
throughout the country. We urge scholars to extend their writing beyond 
books and professional journals into the general public arena. Research 
results in the form of short essays written by scholars are sent to news-
papers for publication on the page opposite the editorial page.'^ ^ 
During their annual fund-raising campaigns, directors of think-tanks 
often approach corporate sponsors armed with statistics on how many opted 
articles were written by their scholars in the past year and the number of times 
their staff members appeared on radio and television talk shows and newscasts. 
The names of their staff who are currently serving in high level government 
positions and former officials who are working in their think-tank are also 
proudly waived before prospective donors. 
Think-tanks are acutely aware of the importance of attracting funding. 
However, at the same time, they cannot afford to ignore the needs of 'policy-
makers, the primary consumers of think-tank knowledge. Since scholars in 
think-tanks, unlike academics in universities, are expected to produce timely 
and policy relevant studies, policy-makers are turning increasingly to think-
tanks for information and advice. Realising this, some think-tanks have taken 
additional steps to capture and maintain their attention. 
The American Enterprise Institute was the first think-tank to recognize 
the importance of providing succinct and informative analyses to policymakers. 
Yet. few organisations have been as successfiil in this regard as the Heritage 
Foundation, the quintessential advocacy think-tank. Specialising in 'quick 
response' public policy research, the Heritage Foundation can provide each 
124 W. Glenn Campbell, 'The Role of Think Tanks in Public Policy; An Address to the Tuesday 
Morning Forum, Los Altos, California, 4 April, 1989, p.6 
125 Donald E. Abelson , n. HI, p.69 
126 Ibid., p.69 
193 
member of Congress and the Executive with hand-delivered executive 
summaries of current public policy issues within 24 hours. In their one to two 
page Executive Memoranda, researchers at the Heritage Foundation outline 
^^ 'hat they consider to be critical information on issues being considered on 
Capitol Hill and in the White House. As the Heritage Foundation points out in 
its J990 Annual Report, our 'entire communications' strategy is based on a 
simple premise: that policy-makers usually don't have the time to wade through 
and interpret long, complex books and reports, let alone much of the legislation 
they're being asked to vote on'. '"^Since the Heritage Foundation admits that its 
premise role is to influence the Washington public policy community, '^ i^t is 
not surprising that it inundates members of Congress and Executive with its 
policy views, In addition to the Executive Memoranda, the Heritage 
Foundation distributes several other brief reports to inform and educate policy-
makers. ^'^ 
In the process of increasing their exposure in the policy-making 
community by relying on the aforementioned channels, think-tank scholars are 
able to establish valuable contacts throughout government. The presence of 
former high-level officials at think-tanks also plays a pivotal role in facilitating 
access to key decision-makers. As former Secretary of State George Shultz 
notes, 'a prominent political person around a think-tank opens up multiple 
channels for think-tank specialists'.'^' Placing the names of former high level 
decision-makers on their institutional letterhead also helps think-tanks attract 
research funding. '^ ^ 
There are several examples of former government officials who have 
sought refuge in or returned to think-tanks after leaving public office. For 
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instance, following his defeat in 1976, President Ford established an affiliation 
with the American Enterprise Institute. Similarly, after completing her 
responsibilities as US Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick 
returned to AEI. Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also joined AEI 
after President Bush's election defeat. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's 
National Security Adviser, accepted a position at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, in 1980, joining other such luminaries as Henry 
Kissinger, Harold Brown, Admiral William Crowe and James Schlesinger. 
Following the completion of their responsibilities in the Reagan administration. 
Secretary of State Shultz took up residence at the Hoover Institution, while his 
colleagues, Richard V. Allen, William Bennett, Jack Kemp and Edwin Meese 
accepted positions at the Heritage Foundation. Meese and Richard V. Allen, 
President Reagan's first National Security Adviser, who now heads his own 
Washington, DC consulting firm, also maintain an affiliation with the Hoover 
Institution. Some prominent decision-makers in the Bush administrafion have 
also established close ties to think-tanks. For instance, following his election 
defeat. Vice President Dan Quayle discovered that the Hudson Institute in 
Indianapolis, Indiana provided him with a congenial environment to 
contemplate his political future. " 
Given the amount of expertise available at these and other think tanks, it 
is not surprising policy-makers frequently turn to them for advice. And in 
exchange for providing their insight on important policy questions, think-tank 
scholars are rewarded in a number of ways. On some occasions, they are 
invited as experts to testify on a wide range of topics before committees and 
subcommittees of Congress. For instance in 1991, 46 members from the 
Brookings Institution, 18 members from the American Enterprise Institute and 
16 members from the Economic Strategy Institute testified before 
congressional committees. ' Appearing before congressional committees and 
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subcommittees provides think-tank scholars with an important channel through 
Avhich to comment directly on proposed legislation. It also allows some think-
tanks to establish greater credibility in the eyes of decision-makers. '^ ^ 
Moreover, thmk-tanks serve as 'prime recruiting grounds for new 
government talent'.'"' As Kent Weaver notes, incoming administrations fre-
quently turn to research institutions to fill vacant posts. He writes: 
Think-tanks' role as a supplier of personnel to government is in large 
measure a result of the permeability of administrative elites. Unlike in 
most parliamentary systems, cabinet ministers in the United States are not 
drawn exclusively from parliamentary caucuses, and senior department 
officials are not drawn primarily from the public service. There are 
multiple paths to such government posts, a lot of posts to be filled 
whenever an administration changes, and a lot of ex-government officials 
who cycle out of government service but want to remain involved in 
policy formation. Think-tanks fit naturally into this system in the United 
States. "^ 
Both the Carter and Reagan administrations relied extensively on think 
tank scholars to fill high-level posts. As noted, President Carter recruited 
dozens of members from the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Brookings Institution and a handful of other 'liberal' think tanks 
to ser\'e in his administration. President Reagan on the other hand drew heavily 
on the talent pool of scholars available at more conservative think-tanks such as 
the Hoover Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Center for 
Strategic and Intemafional Studies, the Committee on the Present Danger and 
the Heritage Foundation to implement his Conservation agenda. During and 
after his 1992 campaign victory, President Clinton also tapped into the 
expertise available at some Washington, DC think-tanks. He invited a number 
of scholars affiliated with a group of Washington-based think-tanks, including 
the Progressive Policy Institute and the Economic Policy Institute, to occupy 
high-level positions in his administration. 
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By serving in the Executive, the bureaucracy or on the staff of con-
gressional committees and subcommittees, think-tank scholars have a unique 
opportunity to contribute to policy development. Instead of simply commenting 
on US foreign policy in a scholarly study, they often find themselves in a 
position to help shape America's role in world affairs. Moreover, once think-
tank scholars accept government posts, they are in a better position to 
recommend their former colleagues for various jobs. " 
Developing and strengthening their ties to government officials is vital 
for think-tanks. Unless they are able to create an extensive network of contacts 
throughout the governmental hierarchy, they will have little input into the 
formulation of policy positions. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
Washington's leading think-tanks devote so much time and effort to building 
alliances with members of Congress and the Executive. 
Ties with government officials 
Think Tanks also recognize the importance of solidifying ties to 
officials in the major institutions responsible for international relations: the 
State Department, the Defence Department and the National Security Council 
(NSC). Obtaining access to the various Presidential advisory boards concerned 
with foreign policy is an additional avenue think tanks rely on to convey their 
ideas. '^ ° 
The State Department does maintain formal ties with several think 
tanks through its diplomats in Residence programme. Between assignments, 
diplomats can take up residence at think tanks to write, conduct research and 
deliver lectures. Diplomats have been assigned to the American Enterprises 
Institutes, the Hoover Institution, the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, the RAND Corporation, the council on Foreign Relations, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International peace and more recently, the Heritage 
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Foundations. '" '^The State Department usually sends diplomats to think tanks to 
conduct research.' ~ 
At the Department of Defence, the views of some research institutions 
are highly valued and acted upon. In a study, the Wizards of Armageddon, 
^Fred Kaplan examines m mtimate detail how, for over three decades, defence 
strategies at the RAND Corporation helped develop America's military 
strategy. Spcialising in the tactics of conventional and nuclear warfare, the 
RAND Corporation, with the assistance and support of Department of Defence 
officials, was in effect able to serve as an extension of the Pentagon.''*'* 
The relationship between the RAND Corporation and the Department 
of Defence reveals that how some contract research institutions have been able 
to obtain a strong foothold in the decision k making process. Defence strategies 
at the RAND Corporation helped develop America's military strategies. 
Specialising in the tactics of conventional and nuclear warfare, the RAND 
Corporation, with the assistance and support of the Department of Defence 
officials, was in effect able to serve as an extension of the Pentagon. The 
Institute for Navel Analysis, the Hudson Institutes and the urban Institute are 
other examples of contract think tanks which have assigned various 
government departments fomiulate policy positions key domestic and foreign 
policy issues.''*^ 
In the white house, members of think tanks have several opportunities 
to contribute to policy development. By participating on the Presidents Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the President's Economic Policy 
Advisory Board (PEPAB), the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB) 
and the President's general Advisory Committee on Arms Control and 
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Disarmament (GAC). think tanks scholars can have a direct impact on the 
foreign policy pursued by the Presidents.'''^ 
By serving on the PFIAB, policy advisors have access to highly 
sensitive informations. They are in a position to provide direct input into 
foreign policy decision made by the President. 
Participating on other advisory boards provides members of the think 
tanks with additional opportunities to become involved in the foreign policy 
making process. The President's Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB), which 
was created by President Ford on the recommendation of the Rockefeller 
commission, afford think tanks scholars such an opportunity. The purpose of 
the three member's board is to monitor the activities of the intelligence 
community and to advice the President as to the legality and propriety of 
intelligence activities. In 1981, President Reagan asked W.Glenn Cambell to 
chair PIOB. Cambell, who was also a member of PIOB, was still serving as 
director of the Hoover Institution at the time of his joint appointment. '""^  
In addition to these, President receives advice on the wide range of 
domestic and foreign economic policies from the President's Economic Policy 
Advisory Board (PEPAB). The idea of establishing the PEPAB was conceived 
by Martin Anderson and modeled after the PFIAB. Convinced that such a body 
could play a valuable role in assiting him implement his economic agenda, 
President Reagan announced the creation of the tvveleve member PEAPAB on 
10 februrary, 1981. Other than Anderson, who serves as the Board's secretary, 
the PEPAB included a number of economist from prominent think tanks, such 
as Arthur Bruns (American Enterprise Institute), Milton Fridman (Hoover 
Institution). Pual McKraken (AEI), Herbert Stein (AEI), and Thomas Sowell 
(Hoover Institution). 
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Through various institutional channels, think tanks have become 
actively involved in the policy making process. Whether by inviting members 
of Congress and Executive to seminars and conferences or by accepting high-
level government or advisory positions, think tanks scholars have establish ties 
to key policy makers. Yet, while think tanks continue to devote considerable 
resources to establishing and strengthening their ties to decision- makers, they 
are relying increasingly on the media to enhance their visibility in the policy 
making community. 
Media and Think Tanks: 
The print and broadcast media in the United States have come depend 
increasingly on a handful of prominent policy specialist to provide succinct and 
informative analyses of important domestic and foreign policy events. Among 
those called upon on a regular basis to share their political insights are 
Secretar}' of State, National Security Adviser to President, Secretary of 
Defence and Ambassador to UN and other States. While these individuals have 
held influential government positions and considered prominent political 
scientist, they share other common attributes. They are affiliated with 
prominent Washington think tanks. '"* 
By relying on policy experts from a number of think tanks to offer 
commentaries on a host of political issues, the media are attempting to provide 
their audience with a more comprehensive understanding of complex political 
issues. Yet, by doing so, they are permitting members of think tanks to gain 
access to important channels through which to influence and shape public 
opinion. While it is often difficult to accurately measure the extent to which 
policy experts can influence and alter public attitude, their willingness to use 
the media to advance the mandate of the organisations they present can be 
disregarded. Although the media can often benefit by soliciting the insight of 
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policy analyst in think tanks, the consequences of this symbiotic relationship 
may be less benign. ^  
The emergence of advocacy think tanks in the late 1960s and early 
1970s has had profound impact on the relationship between policy research 
institution and media. While early research institute were often mention in the 
popular press, the work they conduct and the government officials they advice 
were rarely revealed. ^ However, for many new think tanks, exposing rather 
than concealing their activities has become a preferred method of operation. 
As think tanks become more active participants in the decision-
making process, and as the competitions for corporate ftinding intensified, 
directors of research institutions began to recognise the important role the 
media could play in transforming relatively obscure research organisations into 
prominent players in the policy making community. Rather than simply 
exchanging ideas with learned colleagues in a private board room, think tanks 
began to search for a more divers audience. '^ ^ 
Few think tanks are more acutely aware of the vital role the media can 
play in transmitting their ideas to the American public than Heritage 
Foundation. As the foundation's President, Edwin Feulner, points out, think 
tanks should skillfully advertise their research products, because like, 
manufactured goods must be properly marketed to capture the consumer's 
attentions. '^ "^  It does not matters how many books and studies you produce', 
you have to got market your product [and] get it off the bookshelf'^^ Similarly 
the American Enterprise Institutes, Hoover Institution, Centre for Strategic and 
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151 Deniel Guttman and Barry Wilner. The Shadow Government: The Government Multmullion 
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International Studies and other influential think tanks that recognize the 
importance of attracting media attentions. '^ ^ 
In addition to encouraging its scholars to write op- ed articles for 
prestigious American newspapers and to accept invitations to appear on 
network newscast and political talk shows, on occasion purchased television 
1 en 
time to sponsor programme advocating a political positions. 
It is difficult to ignore the vital contribution policy experts can make to 
increasing public awareness about the political, economic, and social 
dimensions of American domestic and foreign policy. On the other hand, while 
the journalists will continue to rely on policy experts to provide political 
commentaries, they should realise that educating the public is not the sole 
objective of think tanks. 
By becoming more aware of what motivates think tanks in the political 
arena, the American media will be in a better position to determine how and 
\^hat extent the advice of policy experts should be solicited. In additions, by 
acquiring themselves with the ideological orientations of various policy 
research institutions, journalist will be better able to provide their audience 
v i^th a balanced interpretation of political events. Conversely, if the media are 
committed to advance their own political and institutional agenda, they may 
consciously select those experts who will faithfully support their views. In 
other words, the political positions of policy experts, rather than their ability to 
provide an informative and quotable ten second bite, may ultimately determine 
which experts appear regularly on network newscast. 
Although network producers and journalist can limit the access of 
think tanks scholars to \arious media outlets, it is doubtful that when faced 
\Aith the constant pressure of deadlines, they will have the ability and 
\Aillingness to expand their golden Rolodex. As a result, it is unlikely that the 
156 Donald E Abalson, « 77/, p 82 
157 lbid,pr:, 
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small group of policy experts upon which the American media has come to rely 
will quickly disappear.'^ 
The increasing reliance of the media on policy experts will not change 
in the near future. Nor vvill the political motivations of think tanks. On the 
contrary, as policy research institutions continue to proliferate and compete for 
influence and funding in the United States, their desire to gain access to the 
news media will become even more pronounced. However, in the final 
analysis, only the media can determine how much exposure these organisations 
will be granted. '^ ° 
By relying on various governmental and non- governmental channels, 
think tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in the political 
process, have attempted to influence the contents and outcome of major policy 
initiative. The effort of think tanks to become actively involved in the foreign 
policy making process has become a characteristic feature of contemporary 
policy research institutions. Whether on their own or as part of a network of 
organisations sharing similar concerns, think tanks are committed to influence 
the political agenda. By assuming the role lobbyist, many think tanks have 
revealed their primary functions. While some institutions continue to assign the 
highest priority to the advancement of knowledge, other has redefined their role 
in American politics. Rather than remaining disinterested observers of the 
political process, some think tanks have made a concerted effort to become part 
of it. Many think tanks have become more committed to influencing policy 
than to improving it. They are run like businesses whose performances are 
measured on how successful they are in mass marketing their ideas. But think 
tanks that promote a particular ideology, without having the expertise to 
substantiate their views, will not survive in the increasingly competitive 
marketplace of ideas; nor will think tanks that sacrifice scholarship for short-
term public notoriet}'. Only those think tanks that maintain a healthy balance 
159 Ibid., p.90 
160 Ibid, p. 90 
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between scholarship and aggressive salesmanship will remain well entrenched 
in the policy-making process.'^' 
The notion that think tanks exercise political influence is easily 
criticised. Through both formal and informal avenues, think tanks become 
linked to centre of power. However, this potential is limited to policy 
innovation and the dissemination of ideas. There are number of reasons why 
the policy impact of institute is limited. First, outside the formal arenas of 
politics and without large constituencies, think tanks have little political power 
other than the intrinsic persuasiveness of their policy analysis. Most politicians 
and bureaucrats do not have the time or inclinations to read books- length 
studies or even executive summaries. Furthermore, bureaucrats act as 
gatekeepers sifting the information that lands on a minister's desk. They may 
also present it as their own material. On the other hand, they criticise institutes 
for their lack of appreciations of the complexities of policy initiation and 
drafting legislations. Independent research and analysis competes with many 
other sources of advice which often have more direct routes of access to 
decision makers. Indeed, it may be that the end result of the interaction among 
academics, politicians, bureaucrats and other practitioners and experts that 
think tanks so enthusiastically pursue represents no more than the opportunity 
to interact.'^' 
While there are occurrences of think tanks being consulted by 
government, this ad-hoc. Furthermore, political influence may be the result of 
luck or a host of other factors at work. The window of opportunity for think 
tanks may be greatest just before an election and early in the term of a new 
government when political executives are still establishing their priorities and 
think tanks are busy producing transitions documents. While staff of policy 
institutes can be show-n to have a strong desire to influence policy, and while 
some are in positions of authority and have scope for influence, it is not 
161 Donald E. Abelson,/?. / 
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unequivocal evidence that that influence is exerted. The counter factual 
argument can be employed to limited degree. If think tanks are of negligible 
relevance, than they do.'^^ 
Second, the commitment of most institutes to be educational, analytical 
organasation, that adhere to standards of dispassionate and rigorous research 
limits their political activity and erects professional or scholarly standers that 
restricts complete identification with the state, political parties or their sectional 
interests. 
Third, independent policy research institutes are dependent 
organisation. The interest of funders places limits on the autonomy of institutes 
and constrains research agendas. Most of the American institutes are sustained 
in large proportion by foundations. In some, degree institutes are beholden to 
the funding priorities of foundations. Foundations executives and other 
sponsors have the ability to define what are emerging policy agendas and to 
legitimisation particular kinds of professional expertise. ^ ^^  in the interests of 
continued existence and financial viability, institutes need to accommodate 
some of the expectations of Hinders. Institutes are also reliant on the academic 
world for theoretical advances, for scholars to undertake policy analysis with 
these new theoretical insights, and for scholarly regeneration. Furthermore, it is 
the fonnally defined power holders- legislators, bureaucrats, party officials and 
the judiciary - who are responsible for the selection and the persistence of 
ideas in policy and indeed, their incorporation into policy into policy networks. 
In the last, instance, think tanks are dependent on them for recognition and to 
see their policy recommendations implemented.'^^ 
Perhaps the most demanding indictment of contemporary think tanks 
is that they are becoming more like interest groups or are being drawn into 
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164 Ibid., p. 220 
165 Edward Berman , The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on 
American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy ( New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1983) 
205 
interest group circles. This is particularly the case with the "think tanks and do 
tanks". The majority new institutes do not make pretence of scientific, 
dispassionate and objective research and are open about their ideological 
disposition. But they draw a line at declaring an alliance with sectional interests 
in society. Yet, as think tanks become more penalised in conjunction with the 
requirement to be adversarial in advocating policy advice and analysis, they 
appear to be in cahoots with clearly identifiable groups. The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy had good reputation for solid analysis on Middle 
East issues. It also has a clear affinity with the Jewish lobbying Washigton D.C 
and substantial financial support from the Jewish community.'^'' 
There are systematic difficulties faced by think tanks in their 
interaction with government that limit their potential for influence. As they 
operate as 'ginger groups' they can be politically and bureaucratically 
dysfunctional. By elaborating on policy options, increasing the number of 
alternatives and outling possible problems, these policy research bodies 
potentially overload collective decision making process, disrupt established 
programmes, undermine consensus and question the legitimacy of a 
government's chosen policy. They provide the rhetorical weapons for 
opposition groups. Identifying flaws in policies or promoting superior policy 
design does not endear these organisations to politicians or bureaucrats. 
Consequently, 'think tanks are not easy to integrate in to policy making 
system'. They question the accepted and debunk the habitual in 
contradiction to the inbuilt conservatism of bureaucracies. Traditional 
machineries of government are likely to dismiss their contributions to 
policy. Admitting this salience of independent policy research tacitly 
recognizes the flaws in the expertise and authority of bureaucracies. Finally, 
the desire to maintain their independence and distance from government 
166 Dian Stone,;?. 70^, p.221 
167 Ibid., p. 225 
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may result in a self imposed restrain on the impact that mdependent policy 
units can have on policy.'^^ 
There is multiple source of policy advice competing for the 
attention of policy makers. Departmental policy advice, from ministers' 
office, party political advice, political advice from policy units, the 
recommendation of Congressional committees and outside advice are all 
sources of potentially conflicting forms of advice. The favored source of 
advice is subject to a variety of factors such as a leader's personal 
preference to the avenues of access to that leader. Governments can also be 
characterised by closed advice circuits or group think where advisers and 
decision makers share values and policy approaches effectively excluding 
alternatives from consideration. Decision makers do not necessarily have 
time for think tanks research. As Alice Rivlin notes of Brooklyn scholars, 
none of us draft legislation, sit in committee markups, or even talk more 
than sporadically to those who do. President does not call to ask what we 
should do in Middle East? Or how can we balance the budget? Government 
officials do not call -at least not very often. Nor is it the case that the 
decision makers are even aware of think tanks, least of all their current 
research programmes. Further more, the vast growth of think tanks has not 
been replicated with super human abilities in decision makers to read and 
process the information churned out by think tanks and other groups. So, it 
quite different thing to say that think tanks policy recommendation thereby 
percolated into actual policy.'^^ 
It can not be denied that the impact of even the best known think tanks 
on policy is modest. Policy making is mainly driven by interest, not by ideas. 
Despite the absence of proof and criticism, the impact of many institutions in 
helping to forge a consensus on foreign policy has been and remains pervasive. 
Knowledge and ideas are a source of power. The modem state depends on 
168 Dian Stone, « 70-^ , pp 105-106 
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experts whose views on issues can provide the theories and rationale for policy 
legislation. State structures are the dominant but not the only source of policy 
innovations as the there is a need to consult other interests for informations. 
Think tanks seek to provide this kind of information and occasionally play a 
dynamic role in identifying problems. Policy research institutes are most likely 
to inform policy when they are part of an epistemic community, a wider policy 
community or discourse coalition. These analytical frameworks are concerned 
with agenda- setting, networking, research brokerage and the ways in which 
policy actors operate to establish a discourse that frames understanding of 
problems and policy. In particular, institutes help forge common identities and 
shared values among experts and opinion leaders through their conferences, 
workshops and study groups, and thereby help determine the ubiquitous 
climate of opinion. Ideas about networks allow an assessment of think tanks 
influence or effectiveness that gets beyond providing or measuring the input of 
these organisations into a given policy or legislative act. In other words, power 
is not narrowly, conceived as behavioral and observable, but that power is 
structural and operates through exclusion and non-decision making. Through 
both infonnal and formal avenues, think tanks become linked to centres of 
t7 f 
power such as the state or corporate sector. 
Policy institutes are on the margins of government but not in the 
government. There is enormous scope for the investigations of the mechanism 
that connect organisations on the margin of government with the conventional 
structures of government. While the approval of public policy remains with 
elected representatives and appointed officials, governments draw upon outside 
sources of advice and infonnations. Think tanks are shown to be a 
contemporary mode of interaction between the world of scholarship and 
inquiry and the domain of policy- making. In a world where knowledge, 
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information and expertise are burgeonising, think tanks are an increasingly 
important mechanism for fihering and refining such resources in a relevant and 
usable manner. 
The scholars and executive of think tanks act as policy entrepreneurs. 
Think tanks serve three functions: i, they promote ideas by pushing them 
higher on the public agenda, ii. they 'soften up' the system so that when a 
policy winded opens, an epistemic community's ideas meet a receptive 
audience; and iii, they make the critical coupling of problem, policy and 
politics when a window of opportunity open. 
Research brokerage and networking are the primary means by 
which think tanks make ideas matters. Research brokerage is a process of 
conveying social scientific knowledge from universities and research 
organization to the world of politics and decision making. In this process 
think tanks are often conceived as a bridge between academia and decision 
makers. They 'occupy a space in the intellectual life, a society between 
universities, with their preoccupation on teaching and research, and the Civil 
Service with its preoccupation with day to day management of public 
policy." They run by "research brokerage"- people of initiative who build 
institutions where intellectual can work on policy issues- and who could also 
be called; discourse managers. Brokerage also occurs through the training 
and development of staffs. Staffs are required from universities, political 
parties, law firms, interest groups and government. Staffs experience and 
professional interaction is an important facet of communication.'''^ 
Another form of brokerage occurs when policy institutes act as a 
forum for discussion and interaction through conferences, workshops, 
seminars, breakfast and luncheon meetings, television debates, working 
groups and annual dinners- functions that may be ' invite only" or 
members only", closed to the media or open to the interested public. Both 
173 Ibid ,pp.m-\23 
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social functions and the more intensive working environment of seminars 
and meetings serve an intangible purpose of promoting interaction among 
people from diverse backgrounds who would not ordinarily meet but who 
have common interests. Importantly, think tanks provide neutral territory 
where people feel more comfortable and have an opportunity to mingle. 
Academics can meet practitioners, business people can discuss regularly 
policy with bureaucrats, and activists can confront politicians. ''"* 
174 Ibid, p.\26 
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CONCLUSION 
Decision influencers: US foreign policy and think tanks 
In the present study an effort has been made to analyse the domestic 
inputs involved in the fonnulation of American foreign policy. Further, we 
have tried to see what are the objective and issues in American foreign policy 
in which decision makers seek information or think tanks doing research? 
Having this background in mind this study found that in the formulation of 
American foreign policy, the role and responsibilities of the Executive, 
Congress, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department; 
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the decision influencer like public 
opinion. Mass media are clearly defined. However, the role and functions of 
think tanks in the formulations of foreign policy has largely been ignored. 
Think tanks are an increasingly mechanism for refining and presenting 
knowledge and expertise in a relevant and usable manner. Accordingly, one of 
the main objectives of this study was to provide a picture of the independent 
policy research industry in American foreign policy making. A further 
objective was to investigate their policy relevance and the strategies by which 
think tanks hope to sensitize decision makers to change and educate them into 
specific solutions. This study also tries to see how and why many of these 
institutions have cast aside their scholarly objectivity to immerse themselves in 
Washington politics. 
By discussing the growing involvement of think tanks in the policy 
making process and their efforts to shape major foreign policy debates, the 
literature on foreign policy decision- making can be further enhanced. 
Moreover, examining the interaction, which takes place between decision-
makers and members of think tanks, shed additional light on how information 
and advice is transmitted to the highest levels of government. Furthermore, by 
monitoring the career path of think tanks scholars to government posts and of 
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former government officials to prominent think tanks, it is possible to further 
elaborate on the networks of influence, which have emerged between policy 
research institutions and political leaders. 
Foreign policy generally refers to how the government of state acts in 
relation to other states. It can also refer to what government do in relation to 
international organizations, multinational corporations, political and military 
organisations that are not state actors, and sometimes even prominent 
individuals.' 
Academics have sought to describe and explain U.S foreign policy 
through a variety of factors. Some of these factors involved the nature of the 
\vorld faced by the United States as it formulates policy. Other factors relate to 
development and implementation of policy on a regional and global scale. 
Further sources of U.S foreign policy relate to the norms, historical experience, 
ideological preference, and perceptual biases of U.S policy makers and the U.S 
public. The mix and relative power of the interest groups seeking to influence 
U.S policy on any given issue present yet another important determinant of U.S 
foreign policy. Finally, U.S foreign policy is in some ways a product of the 
decision making process." 
The objective of US foreign policy serves first and foremost to 
promote the domestic well being of country. First, the country's domestic well 
being presupposes its physical survival and that of its population. For this 
reason, security of population and territory represents one basic goal of US 
foreign policy. Ensuring the security of the US populations and territory, in 
turn requires that the United States acquire and maintain the capacity to 
identify and contain or eliminate threats that undermine the health and survival 
of the country. Second, the general well- being of the United States as a state 
depends on the continued economic prosperity of its citizens. In the context of 
1 Priya singh. Foreign Policy Making in Israel Domestic Influences (Kolkata; Mulana Abul Kalam 
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foreign policy, prosperity requires the United States to maintain, and where 
possible, promote the creation of international conditions that will allow the 
country and its citizenry to prosper economically. Finally, the US citizenry and 
its leadership have seen themselves as the guardians and promoters of a set of 
moral principles. These include the promotion of democracy and the respect for 
law. Tlirough promoting these principles, the United States has expressed its 
moral \'alues while ensuring its security and prosperity. 
Understanding U.S foreign policy requires not only knowledge of facts 
but also knowledge of process. That is, it is not enough to know names and 
dates, but one must understand the significance of the actors and their place in 
history as well as the implication of this for the present. In order to understand 
better the larger foreign policy making process, one needs to focus on its 
components. Beginning with the centre of foreign policy making the President 
and the executive, this study gradually broadens the scope to other 
governmental forces, and then adds the influence of the American public. 
Finally, included the diverse pluralistic aspect in American society is studied. 
The making of American foreign policy is a complex process. Both the 
legislative and executive branches play important role; the role are different, 
although frequently overlapping. Both branches have continuing opportunities 
to initiate and change foreign policy, and the interaction between them 
continues indefinitely throughout the life of a policy. The President as the chief 
spokesperson of the nation, directs government's officials and machinery in the 
daily conduct of diplomacy, and has the principal responsibility for taking 
action to advance US foreign policy interest. Congress in its oversight 
responsibility can affect the course of policy through enactment of legalisation 
governing foreign relations through the appropriation or denial of funds. 
Experience has shown that cooperation between the two branches is necessary 
for a strona and effective US foreign policy. 
Ibid 
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To cope with the difficuh task of fomiulating foreign poHcy, several 
government organisations were created after World War II. The departments 
such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defence Department, the 
State Department, the Treasury Department, and so forth, as well as the 
executive office of the President (National Advisor and other white house 
staffs). This policy-making machinery enhances United States capacity for 
coping with the complex process of foreign affairs. 
This decentralisation of foreign policy making in the United States 
testifies to America's expanding international concerns, to the interdependency 
of world economies, the growth of political and cultural internationalism, and 
the overlapping of social interests from human rights to the environment, from 
nutrition and health child labor, from the internet to genetic engineering and 
hormonal research. The world has gotten smaller and more complex. As a 
consequence, the pressures and players have multiplied, as has politics. 
American foreign policy since the Spanish - American War of 1898 has 
sought to ensure U.S supremacy in the western Hemisphere. While at the same 
time asserting American influence widely around the globe. Until 1945, U.S 
foreign policy makers sought to fashion the United States into a great power, 
the equal of the major Europeans and contented with the Soviet Union, the 
other so- called super power. In the decade after the Cold War, it stood at apex 
of the international hierarchy. The men and women in charge U.S foreign 
policy have usually based their statecraft on the idea that the United States is in 
a unique position to provide balance and stability to world politics. In an era of 
increasing economic and cultural interdependence, or globalizations, the 
\\ealth. military power, and cultural diversity of the United States has helped 
officials promote the United States was bound to lead. 
There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US 
foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the 
4 Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriejl 
(New York : Routledge, 2002) 
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beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a 
high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force 
structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 
transnational organized crime, and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of 
issues are associated with environment-environmental degradation and 
biodiversity - since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US 
securit}'. These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be 
significant to US foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the 
prosperity of US citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these 
issues are energy, international trade and international financial management. 
Finally, there are wide ranges of issues - sustainable development, pandemic 
disease control, international resource management, and democratisation - that 
are important general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are 
important not only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, 
but also because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country 
has a responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a 
better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by 
US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy 
influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they 
relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy.^ 
Making policies about any particular issue occurs not in a single 
moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a 
series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different 
actors and different types of decisions. In addition to the executive and 
legislative branches of government and the media, there are numerous other 
actors that seek to influence US foreign policy. These include multitudes of 
lobby groups, business interest, trade union, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), think tanks and like.*^  
5 C. HerrickandP.B. McRae,n.2. 
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Knowledge is central aspect of power. In this increasingly complex, 
interdependent and information rich world, government and individual policy 
makers face the common problem of bringing expert knowledge to bear in the 
governmental decisions making. Policy-makers need basic information about 
the world and the societies they govern how current policies are working, 
possible alternatives, and their likely costs and consequences. As a matter of 
fact, in both information rich and poor societies policy makers need 
informations that are understandable, reliable, accessible, and useful. 
The relationship between political leaders and those who advise them is 
critically important to the study of governmental decision-making. By 
providing their expertise to members of Congress, the Executive and the 
bureaucracy, policy advisors play a vital role in formulating and injecting ideas 
into the policy making process. While policy makers in the United States 
continue to solicit the advice of experts in Universities, interest groups, 
professional and business associations, corporations, law firms and consulting 
agencies, they are relying increasingly on scholars from think tanks or policy 
research institutions to identify, develop, shape and at times implement policy 
ideas. Think Tanks are among the most numerous organisational forms devoted 
to policy research, and they are often among the most focused and visible 
sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making. 
Public Policy Research, Analysis and Engagement Organizations (also 
known as Think Tanks) play a vital role in the political and policy arenas at the 
local and national level in the United States. Their fiinction is unique, as they 
provide public policy research, analysis and advice, are non-profit, and operate 
independently from governments and political parties. While the primary 
function of these civil society organizations is to help government understand 
and make informed choices about issues of domestic and international concern, 
the\ also have a number of other critical roles, includmg: 
7 James McGann, 'Think Tank and Policy Advice in the U.S', Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
August 2005 Report,^! 
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> Playing a mediating function between the government and the public that 
helps builds trust and confidence in public officials; 
> Serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; 
Identif}ing, articulating, and evaluating current policy issues, proposals and 
programs; 
r- Transfonning ideas and emerging problems into policy issues; 
r Interpreting issues, events and policies for the electronic and print media 
thus facilitating; 
> Public understanding of domestic and international policy issues; 
> Providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information 
between key stakeholders in the policy formulation process; 
> Facilitating the construction of "issue networks"; 
^ Providing a supply of personnel for the legislative and executive branches 
ofgoveniment; 
r- Challenging the conventional wisdom, standard operating procedures and 
business as usual of bureaucrats and elected officials. 
Among those concentrating on foreign policy, are the Council on 
Foreign Policy; the CFR is non- partisan and regards itself as most prestigious 
and influential think tanks. Its headquarters are in New York. But it has offices 
in Washington D.C and Chicago. The Brooking institution peruses a liberal 
research agenda and hosts regular seminars and working lunches to discuss 
foreign policy issues. The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CISS). is also non- partisan but is regarded as leaning centre right, RAND has 
headquarters in Santa Monica, California and office in Washington D.C. it built 
its reputation in defence policy research for the US air fore but now covers a 
wide range of domestic issues in addition to national security themes. The 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Institute of peace, and the 
Woodrow Wilson centre are leading liberal thinkers with a strong focus on 
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conflict resolution issues. On the right of political spectrum are the American 
Enterprises Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the CATO Institute, and Nixon 
Centre. 
The activities involved in fulfilling these functions involve a balance 
between research, analysis and outreach. The range of activities that think tanks 
engage in. include: framing policy issues, researching and writing books, 
articles, policy briefs and monographs, conducting evaluations of government 
programs: disseminating their research findings and conducting various 
outreach activities (public testimony before congress, media appearances and 
speeches); creating networks and exchanges via workshops, seminars, and 
briefings; and supporting midcareer and senior government officials when they 
are out of office (what it described as a "Human Resource Tank").^ 
Think tanks finance their activities by raising funds from private 
foundations, corporations, individuals and government grants and contracts and 
endowment income. The mix of funding varies from institution to institufion 
but all institutions strive to ha\'e a diversified funding base in order to avoid 
being overly reliant a single funding stream or donor. 
Think tanks are a diverse set of institutions that vary in size, financing, 
structure and scope of acfivity. There are currently well over 1,500 think tanks 
or political research centers in the US, around half of which are university 
affiliated insfitutions and approximately one-third of which are located in 
Washington. DC. Those think tanks that are not affiliated with academic 
institutions, political parties or interest groups are described as freestanding or 
independent think tanks. 
The 25-30 top think tanks in the US have a highly diversified research agenda 
that covers a broad range of policy issues on both the domestic and 
international fronts. Hov/ever, since 1980 the vast majority of think tanks that 
ha\e been established in America are specialized. These "Specialty" or 
8 Cameron Frasser, n 4, pp. 102-5 
9 James McGann, n 7,p.3 
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"Boutique" think tanks focus their activities on a single issue (i.e. global 
warming) or area of public policy (i.e. national security).'° 
Think tanks often play the role of insiders and become an integral part of 
the policy process, such as the RAND Corporation and the Urban Institute, 
which provide research and analysis for key agencies within the government, or 
as outsiders like the Economic Policy Institute and the Heritage Foundation, 
\^hich attempt to get their ideas incorporated into policy by conducting 
research and analysis that is then aggressively marketed to policy elites and the 
public. There is often a clash within these institutions and in the policy 
community between those who believe that think tanks should be "scholarly 
and objective"' and those who feel they must be '"policy relevant" and get their 
research in the hands of policy makers in order to have any value. This is an 
age-old tension between the world of ideas and the world of policy. This 
tension is best expressed by Plato in the Republic when he writes: "There can 
be no good government until philosophers are kings and the king's 
philosophers." The academic oriented school believes that think tanks should 
adhere to academic research standards and focus on big picture and longer term 
issues while the policy relevance school believes that think tanks should be 
more policy oriented and thus focus more on the needs of policy makers and 
current policy issues.^' 
The administrations and Congress rely heavily on the think tanks 
community for a great deal of analytical input and public policy advice. The 
frequent personnel movement backs forth among the ranks of the 
administration, Congress, and the think tanks ensure that the output is policy 
orientated. In addition to a vast out put of publications, both of an advocacy 
and independent scholarly nature, the think tanks stage a continuous iTienu of 
conference, workshops, seminars, and lectures, on a wide variety of foreign and 
security policies issues. They provide a common meeting ground for frequent 
10 Ibicl..p3 
11 lbid.p.3 
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interchange of vievvs and networking among policy makers, diplomats, 
legislators, business, and academia, media and the NGO community.'^ 
The literature on American foreign policy making continues to grow, but 
only recently has the participation of think tanks in the policy formation 
process been discussed. The increasing involvement of think tanks in the policy 
making process requires scholars to reevaluate various models and theories 
developed to explain how leaders make policy decisions. This is not to suggest 
that contemporary theories and models of foreign policy decisions making need 
to be supplemented, but rather that their parameters should be expanded to take 
into consideration how think tanks identify and shape policy issues and 
problems. By treating think tank as an important input into the policy making 
process, instead of passive observers of American politics, foreign policy 
analysts can provide a more detailed explanation of the various actors 
competing for power in the political arena. 
Assessment of policy Research 
Think tanks have a long history of playing an important role in the 
formulation of domestic and international policy in the US. The origins of think 
tanks can be traced to America's Progressive-era traditions of corporate 
philanthropy, its sharp distinction between legislative and executive branches 
of government (which creates few barriers to entry into the policy making 
process), the desire to bring knowledge to bear on governmental decision 
making and inclination to trust the private-sector to "help government think." 
As think tanks have grown in number and stature, scholars and journalists have 
begun to examine more closely the many factors that have led to their 
proliferation, factors that include a: 
12 Cameron Frasser, n 4, p.98 
13 Donald Abelson, Thmk Tanks and their Role in US Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 
pp. 81-90. 
14 James McGann, n. 7, pp. 3-5 
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Division of power between the three branches of government (legislative, 
executive and judicial) and the levels of government (states and federal 
government) 
Political system that has weak political parties that exhibit little or no 
party discipline 
> Highly developed philanthropic and civil culture 
> Public that has a healthy distrust of government and prefers a limited role 
for government 
> Proclivity of citizens to join and support interest groups rather than 
political parties to represent their interest and express their policy 
preferences 
> Political system that has many points of access 
r Tendency to embrace independent experts over politicians or bureaucrats 
Clearly the permeable, decentralized and pluralistic nature of 
American political culture or what some have described as "American 
Exceptionalism" is the driving force behind the growth and diversity present 
among the more than 1,500 think tanks in the US. Think tanks have flourished 
despite the growth in staff in the legislative and executive branches of 
government, which has raised questions about what value they add to the 
thinking being done by the professional bureaucrats and congressional staffers. 
The perception is that think tanks can often do what government bureaucracies 
cannot. Specifically, think tanks are: 
> More effectively future-oriented than government research functionaries, 
who work in an environment in which efforts at creative disruption are 
rarely rewarded; 
^ More likely to generate reconfigured policy agendas, while bureaucracies 
thrive on the security-maximizing environment of standard operating 
procedures; 
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r- And better able to facilitate collaboration among separate groups of 
researchers for a common purpose because they have no permanent vested 
interest in any one domain.'^ 
In addition, think tanks aid the intellectual synthesis that comes from 
breaking down bureaucratic barriers. They are uniquely suited to do this 
because they are: 
> Better able to disseminate relevant policy research within government 
than government agencies themselves, for no jealousies attach to 
proprietary rights: 
> And better able to "telescope" the policy function (i.e., from data 
collection to knowledge to conceiving means of implementation) than 
government bureaucracies, which may be internally segmented along such 
lines.'^ 
Yet, despite their appeal, on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of 
think tanks is among the most important and least appreciated. A distinctively 
American phenomenon, the independent policy research institution has shaped 
U.S. global engagement for nearly 100 years. But because think tanks conduct 
much of their work outside the media spotlight, they gamer less attention than 
other sources of U.S. policy — like the jostling of interest groups, the 
maneuvering between political parties, and the rivalry among branches of 
government. 
Policy impact is a difficult task from the margins. Think tanks are not 
part of government processes. It is impossible to establish a causal link 
between the activities of think tanks and policy outcomes. A particular policy 
and its implementation can rarely be attributed to the influence of once 
oraanization. There are variety of intermediary forces such as political parties, 
15 Ihid, pp. 3-5 
16 Ihid, pp. 3-5 
17 Richard Hass, "Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy : A Policy Makers Perspective", US Foreign 
Polic\' Agenda, International Information Programme, Electronic Journal of the US Department of 
States, 7(3) November, 2002, p. 173, 
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bureaucracies, interest group and the media. Furthermore, think tanks are not 
successful in all their activities or at all stages of the policy process. They have 
selective impact according to issue and circumstances, and are involved more 
in the innovation and diffusion of policy ideas than their adoption or 
implementation by the government. The complexities of the making process 
create a gap between the inputs of policy institutes and the outputs of policy 
making. It could also mean that think tanks have zero impact. This hiatus 
prevents measurement of their impact.^^ 
Moreover, rarely is there a one to one correspondence between a book or 
a study and a particular policy change. There are numerous intervening forces 
that mediate and alter the impact of research that shroud any cause and effect 
relationship that may exist between policy institutes and government decision-
making. Hence, influence can not be measured. Proof of it is elusive and, at 
best, anecdotal. Think tanks indicators such as media citations or appearances 
of staffs before Congress and committees merely signify that think tanks have 
attracted the attentions of the media and politicians. It does not demonstrate 
that the thinking or perceptions of the public or politicians has been influenced 
or that some policy initiative or reform has resulted. Asking the question, 'How 
do you measure the influence of independent policy research institutes,? Misses 
the point. It is more important to ask first, 'what do they do that is policy 
relevant, and how?'^ 
The principal task of the large US think tanks is to generate policy 
relevant knowledge and provide information for political and business elites as 
well as the public at large. Over the last 20 years think tanks have placed 
increasing emphasis on disseminating their research, appearing in the media 
and conducting public outreach programs. Think tanks often employ 
professionals with experience in marketing and public relations in order to 
facilitate the dissemination of information. Think tanks employ a wide range of 
18 Stone. Diane, Capturing the Political Imagination Think Tanks and the Pohcy Process, Frank 
Cass Publication, 2002., p.4 
19 /W,p,238 
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methods to accomplish the vital goal of effectively propagating information, 
including: 
a) Seminars, Conferences and Briefings: Think tanks make a conscious effort 
to target their audience with a range of lectures, seminars, conferences, expert 
meetings, and individual or group briefings. The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), for example, reports that it stages around 700 
events of this kind ever}' year, and the annual report of the AEI generally lists 
200 such occasions."^ 
b) Publications: As a rule, the large US think tanks also operate as highly 
productive publishing houses, generating both traditional and, increasingly, 
multimedia publications. In addition to numerous print publications (e.g., 
Brookings stages press conferences and readings to launch new publications), 
each think tank today also publishes its very own high-quality journal or 
magazine several times a year (e.g., the Cato Journal appears three times a 
year, and The American Enterprise every two months). Such publications also 
carry work by external analysts and academics (e.g.. Foreign Policy from the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, or Foreign Affairs from the 
Council on Foreign Relations). Similarly, institutions often also print a number 
of quickly and easily produced newsletters and information brochures as well 
as policy briefs on individual topics. Finally, some think tanks provide special 
information services via fax or e-mail, which comment on the day's political 
and economic developments. Such daily analyses are often sent free of charge 
to members of Congress, government representatives, and top business 
executives. 
One of the most important tools for any think tank is its website. Today, 
almost every think tank publishes an extensive range of information online, 
which serves to reach the public at large. Most think tank websites also carry 
speeches, commentaries by the fellows, conference reports and programs. 
20 James McGann, n. 7, pp. n. 4-7 
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synoptic analyses, book abstracts, biographies of their experts, information on 
events and. increasingly, video and audio clips, all of which can be downloaded 
free of charge. At the same time, a website will publish information on research 
topics, research programs, and the think tank's organizational structure. It will 
also provides details for contacting specific institution members and offers 
information for those who wish to apply as visiting fellows, general employees, 
or interns (e.g. the AEI employs almost 100 interns each year). 
c) The media: Journalists looking to fill column inches or program slots profit 
from the expertise of think tank employees. In turn, the think tank and the 
expert concerned gain a wide forum for the opinion expressed - and sometimes 
even certain renown as a result of the direct media exposure. Think tank 
analysts are quoted as experts in the print media and appear on television and 
radio news programs as well as on talk shows. Numerous think tank experts 
regularly publish their work, sometimes in their very own newspaper columns, 
but mostly in the form of op-ed pieces. The large number of online political 
magazines also represents an increasingly important forum for publication of 
such contributions. Similarly, other forms of electronic media are also playing 
an increasingly important role for presenting both the think tank itself and its 
employees. The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, for 
example, has a regular radio program called "Dialogue,"* which is broadcast by 
more than 200 stations and already has around 200,000 listeners. The 
Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation both have their own TV 
studios and two think tank experts from the AEI each have their very own 
weekly show broadcast by the US public television station PBS. Many of their 
think tank colleagues appear several times a week as regular political 
commentators on CNN and other cable channels. 
d) Relations with government agencies: The US think tanks are particularly 
concerned with maintaining lines of communication to members of Congress 
21 /ft/ci., pp. 4-7 
22 /6;a'.,pp. 4-7 
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and their staff, administration officials, federal judges, and representatives from 
state and local bodies. Think tank experts regularly testify at Congressional 
hearings and also hold individual briefings for members of Congress and the 
administration as well as their staff. In turn, government officials and members 
of Congress are invited to speak at think tank events, which provide them with 
opportunities to test out political ideas or initiatives on "neutral ground" in 
front of an audience of experts. A number of the major think tanks also stage 
regular meetings and discussion forums in an effort to develop formal networks 
with government representatives. For example, the Council on Foreign 
Relations has a Congress and US Foreign Policy Program, which brings 
together Congressional staff members from both major parties. Additionally, 
members of Congress also serve on the board of directors of numerous US 
think tanks. Some US think tanks purposely cultivate close links to political 
circles, since many of them — most notably the RAND Corporation and the 
Urban Institute — obtain a significant portion of their budget from contract 
work (research projects, producing studies, preparatory work for legislation) 
for various US government agencies. ^ 
It can not be denied that the impact of even the best known think tanks 
on policy is modest. Policy making is mainly driven by interest, not by ideas. 
Despite the absence of proof and criticism, the impact of many institutions in 
helping to forge a consensus on foreign policy has been and remains pervasive. 
Knowledge and ideas are a source of power. The modem state depends on 
experts whose views on issues can provide the theories and rationale for policy 
legislation. State structures are the dominant but not the only source of policy 
innovations as the there is a need to consult other interests for informations. 
Think tanks seek to provide this kind of information and occasionally play a 
dynamic role in identifying problems. Policy research institutes are most likely 
to inform policy when they are part of an epistemic community, a wider policy 
communitv or discourse coalition. These analytical frameworks are concerned 
23 Ibid.,pp. 4-1 
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with agenda- setting, networking, research brokerage and the ways in which 
policy actors operate to establish a discourse that frames understanding of 
problems and policy. In particular, institutes help forge common identities and 
shared values among experts and opinion leaders through their conferences, 
workshops and study groups, and thereby help determine the ubiquitous 
climate of opinion. Ideas about networks allow an assessment of think tanks 
influence or effectiveness that gets beyond providing or measuring the input of 
these organisations into a given policy or legislative act. In other words, power 
is not narrowly, conceived as behavioral and observable, but that power is 
structural and operates through exclusion and non-decision making.^ '* Through 
both informal and formal avenues, think tanks become linked to centres of 
power such as the state or corporate sector. ^ ^ 
Given the extensive ties between think tanks and government 
departments and agencies, as well as the frequency with which their 
members are appointed to higher level government positions, one cannot 
afford to disagree their growing involvement in the policy-making process. 
Through publishing brief and full length studies on a wide range of policy 
issues inviting decision-makers to conferences and seminars, providing 
commentaries on network newscasts, establishing liaison offices to develop 
and maintain contact with members of congress and the Executive, serving 
on various Presidential boards, commissions, election task forces and 
transition teams and giving testimony before congressional committees and 
subcommittees, think-tanks have become permanent fixtures in the policy 
formation process."^ Though not generally considered to be part of the 
formal structure of the American government for decades think tanks have 
managed to operate effectively within its parameters. 
24 James Smith. Strategic Calling The Centre For Strategic and International Studies, 1962-92 
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Policy institutes are on the margins of government but not in the 
government. There is enormous scope for the investigations of the mechanism 
that connect organisations on the margin of government with the conventional 
structures of government. While the approval of public policy remains with 
elected representatives and appointed officials, governments draw upon outside 
sources of advice and informations. Think tanks are shown to be a 
contemporary mode of interaction between the world of scholarship and 
inquiry and the domain of policy- making. In a world where knowledge, 
information and expertise are burgeonising, think tanks are an increasingly 
important mechanism for filtering and refining such resources in a relevant and 
usable manner. 
Yet. despite their appeal, only a fraction of the esfimated 1,500 think tanks 
in the United States have made their presence felt in key policy-making circles. 
The Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, the American Enterprise Institute, Rand, 
and the Heritage Foundation, among others, are frequently referred to in the 
media. 
In the last twenty years, think tanks have undergone major changes. From 
institutions committed to scholarly research to organizations largely engage in 
political advocacy, think tanks have redefined their mission in American 
politics. Should the trend towards political advocacy continue, the type of think 
tanks that were created in the early twentieth century would gradually cease to 
exist? Taking their place will be political research organizations specialising in 
lobbying members of Congress, the Executive and the bureaucracy. 
While policy- makers are often drawn to the Brooking Institution, the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the RAND Corporation Institufion and the 
number of other research institutions because of their expertise in a particular 
era. some think tanks have had to employ aggressive marketing and lobbying 
Ibid., p\) A-2 
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strategy to capture the attention of decision - makers. As hundreds of think 
tanks emerged in around the Washington during and after the World War II, 
pohcy research institutions devoted considerable resources to determining the 
most effective methods to reach decision makers. 
In the early 1900s, it is doubtful that this question would have been posed. 
In establishing their think tanks, Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie and 
Herbert Hoover, among others, made a concerted effort to insulate their 
institutions from partisan politics. Recognizing that the pursuit of scholarly 
inquiry had to be protected from political interest, founders of early twentieth 
century think tanks sought to safeguard their institutions from the vicissitudes 
of American politics. Although the Brooking Institution, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, and other think tanks created in the 
progressive era provided decision- makers with advice on various public policy 
issues, their primary objective was not to impose their political and ideological 
agenda on the American public, but to enhance the economic and political 
interest of the United States.'' 
However, while few observers of American politics may have 
pondered such a question in the first half of the twentieth century, it has 
become a legitimate and important question to ask in light of the changing role 
of think tanks in the United States. Encouraged by the meteoric success of the 
Heritage Foundation in capturing the attention of the Regan administrations, 
advocacy think tanks began to take root in and around the nation's capital. 
Convinced that scholarly publications alone would not persuade members of 
Congress and the Executive to implement their policy ideas, the Heritage and 
other advocacy think tanks began to rely on several strategies to influence the 
content and outcome of major policy debates. Moreover, as the number of think 
tanks entering the marketplace of ideas increased, so too did the competition 
29 Donald Abelson, n. 13, p. 
30 Ibid. 
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between them to attract the attention of decision- makers and the contributions 
of potential donors. ^ 
By relying on various governmental and non- governmental channels, 
think tanks, either acting alone or in concert with other actors in the political 
process, have attempted to influence the contents and outcome of major policy 
initiative. The effort of think tanks to become actively involved in the foreign 
policy making process has become a characteristic feature of contemporary 
policy research institutions. Whether on their own or as part of a network of 
organisations sharing similar concerns, think tanks are committed to influence 
the political agenda. By assuming the role lobbyist, many think tanks have 
revealed their primary functions. While some institutions continue to assign the 
highest priority to the advancement of knowledge, other has redefined their role 
in American politics. Rather than remaining disinterested observers of the 
political process, some think tanks have made a concerted effort to become part 
of it. Many think tanks have become more committed to influencing policy 
than to improving it. They are run like businesses whose performances are 
measured on how successful they are in mass marketing their ideas. But think 
tanks that promote a particular ideology, without having the expertise to 
substantiate their views, will not survive in the increasingly competitive 
marketplace of ideas; nor will think tanks that sacrifice scholarship for short-
term public notoriety. Only those think tanks that maintain a healthy balance 
between scholarship and aggressive salesmanship will remain well entrenched 
in the policy-making process. 
Ibid. 
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